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Accountability has become a prominent theme in the conversation around how 
international development agencies can best achieve their goals in an effective 
and ethical manner, and how they should seek to engage with their 
stakeholders. There is a growing consensus that what accountability looks like 
and how it is achieved varies significantly according to context, shaped by who 
the actors are, where they are working, and the nature of the intervention. This 
thesis presents an original, empirical study of accountability discourse and 
practice by focusing new attention on the global microfinance sector. Debates 
and controversies about the capacity of microfinance to reduce poverty in the 
‘global south’ are pervasive, and, I assert, issues of accountability. I explore 
these issues through the questions I pose in this thesis of, for what are 
microfinance organisations accountable, to whom, and how? 
Through the in-depth, qualitative case study of one microfinance 
institution, Cloud Loan, this thesis extends our understanding of accountability 
and microfinance. Tracing day to day operations, interactions, and decision 
making from Cloud Loan’s headquarters in London to field offices in Malawi, the 
thesis argues that mechanisms of accountability are being co-opted to serve a 
performative role, in ways that legitimise rather than challenge existing 
practices and behaviours in the microfinance sector.  
As the thesis shows, microfinance organisations have come to hold 
themselves accountable for maximising income and keeping costs low, and often 
prioritise these ambitions above stated goals of social impact. Appeals to 
supporters and donors are predicated upon a lack of transparency: accounts are 
carefully constructed and selective, and key information is systematically 
withheld to create an appealing and expected narrative. Constructing and 
maintaining such artifice, as well as narratives of accountability, I argue, have 
come to occupy extraordinary time and resources, often diverting funds from 
alternative uses that are potentially more beneficial to those in whose name 
microfinance organisations operate.  
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The thesis also argues that this lack of transparency cuts deeper and 
more widely across the Malawian microfinance sector, underpinning a culture of 
secrecy, conducive to inefficiency, and fraud. Such findings raise important 
concerns about whether microfinance interventions reflect the will and 
preferences of those in whose name they are being undertaken, and whether 
participating communities are being adequately protected. Beyond Malawi, this 
thesis offers an important reminder that – despite new forms of accountability - 
the logic and practice of global microfinance continues to demand critical 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and 
Methodology 
Introduction 
In her 2002 Reith Lectures, under the title of ‘A Question of Trust’, the 
philosopher Onora O’Neill set out to explore the prevalence of discourse on 
accountability in the modern world, and assertions around the benefits that it can 
bring to society. Whatever the issue encountered, she explained, accountability 
has been pitched as a simple, catch-all remedy, making individuals and 
organisations more honest, more effective, and just better. Responding to the 
lecture, John Inge of Ely Cathedral reflected that, “It seems to me that 
accountability has…become something of an idol, and is a god to which most in 
our society are obliged to pay homage” (O’Neill, 2002a). Such veneration of 
accountability has been replicated too by influential actors and initiatives in the 
international development sector. In the 2011 DFID 'Humanitarian Emergency 
Response Review' (HERR), for example, as in the 2005 Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness, and 2008 Accra Agenda for Action, accountability is framed as a 
necessary precursor for effective aid, with the former observing that,  
“we need to increase transparency and accountability towards both 
donor and host country populations. Far from being burdensome, this 
is in fact a precondition for the improvements we want to see in terms 
of value for money and impact." (DFID, 2011: 4).   
But what does ‘being accountable’ look like? As Fox articulates, accountability is 
a malleable concept that can mean all things to all people (Fox, 2007). 
Furthermore, as authors such as Lewis & Mosse (2006), Walsh (2014), and 
Unerman & O’Dwyer (2006) emphasise, accountability is inherently context 
specific, with the desirability and effectiveness of various tools and processes 
being dependent on myriad features and dynamics of particular interventions and 
organisations (Ebrahim, 2003; Dixon et al, 2006). To understand accountability, 
therefore, one must look beyond universal claims and protocols, and consider how 
accountability is manifested and experienced in particular contexts (Gray, 2002; 
O’Dwyer, 2005). Despite the attention that the subject has received at a broad 
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scale, however, there remains a lack of empirical study and evidence on the reality 
of accountability, with studies of accountability in microfinance being particularly 
underrepresented in the existing research and literature (Dixon et al, 2006; 
Bongasu, 2015; Hartarska, 2005). In this thesis, I address this imbalance, 
exploring the internal workings of a microfinance organisation, and offering an 
investigation into accountability in microfinance. In so doing, I am able to offer 
insight on how key debates and criticisms of microfinance, much discussed at the 
macro scale by the likes of Milford Bateman (2010), are manifested and 
perpetuated by internal practice and dynamics, and everyday interactions. I have 
similarly been able to reflect on the influence of internal relationships on wider 
accountability and effectiveness, and as I argue in this thesis, this is a vital and 
influential area for consideration when studying or practicing accountability.  
Structure of this Chapter 
In this introductory Chapter I will introduce and contextualise my research 
questions, and review my research design process and methodology. This 
chapter also provides context for the later chapters, giving an overview of the 
evolution of microfinance in Malawi, and an introduction to my case study. A 
summary of the structure of this thesis and the content of subsequent chapters 
is also presented. 
Research Questions  
My ambition for this research was to understand accountability in microfinance, 
pursuant to which, the central question that I sought to answer was, ‘How is 
accountability manifested and enacted in the Malawian microfinance sector?’ 
My intention when framing this question was that it should be open, allowing 
me to explore what accountability mechanisms, processes, and relationships 
existed with an open mind, rather than considering observations against a pre-
set definition or model. From a review of the literature1, however, I drew out 
three sub-questions, which together offered a loose framework around which to 
                                               




structure my research and analysis. Together these questions capture core 
elements of accountability, asking; 
• For what are microfinance organisations accountable? 
• To whom are microfinance organisations accountable?, and 
• How do microfinance organisations seek to be accountable? 
Summary of Key Arguments 
In this thesis I argue that microfinance organisations primarily seek to hold 
themselves accountable for maximising income and keeping costs low, 
prioritising this ambition above stated aspirations of social impact. Much of the 
organisations’ appeal to supporters and donors, however, I argue is predicated 
upon a lack of transparency: accounts are carefully constructed and selective, 
and key information, I describe, is systematically withheld to create an 
appealing and expected narrative (Bateman (2010). Furthermore, I argue that 
mechanisms of accountability, rather than challenging this behaviour, are being 
co-opted to serve a similarly performative role. 
I argue that perpetuating this constructed narrative has come to occupy 
and consume time and resources in all parts of my case study organisation, 
diverting funds from alternative uses, potentially more beneficial to those in 
whose name work is being undertaken. Furthermore, I argue that this lack of 
transparency was not restricted to organisations’ presentations of themselves. 
Rather, I observe that it cuts deeper and more widely across the Malawian 
microfinance sector, underpinning a culture of secrecy, which in turn creates an 
environment conducive to inefficiency, and harmful behaviours such as fraud. 
Problem Statement and Contribution 
Microfinance is a global phenomenon in international development, with 
programmes underway in an estimated 60 countries around the world 
(Bateman, 2010). Here, advocates claim, is an intervention that will empower 
participants, and reduce poverty in communities, all through a mechanism that 
is financially sustainable, reducing dependence on aid and donor support; As 
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former Centre for Global Development Senior Fellow, David Roodman, 
describes,  
“Almost no development project has held such strong and 
multidimensional appeal as microcredit. It appeals to the left with 
talk of empowering women and the right by insisting on individual 
responsibility” (Roodman, 2012: 271) 
Through the provision of small loans and financial services, the narrative goes, 
individuals living in poverty can regain agency, as they establish and expand 
their own businesses. The income generated from these enterprises will then 
enable the entrepreneurs to make sustainable improvements in their own lives, 
and through them, the lives of their families and communities. This is a 
narrative that donors, governments, policy makers, publics, and practitioners 
around the world have found compelling, exemplified by the UN’s naming of 
2005 as, ‘The International Year of Microcredit’. Central to the messaging 
around this initiative were calls for the sector to continue its global expansion, 
as a means of releasing the, “powerful, but often untapped, entrepreneurial 
spirit that exists all over the world.” (UN, 2004). As will be returned to more 
fully in Chapter 2, Malawi was one country to embrace such beliefs, with the 
Government in 2002 launching their ‘Microfinance Policy and Action Plan’. The 
document opens with some sobering statistics on the number of Malawians 
living below the poverty line, before asserting that,  
“One way of [reducing poverty] is to promote income generation and 
employment creation among the poor. Increased access to credit, 
savings opportunities and other financial services will be crucial in 
this respect.” (Government of Malawi, 2002: 2). 
Alongside such ambitious claims, however, questions and controversy 
over the mission, effectiveness, and ethics of microfinance have haunted the 
sector. Milford Bateman’s 2010 book, ‘Why Doesn’t Microfinance Work?’ set out 
a stark challenge to the sector’s advocates, arguing that a major disconnect 
exists between what is said of and by microfinance organisations, and the reality 
of what these organisations, and the wider sector, are actually doing and 
achieving. Concerns were similarly raised in a 2011 systematic review of the 
impact of microfinance, commissioned by the UK Department for International 
Development (DFID), which noted that, “Despite the apparent success and 
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popularity of microfinance, no clear evidence yet exists that microfinance 
programmes have positive impacts” (Duvendack et al, 2011: 2). This opinion is 
echoed by the anthropologist, Jason Hickel, who has written that, “What’s so 
fascinating about the microfinance craze is that it persists in the face of one 
unfortunate fact: microfinance doesn’t work.” (Hickel, 2015). 
Concerns that such disconnections between rhetoric and reality exist 
have driven calls and attempts to increase the accountability of organisations 
and actors. As Dixon et al capture, there is a belief that, “more accountability is 
better and will lead to required goals and outcomes being legitimately pursued” 
(Dixon et al, 2006: 405). Nyamori et al (2017) similarly raise that across sub-
Saharan Africa, the promotion of transparency and accountability has been 
central to initiatives aimed at reducing corruption, at all levels. In the wake of 
high profile cases of mismanagement and the exploitation of clients in and by 
various microfinance organisations internationally, Marini et al (2017) raise 
that similar calls have been made for more accountability across the 
microfinance sector, resulting in initiatives such as those explored in this study. 
Against this background, however, there remains relatively less understanding 
of the effects of tools and processes of accountability, or the ways in which they 
are enacted and experienced.  
Microfinance is similarly a subject that has been much explored, though 
the majority of studies have focused on the critical question of what impact 
microfinance programmes are achieving (including Banerjee et al, 2014; Kabeer, 
2005; Bateman & Chang, 2012; van Rooyen et al, 2012 and Mayoux, 1999). 
Within Malawi specifically, the growth of the country’s microfinance sector in 
recent years has attracted the interest of national and global researchers. Aliou 
Diagne and Manfred Zeller, for example, undertook a significant study on the 
impact of access to credit on welfare in Malawi, on behalf of the International 
Food Policy Research Institute, with Diagne having previously undertaken a 
similar study, considering impact on income and food security (Diagne & Zeller, 
2001; Diagne, 1998). Ephraim Chirwa similarly explored how shifts and 
expansion in the Malawian microfinance sector have affected poverty rates in 
the country (Chirwa, 2002). What have been less widely explored, however, are 
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the microfinance organisations themselves. As Mosse articulates, this is a 
pattern that is frequently observed in development research, where,  
“the rich literature on the intended and unintended effects of 
development interventions on populations, regions and communities 
is hardly matched by accounts of the internal dynamics of 
development’s ‘regimes of truth’” (Mosse, 2011: 2) 
As I explore in this introductory chapter, issues of accountability cut across 
these internal dynamics, and concern the relationships and interactions both 
within the organisation, and with external actors. By studying accountability in 
microfinance, therefore, this thesis sets out to offer new insights into the nature 
of accountability, as well as the global microfinance sector.  
Narrowing the focus 
As a means of gaining insight into these internal dynamics, I had at one stage 
thought to adopt a comparative approach, considering accountability in three 
separate case study organisations. This research was supported by an ESRC 
Collaborative Studentship, with the microfinance organisation, Cloud Loan2 
being the collaborating sponsor. At the heart of this arrangement was an 
understanding that what I produced would offer value to Cloud Loan, as well as 
academic outputs. This arrangement therefore influenced the selection of Cloud 
Loan as a case study organisation, and their most established country of 
                                               
2 Cloud Loan is a pseudonym for the organisation with whom I worked. In the Ethics 
and Anonymity section of this chapter, I explain why I have chosen to anonymise the 
organisation throughout this thesis. I have also redacted, throughout this thesis, 
references which compromise the anonymity of my organisation, such as website content 
and reports produced by the organisation. These references have been given a number in 
the style of ‘Cloud Loan Source 1.1’. I hold a list of the original references to which these 






operation, Malawi, as the context in which I would explore microfinance3. As 
will be discussed in Chapter 2, the Malawian microfinance sector is made up of a 
range of actors, including NGOs, commercial micro-credit agencies, and agencies 
established by Government. As such, I had thought to select further case studies 
which reflected this diversity, and consider manifestations and characteristics of 
accountability in these different contexts. On a pilot visit to Malawi, however, 
this plan changed. I had anticipated using this visit as an opportunity to meet 
with Cloud Loan’s in-country staff, make arrangements for future visits, and 
approach prospective, additional case study organisations. My experience on this 
visit, however, encouraged me to take a different approach. It soon transpired 
that I had underestimated the process of negotiating and gaining access to the 
various constituent teams and offices of this dispersed organisation. As will be 
returned to in Chapter 6, I soon observed that communication between the 
various units and locations was slow and stilted, and even with a referral from 
the UK or Malawian Head Office, I found the process of beginning engagement 
with a new team or branch to be akin to engaging with a new organisation. It 
soon became clear to me that gaining the degree of access that I sought, across 
multiple agencies, would not be feasible within the constraints of this study. I 
chose, therefore, to pursue a single, qualitative case study as the mode of 
                                               
3 Researching an organisation that was partly funding my research offered valuable 
opportunities in terms of gaining access, and knowledge exchange, but also raised a 
number of challenges and considerations. I was both in insider and external, and in this 
chapter, I go on to reflect on the challenge of positioning myself as an independent 
researcher, rather than a paid consultant, with the latter being the role and relationship 
that both of us were more accustomed to. While difficult, establishing and maintaining 
this independence was essential, as it enabled me to speak freely and critically of my 
observations. I was aided in this effort by some of the trends that I discuss in this thesis 
more widely. Notably, I felt the pressure to pursue particular activities and lines of 
inquiry most keenly at the start of this research, from the staff who had worked with the 
University of Edinburgh to design the studentship. Several of these individuals, 
however, either left the organisation, or took on different roles, soon after I began, and 
as their replacements came in to the organisation with no pre-conceived notions of my 
role, we were able to establish my independence more clearly. While, as I outline in this 
chapter, gaining access and trust to and from teams across the organisation remained a 
challenge, I must again pay credit to the staff of Cloud Loan, the majority of whom spoke 
candidly to me about their experience and reflections, even when this cast the 
organisation in a negative light. I was very conscious of the responsibility associated 
with the access and candid conversations that I benefited from in this research, and as I 





enquiry for this research. While certain questions went unanswered, and I was 
not able to meet with everyone whom I wished to meet, this decision enabled me 
to focus my efforts, immerse myself in the work and life of Cloud Loan, and gain 
the depth of insight that I sought. This was essential for this research, as my 
case study organisation was more than simply a location within which to 
observe accountability. Rather, as I argue in Chapter 3, accountability is about 
the relationships and interactions between actors, and as such, only through 
such immersion can it be understood.  
The experience of this pilot visit also brought to the fore the complexity 
and richness that can be found within a single organisation, confirming my 
decision to focus on a single case study. Similar research into accountability in 
different categories of microfinance organisations would, however, be an 
interesting area of future study. Furthermore, as will be presented in 
subsequent chapters, these initial observations around internal relationships 
and communication would recur and build throughout this research, and the 
importance of internal accountability and relationships is one of the key 
arguments of this thesis. 
Case Study 
Why a Case Study? 
In the introduction to her book, ‘The Real World of NGOs’, Dorothea Hilhorst 
writes about how an “NGO is shaped by the actors in the organization and their 
surrounding networks (Hilhorst, 2003:1). Contrary to the impression given in 
some NGO literature, she continues, there is not one active manager or policy 
maker surrounded by passive, implementing automatons, but rather each 
individual and group will act according to their own understanding of 
instructions and circumstances, and are influenced by their own priorities and 
experiences. As Mosse & Lewis similarly describe, the translation of policies and 
procedures into practice is not, and should not be considered as, “an 
instrumental or scripted translation of ideas into reality, but as a messy free-for-
all in which processes are often uncontrollable and results uncertain” (Mosse & 
Lewis, 2006: 9). It is understanding this messiness that is at the heart of my 
10 
 
research questions, and as such, I have identified and pursued a single, 
qualitative case study as the most appropriate mode of enquiry for answering 
these questions. 
A case study is defined by Gerring as being, “an intensive study of a single 
unit” (Gerring, 2004: 342).  Bennett & Elman (2006) highlight that this 
approach offers a particular advantage in the examination of context specific 
phenomena, with Crowe et al similarly expanding that, “The case study 
approach allows in-depth, multi-faceted explorations of complex issues in their 
real-life settings” (Crowe et al, 2011: 2). In so doing, the approach can enable the 
researcher to gain an understanding of particular phenomena, in this case 
accountability, in the context in which they occur (Crowe et al, 2011; Yin, 2009).  
An introduction to Cloud Loan and their work will be presented in Chapter 
2, but it is what Bryman (2004) describes as an ‘Exemplifying Case’. It has not 
been selected as an extreme or unique example, rather it is an organisation 
whose approach to microfinance has been inspired by and reflects common traits 
of the global microfinance sector. As such, while generalisations cannot be 
drawn from case specific studies such as this one, as Burawoy (1991) raises, that 
does not mean that they are without societal significance, and the observations 
presented in this thesis can valuably be considered in future research around 
microfinance institutions and accountability more generally.  
Data Collection 
Participant Observation 
The research questions that I pose are deliberately open, as my intention was to 
understand the lived reality of accountability within my case study. Answering 
these questions, therefore, required data which offered detailed accounts of the 
experiences and perspectives of diverse actors within the organisation 
(Campbell & Gregor, 2004). An ethnographic approach offers particular 
advantages in this regard. As Gottlieb describes, ethnography offers, “an 
unparalleled set of methods for exploring and gaining insight into people’s 
values, beliefs and behaviours” (Gottlieb, 2006: 47). Furthermore, as van Donge 
(2006) raises, such qualitative methods can be of particular valuable in 
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addressing questions such as those posed in this study, offering as the do the 
potential to reveal the unexpected.  
 Within this approach, it was through participant observation that the 
majority of my data were generated. There were four phases of participant 
observation in this research: three in Malawi and one in the UK. The first of 
these was in a one-month pilot visit to Malawi in 2014. As previously discussed, 
I made this visit at an early stage in my research design process, and the 
experience was invaluable in shaping the research documented here. During 
this visit, I travelled to two Cloud Loan offices, in the Central Region; the 
African Head Quarters and a branch office4. Though these visits were 
exploratory and introductory, they also generated valuable data and insight into 
the workings of the organisation, and the wider context of Cloud Loan’s work. In 
2015, I spent one month working in Cloud Loan’s London Head Office, before 
returning to Malawi for two longer, two-month visits. The time that I was able 
to spend in-country was limited, but incorporated extended return visits to 
Cloud Loan’s Head Quarters and the branch office that I had visited previously, 
as well as a further Central Region branch, and two offices in the Southern 
Region5. I selected these offices as between them they offered the full range of 
Cloud Loan’s loan products, and provided me with the opportunity to interact 
with staff involved in both service delivery and corporate functions. These 
different locations also enabled me to observe the same activities being 
undertaken multiple times by different people, allowing insight into both 
general norms across the organisations, and specificities of particular units. 
                                               
4 The Second Central Region Branch 
5 As I explain more fully in the Ethics and Anonymity section of this chapter, I was 
conscious, throughout the research and writing-up process, of the importance of 
preserving the anonymity of my case study organisation, as well as their staff and 
clients. As such, I have chosen not to include specific locations of Cloud Loan offices in 
this text. Instead, I refer to specific locations by the region of Malawi in which they are 
located, and order in which I visited them. For example, ‘First Central Region Branch’ is 
the first branch office that I visited in the Central Region, and ‘Second Southern Region 
Branch’ is the second branch that I visited in the Southern Region. This approach offers 
the reader insight into the specific geography, and context of the branch, through 
reference to the region, without compromising the anonymity of the organisation, or 
their staff and clients. 
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On all of these visits I worked from the local Cloud Loan office, enabling 
as this did the opportunity to engage with and observe staff and visitors to these 
offices as they went about their working days. The majority of my time in 
Malawi was therefore spent working from branch offices, and as such, it was 
with the loan officers who worked from these units that I engaged the most. This 
was, I felt, important for this work, as while understanding the corporate and 
administrative functions of the Head Office and African Head Quarters offered 
valuable and essential insight into certain facets of the organisation, as Lipsky 
(1980) observes, it is through front-line workers that clients access services, and 
therefore experience and come to understand the wider organisation. Lipsky’s 
model of ‘street level bureaucracy’ is a valuable one for understanding the role of 
loan officers, which I expand on in later chapters. Importantly, while they are 
often marginalised within the organisation6(Goetz, 2001; Siwale & Ritchie, 
2011), they also undertake much of their work without physical oversight and 
support from their superiors. As such, they must not only manage conflicting 
instructions and priorities from within the organisation, but also balance these 
with demands presented to them by clients, as well as their own judgement and 
preferences. By giving particular weight to my engagements with individuals 
undertaking this critical role, therefore, I can offer a deeper insight into the 
workings of my case study organisation. 
For these engagements in Malawi, language was a consideration. While 
the working language of Cloud Loan is English, with all staff members being 
fluent, only a handful of clients with whom I met could converse in the language, 
and client meetings were therefore also held in the local language. To support 
my observations of these meetings I had thought to hire a translator, who would 
accompany the loan officer and I on group visits. For reasons of practicality, 
however, the experience of my pilot visit encouraged me to change my mind from 
this approach. As will be discussed in later chapters, many of Cloud Loan’s 
clients are located in rural parts of Malawi, in communities not always easily 
accessible by road. As such, all loan officer have the use of a Cloud Loan 
motorbike, enabling them to travel the long distances between groups, and 
                                               
6 See particularly Chapter 6 
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traverse the off-road terrain. When I accompanied a loan officer on a group visit, 
I would travel with them on the back of their motorbike, but if there had been a 
third person, this would not have been possible. One solution that I had 
considered was renting a car, and using this to transport the loan officer, 
translator, and myself between locations. This, however, would not only have 
precluded my visiting certain groups, due to lack of accessibility by road, but 
would also have altered the very dynamic that I was there to observe: the daily 
working life of the loan officers. Instead, I relied on the staff member whom I 
was accompanying to translate proceedings for me, which they always, 
generously agreed to do. A concern with this approach was that officers may 
filter out any negative feedback or comments, but I have no reason to believe 
that this occurred, beyond expected summarising and paraphrasing. On 
numerous occasions, staff members openly shared with me critical reflections 
and complaints from clients in the meetings that I attended, and from their 
wider experience. 
Norman Long (2001) talks of international development interventions 
being undertaken at the nexus of various cultural and social practices. As Cloud 
Loan is an international organisation, I felt that my observations would be 
incomplete without an understanding the organisation’s UK operations, and 
having the opportunity to gain insight into the experiences and perspectives of 
UK staff. As such, between the pilot visit and the first return visit to Malawi, I 
spent one month in Cloud Loan’s London Head Office. Skovdal & Cornish (2015) 
discuss that participant observation should involve both participation and 
observation, and so it was that I spent this month as a volunteer in the 
fundraising team, working on a review of major donors. This role served a dual 
purpose. Firstly, it allowed me to integrate more effectively into the everyday 
operations of the office. It gave me a purpose that others in the office could make 
sense of, moving me, in their eyes, from being an onlooker to part of the team. 
Furthermore, it offered me a deeper insight into the workings of the office and 
organisation than would otherwise have been possible experiencing first-hand 
some of the issues that others would later raise. In the role, for example, I 
frequently encountered difficulties when trying to access information that I 
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required to undertake the tasks assigned to me. This experience added extra 
resonance to encounters where others would raise such frustrations. 
As is typical in the employment of participant observation, I made 
extensive field notes of my observations. Often these would be in the form of 
hand written notes, but where appropriate, other tools were employed. In 
branch offices, for example, I often found that writing in my notebook would 
elicit concerned glances, and make people more wary of my motivations. Using 
my phone, however, seemed to be a behaviour that those around me found less 
worrisome, so often I would use the notes function on my phone to record key 
observations, which I would write-up more fully at a later date. Similarly, using 
the voice recorder on my phone to record short reflections after conversations 
also enabled valuable quotes and observations to be captured. I would often use 
this tool after more informal conversations, as a means of quickly capturing 
specific quotes and points of interest. These notes and records were made with 
little pre-selection as to what was important or significant, but as my research 
progressed, certain issues and behaviours emerged that I would consciously look 
out for, meaning that while I remained open to unexpected observations, my 
notes became more structured as time went on. 
Interviews and Documents 
My preference in this research would have been that all engagements offered 
the opportunity to spend these extended periods of time with my participants, 
observing their lived realities. For various reasons of practicality, however, this 
was not always possible. Time was the major issue in this regard. The length of 
time that I was able to spend in Malawi, for example, was limited, and also 
those with whom I wished to engage were also often those with many demands 
on their time. So as not to lose their perspectives completely, however, when 
more intensive engagement was not possible, I sought the opportunity for an 
interview. Furthermore, as Bryman (2004) observes, even intensive periods of 
participant observations will not reveal all pertinent information. As such, he 
continues, practitioners will typically follow-up on their observations and 
conversations with more focused interviews, and a review of relevant 
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documentation. It was this broader approach to qualitative data collection that I 
employed in this research. 
As van Donge (2006) emphasises, a principle of ethnographic methods is 
that they seek to avoid, as far as possible, artificial research situations. In-line 
with this thinking, all participant observation in this study was undertaken in 
contexts and events that would have occurred with or without my presence, for 
example routine client meetings. My interviews, however, contravened this 
principle, as they were all arranged specifically for the purposes of this research. 
I sought to mitigate this as far as possible, however, by undertaking all such 
meetings in the offices of those with whom I spoke. This added an additional 
dimension to these encounters, beyond the content of our conversation. In later 
chapters, for example, I discuss an individual with whom I met, whose job had 
so significantly expanded that he did not have the time to undertake all his 
duties to the degree and standard required. While he raised in our interview 
that he often felt overwhelmed by the demands of his role, observing his 
cluttered desk, and the frequent interruptions during our time together, gave 
these claims resonance beyond what they would have had, had we met in a 
different location. 
As discussed, these interviews were an opportunity to explore in greater 
detail my observations and experiences with Cloud Loan staff, but they also 
provided an opportunity to gain wider insight into the Malawian microfinance 
sector, from representatives of other microfinance organisations, and those 
working elsewhere in, or with, the Malawian microfinance sector. In that I 
would enter these engagements with particular questions and issues that I was 
keen to explore, but allowed interviewees to expand and deviate on, and from, 
these subjects, these meetings fall within the definition of a semi-structured 
interview (Bryman, 2004). A full list of those with whom I met is included in 
Appendix 1 
 Existing documentary evidence also provided a valuable source of 
information. It is a characteristic of many tools and processes of accountability 
that they result in the generation of plentiful reports, records, and other forms 
of documentation. These, however are political: they are official representations 
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made with a specific agenda, for a particular audience. While I engage with and 
interrogate these official accounts, particularly in Chapters 3 and 4, the wider 
conversations and observations integral to my research enabled me to challenge 
their content, and expose where lived realities and perceptions differed from 
official presentations. 
A note on language and terminology 
Artefacts of Accountability 
In this thesis, I explore various relationships of accountability through the 
artefacts employed to facilitate communication or realise commitments. In 
framing these mechanisms and processes of accountability as artefacts, I borrow 
from the work of Rosalind Eyben. In her writing on results and evidence, Eyben 
adopts the term artefact to describe the tools and protocols, developed and 
utilised as means of progressing these agendas, and translating ambitions in to 
reality. They are, she continues, the ‘concrete expressions’ of discourse (Eyben, 
2015: 19). In so doing, Eyben expands the definition of artefact long employed in 
workplace studies, to incorporate such techniques and processes as logical 
frameworks, performance measurement indicators, business cases, and theories 
of change (Eyben, 2013, 2015). My use of the term, ‘artefacts of accountability’ 
similarly captures the range of tools and approaches used to deliver on 
commitments to accountability, and facilitate associated exchange and 
communication. As Eyben explains, the examination of these artefacts offers 
insight into the agendas and discourse that led to their creation and adoption. In 
this work, I make similar observations, noting the myriad reasons and 
rationales for Cloud Loan’s development of particular techniques and processes 
of accountability. The Progress out of Poverty Index7, for example, I present was 
developed and shaped by discourse on poverty outreach, as well as criticisms 
and concerns within and of the microfinance sector about evidence of impact. 
The carefully crafted client profiles, discussed in Chapter 7, are similarly, I 
argue, artefacts generated in response to expressed desires for more authentic 
and direct connections with beneficiaries. 
                                               
7 Chapter 5 
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Van Es & Guijt (2015) also employ the terminology of artefact, using the 
label to describe an organisation’s utilisation of Theory of Change, in their work 
on accountability. In the piece, the authors consider whether wider politics and 
pressures faced by the case study organisation have transformed the tool in to 
an “artefact for compliance” (van Es & Guijt, 2015: 109). As the pair, and Eyben 
(2013, 2015), note, the same artefact can be utilised and experienced differently 
in different environments, just as its significance and effects can change over 
time. As Eyben reflects, the conceptualisation of these mechanisms and 
processes as constructed artefacts enables, through their examination, greater 
understanding of the organisational environment and power relationships in 
which they have developed (Eyben, 2013). In my undertaking of this case study, 
conceptualising tools and processes in this way, and placing the artefacts at the 
centre of my analysis, enabled me to explore these wider issues of 
accountability. 
How people talk about accountability 
Accountability is the concept which inspired this research: as I outline in this 
chapter, it is one that while being much discussed and promoted in the abstract, 
is less well understood in practice. My ambition in this work was to explore how 
accountability is manifested and enacted in the Malawian microfinance sector 
and as such, it is valuable to reflect at this stage on the language of 
accountability that I encountered in the sector. 
As I describe in this introductory chapter, in designing this research I 
sought not to impose too heavily my own interpretation of accountability, and 
instead to explore the subject with an open mind. This, however, presented a 
quandary. Strict adherence to this ambition would have meant restricting my 
analysis to those artefacts specifically identified by informants as being related 
to accountability. As Crack et al (2018) highlight, however, language can present 
a barrier in international and multilateral operations, with certain terminology 
not having direct translations in local dialects, and common parlance varying 
between groups and locations. As such, to restrict my analysis in this way 
would, I felt, have led to the exclusion of important and interesting artefacts and 
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relationships, simply because the precise term ‘accountability’ was not attached 
to them.  
To overcome this challenge, and ensure that I gained a comprehensive 
view, I developed a broad understanding of accountability which enabled me to 
identify wider practices and considerations, while not being overly prescriptive. 
This understanding was drawn from a review of accountability literature, 
presented in Chapter 3. In this chapter, I argue that what unites diverse 
interpretations of, and approaches to, accountability is that it is a 
fundamentally relational concept, concerned as it is with the giving of account 
by one actor to another. There are two core elements to this understanding 
which inspired my work: the interaction between parties, and the commitments 
made in, and wider content of accounts given. This broader understanding 
enabled my identification and examination of the organisation’s relationships, 
and the content and form of communication and exchange between actors and 
groups, such as reports, public communications, and client feedback, as artefacts 
of accountability. Similarly, it encouraged my consideration of the means by 
which Cloud Loan sought to enact and evidence their espoused commitments of 
creating businesses and reducing poverty. 
Within Cloud Loan, I encountered the use of the term accountability 
most commonly in statements made by staff in branch offices. Loan officers in 
particular would often, as I recount in this thesis, describe their sense of being 
accountable to superiors in the African Head Quarters and in London, and for 
their being held to account, by these groups, for the undertaking of certain 
prescribed activities. These are dynamics that emerge frequently in Chapters 4 
and 5, where loan officers describe requirements such as the delivery of client 
training, and undertaking of PPI interviews. It is also a central theme in my 
discussion on internal accountability in Chapter 6, where I argue that the 
organisation seeks to control behaviours and decisions at the branch level, 
requiring a flow of information up through the organisation to the London office, 
with relatively poor reciprocal communication to, and engagement with these 
staff. This internal conceptualisation of accountability as being concerned only 
with the holding to account of agents by principals, and matters of status and 
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hierarchy, not only echoes common discourse around accountability, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, but also offers a valuable insight into the power 
dynamics within the organisation, which I also explore in Chapter 6. 
In contrast, while loan officers and staff across Cloud Loan expressed a 
desire and commitment to improve the lives of their clients, the language of 
accountability was not used to describe these relationships. This too, I argue, is 
indicative of the power relationships within Cloud Loan, which I explore 
throughout this thesis. Clients were not conceptualised as rights holders to 
whom something was owed, rather they were largely considered by the 
organisation to be passive recipients of Cloud Loan’s services. While my 
formation of a framework for understanding accountability, however, broad, 
imposes a degree of my own judgement and perspective, I feel that my actions 
were justified, enabling as they did dynamics such as those I highlight here to be 
raised, and a more holistic and valuable insight into accountability in the 
Malawian microfinance sector to be created. 
Reflexivity 
Integrating myself into the work and routines of the London office was relatively 
simple. I was one of three volunteers working in the office at the time, and the 
organisation was accustomed to new faces, with a steady turnover in the 
permanent staff. Having previously worked in the head office of an international 
development NGO, I also had some familiarity with much of the language and 
jargon that was used, and the tasks that were being undertaken. This 
experience enabled me to play an active role in the work of the team, but also 
raised in my mind issues of my own positionality and experience. As Wisker 
(2001) raises, when observing a context that the researcher finds familiar, they 
may read situations and behaviours differently to how they would in a new and 
unfamiliar context. DeWalt & DeWalt similarly observe that, more widely, “We 
need to be aware of who we are, understand our biases as much as we can, and 
understand and interpret our interactions with the people we study.” (DeWalt & 
DeWalt, 2002: 94) 
Such reflexivity is essential in participant observation, as just as my 
philosophical assumptions outline that it is in the interpretation and experience 
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of actors that reality is created, so too are the findings presented here produced 
through my own judgements and interpretation (O’Reilly, 2005). I was 
particularly conscious of the effects of my own background during the early 
stages of this research. In the four years before returning to academia to start 
work on this PhD I was working for a large international development NGO, 
and it was here that my interest in the subject of accountability was first 
stirred. When I first began working with Cloud Loan, therefore, my default 
approach was to consider the work as a form of consultancy, leading me to 
approach issues in a mode that can best be summarised as ‘diagnose and fix’. As 
an intensive study of a particular organisation, it would have been easy for this 
work to become instrumental in nature, offering insight for the organisation into 
how to improve their operations and practices, but contributing little to wider 
theory.  
I was not, however, the first researcher to encounter such challenges 
when undertaking in-depth study of a particular organisation. The work of 
David Mosse (2001; 2005; 2011) and Dorothea Hilhorst (2003) provided a 
valuable guide for how to approach this research, as both showed the value, and 
challenges, of understanding of dynamics and lives within aid organisations. 
One danger that I was particularly conscious of was raised by Hilhorst (2003), 
who cites Stirrat & Henkel (1997) in her observation that research can be 
undermined if the researcher does not challenge their own assumptions, and 
gives too much weight to their own interpretation of events, rather than how 
they are perceived and experienced by others. As a means of mitigating against 
such risks, I sought to ensure that my field notes were as full and objective as 
possible, continually asking questions to which I thought that I knew the 
answer, as often this would expose responses and perspectives different to those 
that I had unconsciously assumed. I also found it valuable to create a distance 
between myself and Cloud Loan.  As my research design and fieldwork plans 
were intentionally open and loose, it would have become easy for my time to be 
taken over pursuing tasks of interest to Cloud Loan management. While, to a 
degree, engaging in such tasks offered valuable insight into the organisation’s 
internal workings (Mosse, 2001), committing myself to such work would have 
limited my potential to explore wider subjects of interest as they emerged, and 
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made a return to a ‘diagnose and fix’ approach more likely. While I have 
committed to producing learning reports for both Cloud Loan and the Malawi 
Microfinance Network, I am treating these as distinctly separate pieces of work 
from this thesis.  
Creating some distance between myself and UK management was also 
valuable in Malawi. As a white, British researcher, I was conspicuously different 
from others in Cloud Loan’s Malawian offices, and to a greater degree, in the 
client meetings that I attended. I discussed previously the ongoing issue of 
negotiating access to Cloud Loan teams and branch offices, and in these 
processes, a question that would nearly always emerge was whether I was there 
on behalf of the management team in London. As I discuss in later chapters, 
there was a strong culture of top down management through prescribed 
processes and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) in the organisation, and I 
often found that my first few days in a new location would be spent clarifying 
my role, and reassuring staff that I was not there to check-up on them. The 
ability to offer anonymity, as I later discuss, was valuable in overcoming the 
reservations of staff, concerned that offering critical reflections would have 
negative implications for themselves or their teams.  
Ethics and Anonymity 
All research brings with it ethical considerations, but these are particularly 
acute when employing participant observation. As described, this is a method 
that offers clear advantages for exploring the relationships and perceptions that 
are at the heart of this study, but it is also one that lacks the rigid boundaries of 
certain other methods: Observations are not contained to discrete times and 
spaces, instead they are gained through more immersive, holistic experience. 
This can present particular challenges in obtaining informed consent from 
participants. As Bryman observes, the principle of informed consent is that 
participants should have sufficient information about the research to make an 
informed choice about whether or not to participate (Bryman, 2004: 540). 
Throughout this study I sought to be transparent, and ensure that I both 
provided such information, and created space for questions and concerns to be 
raised, enabling informed consent to be obtained, or for individuals to exclude 
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themselves from the study. When first making contact with staff from a new 
Cloud Loan branch office, or another external agency, for example, I would set 
out a clear summary of my research and my reasons for approaching that team 
or individual. On arriving in a new location, I would similarly seek to introduce 
myself, either collectively at a staff meeting, or individually to members of the 
team, again reiterating my objectives, and inviting questions or further 
clarification. Throughout my research, I also maintained a profile page on the 
University of Edinburgh website, allowing anyone with an interest to access 
information about who I am, and what research interests I am pursuing.  
I was conscious, however, of the limits of that informed consent, 
particularly when travelling between formal and informal contexts. While my 
interest was in the professional lives of Cloud Loan employees, the boundaries 
between professional and personal contexts and interactions were not always 
clear. During my time at the African Head Quarters, for example, I shared 
accommodation with visiting and resident members of Cloud Loan staff. As 
such, my engagement with these individuals would continue beyond the office, 
over dinner in the accommodation, for example, or travelling to and from work. 
Spending extended periods of time in various locations, I also formed friendships 
with staff members, visiting their homes for meals, or going to local bars and 
restaurants. While such interactions were never intended to 'catch people out', 
the more informal setting would often lead to more candid reflections on issues 
that we had discussed previously, and on numerous occasions, issues that 
became valuable lines of future inquiry. This presented an ethical quandary, 
with one solution being to restrict my data to the information obtained in purely 
formal settings. To exclude data in this way, however, would have been to ignore 
valuable insight and reflections. Furthermore, to completely exclude such 
insights would also have been impossible, as the iterative nature of this research 
meant that all information received influenced my future lines of inquiry, and 
the way in which I analysed and considered data. My solution was therefore to 
anonymise individuals, with all names of Cloud Loan staff members having been 
changed in this text. In so doing, I was able to ensure that participants felt more 
comfortable and secure in such interactions, and also that they were protected if 
they disclosed controversial information or opinions.  
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Simply changing the names of individuals, however, could only be a 
partial means of achieving these ambitions. As previously outlined, a major 
contribution of this study is that it offers a rare investigation into accountability 
in a specific context. As such, a degree of specificity is required, as the location of 
observations and sources of comments lend much to their meaning. For the 
majority of readers, it is the position or location of an individual within the 
organisation that will be more of an identifier than their name, therefore by 
anonymising the wider organisation I have been able to enhance the protection 
to individual participants, and balance this protection with the specificity that 
enriches the research and findings. 
Continuing the theme of informed consent, I have also excluded the 
names of clients and credit groups from this text. When accessing clients, 
engaging the judgement of loan officers was essential. In one instance, for 
example, a loan officer explained to me that he expected the meeting with a 
particular group to be difficult: a member of the group had passed away 
suddenly, and this was to be the officer's first interaction with the members 
since hearing the news. As such, we agreed that my presence at this meeting 
would be an unnecessary burden for both the clients and the loan officer, and I 
made alternative plans. More generally, when accompanying loan officers to 
client meetings, I would always introduce myself to those in attendance, and 
seek the permission of the chair to observe proceedings. Despite my best efforts, 
my Chichewa did not extend beyond basic greetings, meaning that I was reliant 
on others to inform non-English speaking clients of who I was or why I was 
there. As such, I could not guarantee that the message had been conveyed as I 
would wish, or how well it had been understood. As a result, I have chosen not to 
use the names or images of clients and groups, and this concern also contributed 
to my decision to anonymise the organisation more generally. 
A further consideration around anonymity presented itself in the 
analysis and writing stage of this study. While several examples of problematic 
and even harmful behaviours are recounted in these chapters, these should not 
obscure the commitment of the majority of Cloud Loan’s staff to achieving 
positive results for their clients that I witnessed across all locations visited. 
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International development is a complex and challenging area of work, yet in the 
UK and beyond there is a climate where tolerance of failure by NGOs, and other 
development actors, is extremely limited. The same climate has encouraged an 
increasingly competitive funding environment, where concerns around 
performance can be quickly be translated into financial penalties. While, as 
previously outlined, findings from case studies such as this one should not be 
generalised, it was my impression that the issues raised in the context of Cloud 
Loan’s work are not unique to this organisation. As such, I would not want to 
single the organisation out for particular criticism.  
I selected the pseudonym of Cloud Loan at the end of this research, and 
at a late stage in writing this thesis. The process of selection proved to be a 
valuable opportunity to think holistically on what I had learned about, and how 
I considered, this organisation that I had been engaged so closely with. Various 
options were considered and rejected, as they pre-empted or contradicted themes 
in this research, but the suggestion of Cloud Loan resonated with the ideas that 
had made this research interesting to me in the first place, capturing the opacity 
of the organisation, and the difficulty an onlooker has in seeing beyond the 
outside image, into what it holds inside. It is seeking to expose and understand 
what is hidden that is the purpose of this research. 
Overview of the Thesis 
As previously raised, the central question that I sought to answer in this 
research was, ‘How is accountability manifested and enacted in microfinance 
organisations?’. To help structure my research and analysis, I developed three 
sub-questions, namely, for what are Cloud Loan accountable, to whom, and how? 
I have also used these questions, as I describe here, to structure this thesis. 
The first of my sub-questions is, ‘For what is Cloud Loan accountable?’. 
As was raised in the preceding discussion, accountability has frequently been 
proposed as a means of ensuring that organisations do what they say they are 
doing. As such, Chapters 4 and 5 will consider what it is that Cloud Loan say 
that they are doing, and reflect on the means by which they seek to hold 
themselves accountable for achievements in these fields. From my time with the 
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organisation, and a review of their literature and promotional materials, two 
core ambitions emerged: to support the creation and development of micro and 
small businesses, and to reduce poverty in Malawi.  
Taking each of these subjects in turn, Chapter 4 considers the objective of 
business creation and development. Building such profit making enterprises is 
at the heart of the microfinance narrative, and it is with the aim of achieving 
this objective that Cloud Loan has developed a programme of client training. In 
considering this training, however, concerns around whether the organisation is 
accountable to its clients, a subject that will be explored more fully in Chapter 8, 
are introduced. It is observed that clients have very limited scope to request 
particular support or guidance from the organisation. Instead, loan officers, with 
varying levels of skills and expertise, deliver a curriculum that has been created 
by Head Office, and there is little evidence to show the impact of this training. 
Furthermore, I observe that, with certain exceptions, Cloud Loan does not show 
a strong interest in how clients use their loans, or the nature of their businesses, 
all of which leads me to argue that, despite the rhetoric, this is an area of work 
that is valued more for its appeal to donors and supporters, than integral to 
operations. 
In Chapter 5, I explore Cloud Loan’s ambitions around poverty reduction, 
through close examination of the organisation’s primary monitoring and 
evaluation tool, the Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI). In this chapter, I raise 
issues that affect the quality of data collected through this mechanism, such as a 
lack of understanding on the part of implementing staff over the purpose of the 
tool, and wider fears and concerns which may inhibit clients from disclosing full 
and accurate information. Despite there being weaknesses and gaps in this data, 
which is the primary means by which the organisation seeks to demonstrate its 
impact on reducing poverty, I observe that this does not appear to have affected 
the support that the organisation receives from donors and supporters, and 
suggest that it is being able to say that a tool or process is in place which 
satisfies demands for accountability, rather than the quality or value of evidence 
or engagement that it provides. 
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Chapters 6, 7, and 8 move on to the question of, ‘To whom are Cloud Loan 
accountable?’ International development interventions entail the coming 
together of multiple actors, including branch offices, corporate donors, national 
and international governments, and local communities. In such complexity, 
when there is discussion of an organisation being accountable, it must be asked, 
to whom? In Chapter 3, I propose that relationships can be considered to fall 
into three broad categories: internal, upward and downward. Over three 
chapters I will therefore consider how Cloud Loan seeks to be accountable to 
constituents in each of these three groups. 
Chapter 6 explores the concept of internal accountability, or the 
relationships between groups and individuals within Cloud Loan. In this 
discussion, I explore formal systems of management, including how staff are 
held accountable for their actions and performance through a set of KPIs. In this 
discussion I note that they are indicative of attempts on the part of Cloud Loan’s 
centralised leadership to exert control over devolved functions, and are widely 
interpreted by branch staff as signs of the leadership’s lack of trust in loan 
officers. Resentment at these mechanisms, I explore, is part of a larger problem 
of poor relationships and communication within the organisation, and through 
examination of Cloud Loan’s Farming Loans initiative, I argue that these poor 
relationships, and hierarchical structure, are impeding both the effectiveness of 
the organisation, and their ability to be accountable to external actors. 
Chapter 7 moves on to consider upward accountability. It is this form of 
accountability that is most prevalent in the literature on accountability, 
encompassing as it does ideas of reporting to donors, regulators, and other 
powerful actors. In considering such relationships, this chapter focuses on a 
particular form of interaction with financial supporters that has come to be 
characteristic of microfinance: online lending platforms. This chapter considers 
the ways in which microfinance organisations use their clients’ images and 
stories to communicate their work to external audiences, and solicit funding. 
Particular concerns are raised over the ethics of these activities, and whether 
clients are giving their informed consent for their information to be used in this 
way. I also raise that the apparent simplicity of donors offering support to 
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particular entrepreneurs obscures the reality of how funds are used, and 
question whether such platforms see microfinance organisations conforming to 
an expected story, rather than giving their supporters genuine information. 
Building on arguments raised in previous chapters, I observe once again that a 
discrepancy exists between the image or brand presented by Cloud Loan, and 
the reality of their operations. 
 Chapter 8 explores the final of these three groups, considering downward 
accountability, or how the organisation holds itself accountable to its clients. In 
this chapter I discuss Cloud Loan’s Hotline, a phone line established by the 
organisation as a means by clients can raise concerns, questions or complaints 
directly with Head Office. In considering this service, I note that despite its 
status as Cloud Loan’s primary mechanism of downward accountability, it is 
little used, and has not captured major issues such as fraud and corruption. 
Furthermore, I observe that the tool has not been prioritised internally, with 
feedback not being considered, and the service itself being under resourced. I 
propose that it has been developed not as a means of downward accountability, 
but as a means of complying with the demands of the Government regulator. As 
such, it can be considered an investment in this upwards relationship rather 
than downwards relationships with clients. 
 Across this piece, I also seek to answer my third sub-question of, ‘How do 
Cloud Loan seek to be accountable?’ In each chapter I focus my analysis and 
discussion around particular artefacts of accountability which emerged in my 
research as a significant, or sometimes the only, means by which the 
organisation sought to be accountable for a particular achievement or to a 
particular group. Across these chapters, therefore insight into the tools and 
processes of accountability in microfinance can be gleaned. 
 In Chapter 9 I return to my research questions, and in my conclusion 
draw together what I have learned about how accountability is manifested and 







Chapter 2: Introducing Cloud Loan 
 
Introduction 
As described in the previous chapter, the mode of enquiry that I adopted for this 
research was examination of a case study microfinance organisation in Malawi, 
which I have anonymised in this thesis as Cloud Loan. While over the course of 
the following chapters I will introduce various dimensions of Cloud Loan’s work, 
in this chapter I present an overview of the organisation’s structure and 
operations, providing context for later observations and discussion. Cloud Loan’s 
first, and most established, country of operation was Malawi, and as such, it was 
here that I focused my research. As such, in this chapter I also present an 
overview of the emergence and evolution of Malawi’s microfinance sector. 
Cloud Loan 
Working across three African countries, with plans to expand further in the 
coming years, Cloud Loan is a microfinance organisation that was founded, and 
registered as a charity, in London in 2002. Beginning operations in Malawi the 
same year, Cloud Loan is one of 10 ‘Non-Deposit Taking Microfinance 
Institutions’, licensed by the Reserve Bank to operate in the country. Since this 
date, Cloud Loan report that they have helped over 150,000 women, disbursing 
over £25 million through more than 370,000 loans8. Malawi was where the 
organisation first began international operations, and continues to account for 
the majority of the organisation’s work, making it a valuable location for in-
depth study into Cloud Loan. Furthermore, as the following section describes, it 
is a country where NGOs play a particularly significant role in the delivery of 
international development initiatives, with international donors such as DFID 
choosing to work directly with such organisations, rather than through 
Government support. As such, increasing understanding of the real world of 
NGOs in Malawi is a further contribution of this study. 
                                               
8 Cloud Loan Website (Cloud Loan Source 2.1) 
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Microfinance in Malawi 
A small, landlocked country in south-east Africa, Malawi is one of the most 
densely populated countries in the continent, with a growing population that 
reached18 million in 2018, and is expected to reach 30 million by 2030 (DFID, 
ND). While frequently described as one of the poorest countries in the world, 
progress against a number of demographic indicators and poverty metrics has 
been observed in recent years. Between 1990 and 2016, for example, life 
expectancy at birth increased by 16 years, from 47 to 63, and in the same period, 
the primary school completion rate rose from 29% to 79% (World Bank, 2016). 
Despite such progress, however, the UN continues to categorise Malawi as ‘low’ 
on the Human Development Index, and in 2016 the country was ranked 170, out 
of 188, with over 70% of the population thought to be living below the poverty 
line9 (UNDP, 2016). 
Agriculture 
With approximately 84% of the population living in rural areas (World Bank, 
2016), the agricultural sector forms the backbone of the country’s economy. 
Activities are undertaken at a range of scales, from large commercial enterprises 
through to subsistence farming, and the sector accounts for 70% of total 
employment in the country (World Bank, 2017). Since its days as a British 
protectorate, agriculture has been a particular focus for interventions aimed at 
promoting economic development, with a number of cash crops being introduced 
by early missionaries and settlers, to varying degrees of success. Morton (1975) 
documents the importance of tobacco, cotton, and tea to the country’s economy 
since the 1900s, and tobacco in particular continues to play a significant role in 
Malawi’s economy. Accounting for approximately 55% of the country’s total 
exports, Malawi is one of the largest producers of tobacco in the world. Such 
reliance, however, brings with it vulnerability, as the country’s economy is 
sensitive to both changes in the global market for crops, and to climatic 
conditions affecting yields (FAO, 2003). Volatility in the agricultural sector more 
widely also exacerbates issues of poverty, with crop failures creating periods of 
                                               
9 Population living below income poverty line, PPP $1.90 a day (UNDP, 2016). 
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food insecurity, and diverting the attention of local and international 
development actors away from long term development initiatives, with the need 
to provide emergency support. 
International Relationships 
Malawi’s political past is mirrored in its current international relationships. 
Hastings Banda became Prime Minister of Malawi in 1963, and oversaw the 
country as it gained independence from Britain in 1964. The two countries, 
however, maintained close links, and Malawi continued to be heavily reliant on 
foreign aid, with receipts from Britain alone representing approximately half of 
all government spending in the years immediately following independence. The 
country’s first, post-independence, multi-party elections in 1994 saw the arrival 
of President Bakili Muluzi. In the same period, concerns about inefficiency, poor 
management practices and corruption were also being widely voiced, with the 
Malawian Government accruing debt at such a rate that in the early 2000s, 
interest payments vastly exceeded spending on areas such as education and 
health. Such concerns have continued to this day. The so called ‘Cashgate’ 
scandal during President Joyce Banda’s time in office was a major theme in the 
country’s 2014 general election, and led to the most recent international 
suspension of government support in 2013. As DFID articulated in their 2017 
country report, 
“We work with government, and in support of national priorities, but 
do not currently plan to provide direct support through government 
financial systems” (DFID, 2017: 2).   
Agricultural Credit and MSEs 
Given the historic and continuing significance of agriculture in Malawi’s 
economy, it is unsurprising that the roots of Malawi’s microfinance sector can be 
found in the form of agricultural credit initiatives, most notably, the 
Smallholder Agricultural Credit Administration (SACA). Launched in the 1970s, 
SACA was a department of the Government of Malawi’s Ministry of Agriculture, 
and a manifestation of the country’s post-independence, interventionist 
approach to development. Through this state-run entity, small, subsidised loans 
were made available to farmers, at the discretion of Government agents, with 
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Kumwenda & Madola, (2005) being among those to observe that interventions 
were largely supply rather than demand led. Criticisms of such dynamics, and 
the inefficiencies and expense entailed therein, were reflected in the drive for 
market liberalisation that built up momentum in the 1980s. The early 1990s 
also saw the Government start to scale back its role as a direct provider of loans, 
and begin a transition that continues through to present day, of redirecting its 
efforts to be that of an enabler and supporter of credit services, rather than a 
direct provider. 
The political change brought about by the 1994 elections resulted in 
deliberate efforts to speed-up these emerging processes of market liberalization, 
creating an environment that saw both growth and diversification in the 
Malawian microfinance sector. Participation in informal employment was then, 
and continues to be, high, with farmers establishing micro-enterprises alongside 
their agricultural work, and those affected by high levels of unemployment in 
the formal sector similarly establishing their own ventures. A national baseline 
survey on micro and small enterprises (MSEs), undertaken on behalf of DFID in 
2000, raised the importance of MSEs to the national economy, estimating that 
there were at the time some 747,000 MSEs employing around 1.7 million people 
across Malawi (NSO, 2000). Responding to this growth, the microfinance sector 
of the late 1990s and early 2000s increasingly began to offer micro-loans for 
business use, as well as to support agricultural extension. To give a sense of 
scale of these MSEs, Luboyeski et al (2004) report that the annual turnover of 
71% of such enterprises was less than 50,000MWK, $833 US at the time of the 
survey. Orr & Orr (2002) similarly observe that 90% of these MSEs employed 
four or fewer people, including the owner of the business. 
Microfinance Legislation and Regulation 
In April 2002, Malawi’s ‘Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper’ (PRSP) was 
launched, featuring ambitions to further expand the country’s microfinance 
sector, attract greater international donor support for MFIs, and develop a 
regulatory system to provide oversight of the sector’s activities (IMF, 2002). The 
same year saw the first legislation to progress these ambitions, in the form of 
the ‘Microfinance Policy and Action Plan’, with its previously articulated 
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ambition of reducing poverty in Malawi by encouraging income generation and 
employment creation through increasing the access to credit and other financial 
services (Government of Malawi, 2002: 2). Despite this enthusiasm, Kalanda 
(2006) observes that following the approval of the Plan in 2002, action to take 
forward its ambitions was slow. 
By 2010, the microfinance sector in Malawi incorporated NGOs, private 
moneylenders, government run and parastatal agencies, commercial banks, and 
cooperatives (RBM, 2015: 15), with the World Bank estimating that the 
country’s MFIs had a total loan book of 12 billion MWK, and were reaching close 
to half a million borrowers (World Bank, 2012a: 43). New agencies were entering 
the market, and existing MFIs continued to expand both the geographical reach 
of their operations, and the range of services provided. Despite such growth, 
little achievement against the 2002 ambitions of enhancing regulation and 
gaining strategic oversight of operations had been achieved. The form of 
regulation that potential and established MFIs faced at this time was guided 
more by the nature of the enterprise than the activities that they were 
undertaking, with NGOs and parastatals, for example, facing quite different 
requirements and limitations. Under this haphazard approach, no one entity 
had oversight across the sector. The Reserve Bank of Malawi, the country’s 
Central Bank, and agency with responsibility for oversight and governance of 
the financial sector, had no formal interaction with the majority of MFIs 
operating in the country. Commenting on this situation, the Bank reflected that, 
 “This regulatory environment continued to create unlevel [sic] 
playing field to the different categories of microfinance services 
providers ... Banks with microfinance operations remained the only 
category subject to prudential supervision” (RBM, 2010: 15) 
That same year, however, saw a major step forward in this regard, with the 
passing of the 2010 Microfinance Act, described as,  
“An Act to provide for the regulation and supervision of microfinance 
services and to make provision for matters connected therewith or 
incidental thereto” (GoM, 2010: 4) 
The substance of this act was to establish categories and processes for 
registration and licensing of microfinance institutions. A license to operate, the 
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Reserve Bank explained, would only be granted if MFIs were able to prove 
compliance with required standards of governance and financial management, 
through periodic reporting and inspection (RBM, 2010: 20).  
The 2010 Act, however, offered little specificity on these requirements, 
with the Reserve Bank instead commenting that registration and licensing 
would not begin immediately, and that work to develop specific guidance would 
begin in 2011. 2012 saw progress in this area, with the release of directives 
setting out information on matters such as the requirements and application 
process for licensing, expectations of conduct, and reporting requirements (GoM, 
2012a). These requirements are discussed further in Chapter 8, with a 
particular focus on issues around client protection. 
When, as part of this research, I met with a civil servant10 in the 
Government of Malawi’s Ministry of Finance, he explained that the regulatory 
framework had been kept “intentionally light”, so as to minimise barriers to 
entry for new actors coming in to the sector. This is reflective of the 
Government’s continued support for microfinance, and a belief that the benefits 
of encouraging growth and expansion outweigh the potential risks of such loose 
oversight. As such, MFIs have significant freedom to operate how and where 
they wish. Furthermore, regulation and oversight are managed centrally, from 
the Bank’s Blantyre and Lilongwe offices, with no role for regional actors, such 
as local government.  One manifestation of this is that while capacity for the 
sector to further expand has been identified at the national level, certain areas 
are saturated, while others remain under-served. In the outskirts of Malawi’s 
cities and towns, concentrated pockets of microfinance activity have emerged. In 
such areas, MFIs can attract large numbers of clients in close proximity to one 
another. This offers a financial advantage to MFIs, as loan officers’ 
‘unproductive’ travel time is reduced, and they are able to increase their client 
numbers more easily than their rurally focused counterparts. Such operational 
advantages, however, do not necessarily correlate with need, and this dynamic 
exposes a tension central to criticisms of microfinance, namely whether the 
                                               
10 Golden Nyasulu, Principle Economist in the Government of Malawi’s Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Planning and Development 
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sector is more motivated by issues of financial efficiency than poverty outreach. 
This is a subject that will be explored more fully in the following literature 
review, and in subsequent chapters. 
The Sector Today 
At the time that this research began, 27 licensed and registered MFIs were 
operating in Malawi, with a collective loan book worth 27.9 billion MWK (RBM, 
2015: 49). The sector showed strong growth, with the loan book having been 
valued by the Reserve Bank at 9.3 billion MWK only one year previously. The 
number of clients accessing loans through MFIs was also continuing to grow. In 
a 2014 study on behalf of the Reserve Bank of Malawi, Chirwa & Mvula found 
that 4.9% of the population of Malawi, some 833,000 people11, had accessed 
credit from an MFI some at some point in the last five years, in comparison to 
1.27% who had accessed formal credit, (Chirwa & Mvula, 2014: 45). By 2015, the 
Bank reported that the number of active clients had reached 1,296,640 (RBM, 
2015: 50), outpacing the rate of population growth in the country. 
Cloud Loan Operations and Structures 
Group Lending 
While a diversity of organisations and practices constitute the microfinance 
sector, both globally and within Malawi, MacPherson et al (2015) observe that a 
number of common characteristics can frequently be observed across 
microfinance programmes, particularly those run by NGOs. These are 
observable too in Cloud Loan. The first of these characteristics is that loans are 
granted to groups rather than individuals. This was a policy of the influential 
Grameen Bank, and is regarded within Cloud Loan as a means of balancing 
outreach with risk. While multiple factors contribute to the exclusion of 
prospective microfinance clients from commercial banks and financial 
organisations, among the greatest is the risk that they pose for the lender: if a 
borrower does not have assets to put up as collateral against a loan, then the 
lender has no protection if that borrower defaults. The joint and several liability 
                                               
11 Based on a population size of 17 million in 2014 (World Bank, 2016) 
36 
 
model of group lending offers an alternative means of security for the lender, as 
should one individual client default on their loan, the group to which they 
belong undertakes to make up that shortfall. Furthermore, the knowledge that 
failing to repay a loan will result in an additional burden landing on friends and 
neighbours is thought to act as a form of social pressure, encouraging the high 
repayment rates observed within Cloud Loan, and MFIs more widely. As will be 
raised in Chapter 5, however, there are concerns across the sector about how 
such pressure may manifest in harmful behaviours, such as undue pressure 
being placed on clients, or defaulters having their possessions seized, by fellow 
group members. 
At Cloud Loan, groups are self-forming. Staff from local branches will 
visit communities to promote the organisation, and discuss with prospective 
clients how the service works, and what they can offer. From there, those who 
are interested in taking a loan are encouraged to join with family members and 
neighbours, and approach Cloud Loan as a fully formed group. In line with the 
principles of group lending, Cloud Loan state that this approach means that 
clients will only bear the risk of liability for repayments of those they choose and 
trust. Over successive loan cycles, it is common for membership to change, with 
individuals leaving, either by their own volition or the will of the group, and new 
members joining. Commonly, Cloud Loan credit groups are of between 15 and 20 
members, though increasingly the organisation is encouraging larger groups, as 
a means of improving the efficiency of field operations: fewer, larger groups 
require less loan officer time, and fewer miles travelled, reducing two of the 
organisations major operational costs of staff salaries and fuel. The issue of cost 
savings is one that will emerge throughout this thesis, particularly in Chapters 
3, 6 and 8, where it will be questioned whether aspirations of financial 
sustainability are overshadowing accountability to clients, and to the 
achievement of social impact. 
Repayment 
The second common characteristic that MacPherson et al describe is that the 
period of the loan is often short, with repayments starting quickly after the loan 
is disbursed. Cloud Loan offers a range of loan products, which can broadly be 
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divided into two categories. The first are what are referred to here as Normal 
Loans. These normal loans refer to products where money is lent to clients for 
them to use as they wish. Ostensibly this is for the client to establish or expand 
a business of their choosing, though as Chapter 4 raises, checks on how such 
loans are actually utilised are limited. The second category of products are 
Venture Loans. Through these loans, Cloud Loan will, often working with a 
partner organisation, offer clients the inputs to establish a specific venture, such 
as fish farming, or agriculture, with sums equal to the value of these inputs 
being repayable to Cloud Loan. These venture loans will be discussed more fully 
in Chapter 5. The precise duration and repayment arrangements for Cloud Loan 
clients varies by loan type, but all loans are repayable over periods of two to 
twelve months. The majority of clients hold a Standard Loan, a normal loan 
product which requires fortnightly repayments over a four-month period, 
beginning two weeks after the loan is disbursed. While groups share collective 
responsibility for repayment of loans, individual clients within each group are 
free to apply for loans of varying sizes, depending on their needs. These loans 
can be of up to 30,000MWK (£36)12 for new clients, or 180,000MWK (£214) for 
returning clients whom branch staff deem capable of managing a larger sum. In 
all cases, repayments are made through a local, commercial bank. At the 
fortnightly repayment meeting, the group will gather, bringing with them the 
money for their repayment contribution. Under the oversight of the loan officer, 
office bearers elected by the group from within their own membership, will pull 
together these contributions, making note of each individual contribution, and 
checking that all members have paid their share. As part of the loan agreement, 
clients also undertake to make regular savings deposits, alongside their loan 
repayments. This is a practice that Cloud Loan promote as a means of 
supporting clients to improve their financial management skills, and to make 
the impacts of increased profits through business expansion more sustainable. 
Records are similarly made of individual clients’ savings deposits, and all cash is 
then gathered by a member of the group who will travel to the designated local 
bank branch. At no point should the loan officer, or any other member of Cloud 
                                               
12 All currency conversions in this thesis are made at 2015 rate of 842 Malawian Kwacha 
(MWK) to the pound, unless otherwise stated. 
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Loan staff, handle cash directly. Having deposited the repayment and savings 
contributions at the bank, the group member receives a deposit slip, which they 
will then deliver to their local Cloud Loan branch office. For some groups, both 
journeys are short and easy, though for other more remote clients, this is a more 
significant undertaking, and one that is frequently made more difficult by 
unexpected early bank closures and travel disruptions. 
In addition to overseeing clients’ loan repayments at these meetings, the 
loan officer will also deliver training for the attending clients. These centrally 
crafted modules cover a range of subjects around financial management and 
business development, and are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.  
Graduation 
A further common trait, identified by MacPherson et al, and observed in Cloud 
Loan, is the potential for clients to graduate to larger loans. It is the norm 
within Cloud Loan that having completed a loan cycle, the group will return to 
the organisation for another loan. The CEO and Founder of Cloud Loan 
describes that such returns are encouraged due to the belief that each loan cycle 
will bring about a deeper level of impact for participating clients, and their 
families. As previously described, at the discretion of branch staff, clients who 
have proved themselves capable of managing a preliminary loan are invited to 
apply for larger loans in subsequent lending cycles. Beyond this, other normal 
loan products are also available. Some branches, for example, offer smaller loans 
of no more than 25,000MKW (£30), repayable on a weekly basis over a period of 
two months, for clients who staff consider unable to manage the larger, standard 
loan. The intention is that through these smaller loans, clients will build both 
their business and financial management skills, enabling them to graduate to 
the standard product. Similarly, for clients who are considered to have excelled 
in their use and management of standard loans, larger normal loans are 
available. These loans, repayable in monthly instalments over the course of a 
year, can be for up to 350,000MWK (£416). Such loans are described by Cloud 
Loan as being a bridge between microfinance and commercial finance, helping 
clients to build their enterprise to the point where they are an attractive and 
secure proposition for mainstream banks.  
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Lending to Women 
Globally, the majority of microfinance clients are women (BNP Paribas, 2017), 
and this is also true of Cloud Loan’s client base. This again echoes the principles 
of the Grameen Bank, with the CEO and Founder of Cloud Loan explaining 
that, like Yunus, he believes that not only are women more reliable clients, but 
also that they are the most effective ‘change agents’ within their communities, 
reflecting a feeling common in the sector that women are more likely than men 
to use funds for the betterment of their families and communities (MacPherson 
et al, 2015).  
The Micro and Small Enterprise (MSE) sector is one that has been 
identified by the Government of Malawi, and other global actors, as having the 
potential to be a major engine for economic growth in the country (GoM, 2002b), 
and it is also a sector where women in Malawi are recognised to be playing an 
increasingly significant role13. Chirwa (2008) similarly emphasises the 
contribution that women in Malawi can and do make to the incomes of their 
households, but goes on to note that their ventures have long been limited by 
factors including inequality of opportunity, and lesser access to productive 
resources and capital. Microfinance is presented by agencies such as Cloud Loan 
as being a means by which such inequalities can be addressed. Despite domestic 
and international efforts, however, the Reserve Bank of Malawi reported that in 
2015 women accounted for only 44.2% of the country’s microfinance clients 
(RBM, 2015: 50), showing that despite these targeted interventions, inequality 
persists.  
As Johnson (2005) observes, while the microfinance sector is highly 
gendered, as a result of this focus on lending to women, relatively little gender 
analysis has been done. Without an understanding of the dynamic relationships 
and contexts in which women find themselves, she continues, interventions are 
liable to be less effective, or inappropriate. Chirwa (2008) also emphasises that 
to maximise the benefits of microfinance for women in Malawi, products must be 
tailored. In his study on the effects of gender on the performance of MSEs, 
                                               
13 I explore the Malawian MSE sector more fully in Chapter 4 
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Chirwa goes on to note differences in the nature of female versus male owned 
MSEs, and their differing sensitivity to various circumstances and forms of 
support. He notes, for example, a tendency for female led enterprises to be 
home-based, and often less profitable than male-led businesses, more commonly 
strategically located in higher-demand areas. This, he continues, is motivated by 
various factors. As Davison (1993) describes, in the Southern Region, this 
decision can be symptomatic of a desire to maintain traditions of ‘banja’ 
production. More broadly Chirwa (2008) notes that it may be driven by gender 
disparities in education, and women being unaware of what other business 
opportunities are available, or how to pursue them. Understanding the specific 
motivations and circumstances of clients can therefore support tailored, 
impactful interventions. As Johnson (2005) notes, and I go on to observe in this 
thesis, however, relatively little is known by Malawian MFIs generally, or Cloud 
Loan specifically, of the preferences and circumstances of their clients, who have 
little voice in the way that loans and service are designed and delivered. 
Across Malawi, gender norms, and the relationships between men and 
women, vary. In the Southern Region, for example, many communities still 
adhere to matrilineal traditions, whereby husbands move to their wives’ villages 
after marriage, and rites to land are passed down through the female line. Here 
too, however, women find themselves subject to male gatekeepers, with assets 
commonly controlled by maternal uncles (Phiri, 1983). Conroy (2014) similarly 
observes that women’s autonomy to pursue economic activity, as well as to make 
decisions about their personal relationships and family lives, differs widely 
across the country, and within and between communities, further emphasising 
the importance of specific, contextual understanding in the design of 
interventions.  
 While all of Cloud Loan’s normal loans are granted only to women, men 
are eligible for certain venture loans. In the southern region of Malawi, for 
example, Cloud Loan offers loans in the form of inputs to support the 
establishment of fish farming businesses. At the recommendation of the 
technical partner for this programme, these loans were also offered to men: As 
one branch manager described to me, the organisation knew that husbands and 
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wives would likely work on this venture together, so they preferred to leave it to 
individuals to decide which of them should formally be the client. More broadly, 
however, men feature prominently in the work of Cloud Loan. On entering a 
new community, for example, the organisation seeks the approval of the village’s 
Head Man before any groups are formed. While only named clients participate 
in repayment meetings and training activities, it was also not uncommon for the 
circle of clients to be surrounded by an outer circle of husbands and other male 
relatives, to whom the women would refer in answering certain questions. These 
men, however, are all but invisible from Cloud Loan’s literature and promotional 
materials. Instead, it is the previously described approach of the Grameen Bank 
with their focus on women that is central to the organisation’s brand.  
Within the organisation too, a gender imbalance is observed. The CEO 
and Founder is male, as are all three country managers. In Malawi, all but one 
of the senior management team are men, the majority of branch managers are 
male, and in every branch that I visited, the majority of loan officers were also 
male. As such, while women are the majority recipients, the service that they 
receive is shaped by, and accessed through, men: The pattern of men asserting 
control over the economic activities of women, observed by the likes of Conroy 
(2014) is therefore consciously or otherwise being replicated in Cloud Loan’s 
operations. 
Interest Rates 
Across all these products, the rate of interest applied to loans is 20%, with the 
exception of a particular group of clients discussed in Chapter 7, who pay a 
reduced rate of 12% interest, in compliance with the requirements of an external 
funder. The total interest due is calculated for each client at the start of the 
loan, with the sum being evenly divided across all repayments. Towards the end 
of the period of research for this study, this practice was under review following 
guidance from the Reserve Bank of Malawi that MFIs should adopt a declining 
balance approach, where, while the same sum would eventually be repaid, 
individual instalments would reduce over the course of the loan. This move met 
with resistance from Cloud Loan and other MFIs on the grounds that constantly 
changing repayments could be confusing to clients. At 20%, Cloud Loan is one of 
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the cheaper MFIs currently operating in Malawi. A concern raised throughout 
this piece is that there is a lack of transparency in the sector’s operations, and a 
manifestation of this is that no organisations make their rates easily available 
to the public. Nowhere in Cloud Loan supporter facing literature, for example, 
can details of interest rates be found, with this being described by Cloud Loan 
staff members as commercially sensitive information. This was a situation and 
sentiment reflected in and by other MFIs with whom I met in this study, as I 
was unable to find details of interest rates in any publically available on or 
offline material produced by MFIs. In an interview with the CEO of another 
Malawian MFI in Lilongwe, I posed the question of what interest rate they 
charged three times before it was begrudgingly revealed that the average rate 
across the organisations five different loan products was 45%. A 2012 World 
Bank report similarly raises that in Malawi payroll lenders continue to be 
regarded as microfinance institutions, and even with their relatively more 
reliable and less risky means of loan repayment, clients will frequently pay in 
the region of 30% interest per month, plus any additional charges required by 
the lender (World Bank, 2012a: 43). Cloud Loan’s rate is also competitive when 
compared to formal lending institutions, with the central bank base rate sitting 
at around 25% over the period of this fieldwork14.  
Funding 
This competitive rate is in large part enabled by the way in which Cloud Loan is 
funded. While larger MFIs, such as the South African MFI SEF, frequently 
borrow from commercial lenders to fund their loan book, and therefore have to 
recoup interest on these loans from clients, this practice has so far been resisted 
by Cloud Loan. In 2015, a little over 40% of Cloud Loan’s global income came 
from interest on repaid loans, the most significant single source of income. A 
further 36% came from grant making trusts and institutional donors, such as 
DFID and the Scottish Government, and from online lending platforms, such as 
those I explore in Chapter 7. 15% came from individual donations and the 
revenue from community fundraising events, and 4% came from corporate 
                                               
14 Fieldwork for this research was undertaken in 2014 and 2015. During this period, the 
Bank Rate in Malawi was between 24-25%. Full details on RBM interest rates can be 
found at: https://www.rbm.mw/Statistics/BankRates 
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supporters and other institutions. The remainder was generated through 
miscellaneous in-country grants. Generating income from such sources, 
however, also incurred costs for Cloud Loan, which were passed-on to clients 
through interest rate charges. In 2015, the cost of fundraising activities equated 
to 18% of the organisation’s total income in that year, with returns being more 
unpredictable than commercial borrowing. If a major community fundraising 
event fails to attract crowds and donations of the hoped-for size, for example, 
this can have a significant effect on income and wider operations. Funds from 
institutional donors also bring with them reporting and other administrative 
requirements that can necessitate designated staff capacity. Such demands are 
reflected in Cloud Loan’s staffing structure, with the fundraising team 
composing approximately half of the organisation’s UK workforce. Furthermore, 
more than a third of Cloud Loan’s annual income is classed as ‘restricted’, 
meaning that the organisation has limited scope to deviate from priorities 
agreed with donors, and respond to changing circumstances. 
Staff and Structure 
As has been previously raised, an influential factor in the decision to focus this 
research on one case study was the internal structure of the organisation. Cloud 
Loan’s sprawling footprint sees the organisation’s 161 employees15 working 
across three broad locations: London Head Office, the African Head Quarters, 
and in the field. 
The last of these is the most expansive, describing not one single location, 
but the hundreds of individual communities where Cloud Loan’s interactions 
with their clients occur. In Malawi, Cloud Loan’s services are delivered through 
16 branches16 located across the northern, central and southern regions of the 
country. Each branch office is home to a local team of four or five loan officers, 
under the leadership of a branch manager. Clients interact near exclusively 
with one specific loan officer from their local branch, who will take responsibility 
for all corporate processes pertaining to the group and their loans, and will 
travel to meet group in their own community for each repayment meeting. 
                                               
15 Charity Commission Records, 2016 (Cloud Loan Source 2.2) 
16 Cloud Loan Website (Cloud Loan Source 2.1) 
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Branch offices tend to be located on the edge of the largest city or town in the 
area that they serve. As Cloud Loan’s client base are predominantly rural, this 
means that loan officers will often spend much of their working day out of the 
office, travelling by motorbike between their various groups. As part of process 
of reducing incidents of fraud in the field, in addition to the previously discussed 
filing of bank deposit slips, the whole group must also visit their local office once 
per loan cycle, so that the branch manager can verify details of the group’s 
membership and loan. 
As I introduced in Chapter 1, it was with the organisation’s loan officers 
that I spent the majority of my time in Malawi. The officers whom I met, across 
all branches that I visited, were Malawian, and the majority had roots in the 
community where they were working. One officer in the Southern Region, for 
example, explained to me that she had applied for a job with Cloud Loan, as 
their devolved structure meant that she didn’t have to move away from her 
family for work. In the Central Region, one of the loan officers whom I 
accompanied would similarly often wave to, or stop to speak with, people that 
we passed on the road on our way to meet clients, explaining that they were 
family members or old acquaintances. As I go on to explore in later chapters, 
such familiarity can bring benefits in terms of the efficacy of the organisation, 
but can also present particular challenges for combatting fraud.  
Lipsky (1980) in his work on street-level bureaucrats, describes that 
front-line workers, such as loan officers, are often attracted to roles where they 
share a commitment to the vision and values of the employing organisation. 
Once in the role, however, they will often find themselves constrained by factors 
such as unmanageable caseloads and insufficient resources, resulting in their 
ambitions being disappointed. As I go on to describe in this thesis, these 
observations reflect the experiences of many loan officers with whom I engaged: 
while frequently demonstrating knowledge of, and commitment to, their clients, 
loan officers’ work was heavily informed and controlled by organisational 
procedures and protocols, resulting, as I observe, in frustrations and 
inefficiencies.   
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One branch office that I visited17 shared accommodation with Cloud 
Loan’s African Head Quarters. It is here that the Malawian central 
management team, including the country CEO, Finance Manager, and Head of 
HR and Administration, are also based. Teams providing central functions are 
also located in these offices, including IT support, finance and purchasing, and 
the Social Performance Management team. There is limited physical interaction 
between staff based in Head Quarters and those in branch offices, as, with only 
a few exceptions, visits to the field are rare, and branch staff will usually only 
visit Head Quarters for training, if at all.  While the African Head Quarters 
takes the lead on the day-to-day running of the organisation in Malawi, Cloud 
Loan’s strategic hub remains in London. In 2015, ten staff members, and a 
handful of volunteers, were based in the Head Office, but its relatively small 
size belies its impact on operations and decisions across the organisation. Only 
two staff members in London have a specific operational focus, leading on, and 
supporting as they do Cloud Loan’s work on social performance management, 
which will be introduced in Chapter 3. These staff members, however, play an 
influential role in shaping the way in which services are delivered in the field, 
including the design of loan products, and the development of client training 
modules. The dominant activity in this office is fundraising, with five of the 
office’s ten staff members focused wholly on tasks such as managing existing 
funding relationships, planning and coordinating community fundraising 
events, and applying for funds from institutional donors. As will be discussed in 
Chapters 5 and 6 particularly, such work can mean that the fundraising team 
also play a significant role in shaping the agenda and priorities for the Head 
Quarters and branch offices. 
Chapter Summary 
While throughout this thesis, I will introduce and explore various dimensions of 
Cloud Loan’s work and operations, to provide context for these discussions, I 
have, in this chapter, presented an overview of both Cloud Loan’s background 
and operations, and the evolution of Malawi’s microfinance sector. In so doing, I 
                                               
17 The First Central Region Branch 
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have introduced a number of key themes, which will re-emerge in later 
discussion.  Cloud Loan’s sprawling geography, for example, I discuss as being a 
contributing factor in the problems of poor internal communication, which I 
particularly address in Chapter 6. I have also here introduced the widespread 
support for, and promotion of, microfinance as a means of reducing poverty and 
encouraging development in Malawi. Throughout this thesis, I question the 
validity of these claims, and in the following chapter, I explore further these 
ambitions across the global microfinance sector. 
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Chapter 3: Accountability, and 
Microfinance 
Introduction  
Accountability, as I raised in Chapter 1, has become a prominent aspiration 
across international development, and wider public policy. This prominence, 
however, belies the contested, even contradictory, understandings and 
definitions of the term (Fox, 2007, Mulgan, 2000, Ebrahim, 2003). The purpose 
of this chapter is not to offer a comprehensive review of various perspectives on 
accountability, as several of the texts referred to in this chapter have already 
undertaken such a task.  Ebrahim (2003), for example, explores legal and 
economic perspectives on accountability. Walsh (2014) similarly reviews various 
theoretical perspectives, considering accountability from a structuralist, 
institutionalist, and actor oriented-approach. As Fox (2015) argues, however, 
there is such complexity and diversity in the field of accountability that 
conventional frameworks are of limited value. Instead, he proposes that 
practical experience and consideration of specific, real-world examples should 
inform understanding (Fox, 2015: 347). This, as described in Chapter 1, is a 
belief that has also inspired this research. As such, I don’t here seek to replicate 
the comprehensive presentation of such frameworks that others have 
undertaken. Instead, I offer an introduction to the key literature, ideas and 
debate around the two central themes of this research, accountability and 
microfinance, as a means of providing context and background for forthcoming 
chapters and discussion. 
 Starting first with the subject of accountability, I argue that what unites 
the diverse perspectives and interpretations of accountability is that they are 
fundamentally concerned with relationships and exchange. Building on this 
understanding, I go on to explore the three groupings of relationships around 
which I structured my analysis, and the presentation of findings in this thesis: 
Upwards Accountability, to donors and regulators; Downward Accountability, to 
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beneficiaries and communities; and Internal Accountability, within the 
organisation. 
 In the second part of this chapter, I build on Chapter 2’s discussion of the 
Malawian microfinance sector, to offer a more general introduction to 
microfinance. In particular, I reflect on a question that I later ask of Cloud Loan, 
and explore for what the global microfinance sector is accountable. In reviewing 
literature on microfinance as a tool for development, four key aspirations 
repeatedly recurred; to reduce poverty, to promote freedoms and empowerment, 
to support profit making enterprise, and to achieve financial self-sufficiency. I 
explore each of these themes in turn, introducing challenges and areas of debate 
and contention around these achievements, many of which I later raise in my 
examination of accountability in Cloud Loan. 
Accountability: A Relational Concept 
While its current prevalence in development discourse has been relatively recent 
(Mulgan, 2000), Day & Klein (1987) trace the concept of accountability back to 
ancient democracies, discussing the dual pillars of political and financial 
accountability: Elected leaders and state officials, the pair discuss, were held 
accountable through democratic means, for their decisions, and their 
management and use of collective and state resources. While these ideas of fiscal 
and legal accountability remain prominent (Crack, 2013a), Mulgan observes 
that “the concept of ‘accountability’ has lost some of its former 
straightforwardness and has come to require constant clarification and 
increasingly complex categorization” (Mulgan, 2000: 555). Across this 
complexity, however, what unites various conceptualisations of accountability is 
that they are fundamentally concerned with relationships (Jacobs & Wilford, 
2010; Ebrahim, 2003; Unerman & O’Dwyer, 2006; Najam, 1996). Mulgan (2000) 
raises the centrality of relationships to understanding accountability, in his 
assertion that the defining characteristics of contemporary accountability is its 
concern with interaction and exchange, whereby one individual or body demands 
accountability from, or is held to account by, another. This view is echoed by 
Gray (2001) in his statement that being accountable is about, “identifying what 
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one is responsible for and then providing information about that responsibility 
to those who have a right to that information” (Gray, 2001: 11). Cornwall et al 
(2000) take a broader view, but raise similar themes, in their understanding 
that accountability is not simply reactive, and instead actors should proactively 
seek to hold themselves accountable to others. In these few reflections, the 
complexity that Fox (2015) and Mulgan (2000) discuss can be seen, as while each 
are concerned with relationships and interactions, they offer different answers 
to the questions of to whom actors should seek to be accountable, how and for 
what. These are questions that this chapter will return to, and this thesis seeks 
to address. 
 As Ramalingham (2013) discusses at length, our world today is one of 
ever increasingly complexity and interconnectedness, where a variety of public, 
private and third sector organisations operate and interact within systems of 
delegated authority and collaboration. As Crack (2013b) discusses, since the 
Cold War, Governments have increasingly partnered with or contracted NGOs 
and others to deliver aid and relief programmes. Behind any one intervention, 
therefore, will be numerous actors, including groups and individuals whose lives 
and livelihoods will be affected by the intervention, those whose support and 
permission is necessary for work to be undertaken, and actors directly involved 
in delivery and operations (Gray et al, 1996; Unerman & O'Dwyer, 2006). As 
Hilhorst articulates, this diversity means that, “NGOs must answer for the 
quality and impact of their work in a range of different arenas” (Hilhorst, 2003: 
125).  Furthermore, as organisations themselves become larger and more 
complex, actors within those organisations are likely also to face internal 
accountability demands. This breadth of engagement makes the consideration 
and study of relationships vital in understanding development interventions. As 
Eyben (2006) argues, the quality of an organisation’s internal and external 
relationships have a great influence on the effectiveness and impact of an 
organisation and their intervention, and Hilhorst (2003) similarly contends that 
it is accountability that promotes well-functioning, harmonious relationships. 
Within this diversity of actors, their ability to demand accountability 
from one another varies significantly, commonly as a result of their differing 
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abilities to withhold funding and permissions key to the undertaking and 
success of an intervention (Walsh, 2014). Similarly, in different relationships, 
subjects of interest will vary, as will the most appropriate mechanisms and 
processes of accountability. A regulator, for example, may seek assurance that 
certain safety standards are being met in the course of operations, or a donor 
may demand financial accounting for how funds have been used. Hilhorst 
(2003), however, cautions against restricting consideration of accountability to 
such formal mechanisms, encouraging examination of everyday interactions, 
within and between organisations and actors. In my time with Cloud Loan, I 
observed that relationships and interactions fell into three broad categories, and 
it is in this form that I present my findings in this thesis. The first of these 
groups concern relationships with influential actors, such as donors and 
regulators, commonly grouped under the label of Upwards Accountability. 
Secondly, I reflect on Cloud Loan’s relationships with their clients, or 
beneficiaries; a set of relationships that fall under the heading of Downward 
Accountability. Thirdly, I consider Internal Accountability, or the accountability 
relationships within the organisation. In this next section I discuss some of the 
existing literature and thinking on each of these areas of accountability, but 
before proceeding, it is valuable to reflect on the language used. The ‘Upwards’ 
and ‘Downward’ labels are somewhat jarring, imbuing as they do a sense of 
superiority on the former group, and diminishing the latter. This is not how they 
are intended in their use here. I thought, in the process of this research, of 
coining different labels, but as these reflect the terms regularly used by 
practitioners (Fox, 2018; Jacobs & Wilford, 2010), I have retained them in this 
thesis, as a means of better situating this work in existing discourse. 
Upwards Accountability 
Edwards and Hulme define accountability as being “the means by which 
individuals and organisations report to a recognized authority, or authorities, 
and are held responsible for their actions” (Edwards & Hulme, 1995: 9). While 
this definition opens up further areas of ambiguity and debate around authority 
and legitimacy, it is one that reflects clearly the hierarchical nature of many 
writers’ conceptualisations of accountability. It is this hierarchy that typifies 
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upwards accountability. Gailmard (2012) and Ebrahim (2003) are among those 
who engage the Principal-Agent Model in seeking to describe such relationships. 
Here one actor – the Principal – provides inducements to other actors – the 
Agent(s) – to make decisions and pursue activities which further the agenda and 
priorities of the Principal. A common construct in the world of public policy, this 
conceptualisation has permeated much of the discourse and practice around 
accountability more widely. When examining different organisations, contexts, 
and interventions, the identity of the principal will similarly vary, and as 
Ebrahim (2003) raises, an individual NGO can find themselves taking on the 
role of either Principal or Agent. For example, an NGO may be accountable to a 
donor for the delivery of an agreed programme of work, but in delivering this 
work, they may, as described in the previous section, partner with or contract to 
other actors or agencies, who in turn find themselves accountable to the grant 
holder. Similarly, as I discuss in Chapter 6, such hierarchies can exist within an 
individual organisation. 
At the core of this understanding of accountability is the ambition to 
make available an account of work to an actor removed from the direct site of 
operations and activity. In exploring this motivation, ideas of control and 
surveillance quickly come to the fore, leading Hilhorst (2003) to draw parallels 
with Foucault’s discussion of the Panopticon. As a symbol of surveillance, the 
Panopticon is described as a structure where individual units are separated, and 
overlooked by an authority, remote from, and invisible to, the observed 
(Hilhorst, 2003; Foucault, 1995/1975). Such a symbol is useful in illustrating the 
unidirectional flow of information up to the Principal or Patron, common in 
models of upwards accountability, with its absence of interaction between, and 
feedback to, subordinate units. These are themes which resonate with 
discussions in later chapters, particularly those considering internal and 
upwards accountability in Cloud Loan. 
Exploring hierarchical relationships in aid and development, Najam 
(1996) identifies that the power and resources of Principals, or Patrons, mean 
that without their support, work cannot be undertaken. This status, he 
continues, makes it unsurprising that NGOs will often prioritise accountability 
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to these groups. Bongasu (2015) makes a similar observation in her reflections 
on accountability in microfinance, identifying that the adoption of private sector 
practices, by microfinance organisations and supporters, have also played a 
significant role in organisations’ default prioritisation of the most powerful 
stakeholders, most closely connected to an intervention. Even within this elite 
group, however, inequality persists, with those offering financial support 
commonly enjoying the most attention. Sinclair, for example, labels 
microfinance as being a $100 billion industry, but one that we collectively “forgot 
to regulate” (Sinclair, 2012: 218). Drawing on Weber (1978), Hilhorst (2003) and 
Walsh (2014) both reflect that systems of accountability enable expectations to 
be codified, and responsibilities clearly defined. Such actions provide a common 
justification for the promotion and privileging of upwards accountability, as 
powerful actors, such as governments, who have ultimate responsibility for the 
welfare of citizens, can use regulatory systems to enshrine the rights of their 
citizens, and ensure adherence to standards and commitments. In contrast, 
however, raising deficiencies in regulation, many commentators return to the 
neoliberal ideology that underlies large parts of the microfinance sector, 
reflecting on expressed concerns that government intervention will interfere 
with the free market operations integral to the approach. Hartarska too raises 
concerns over national governments’ attempt to regulate microfinance, 
observing that, in her research, she has found that audit and supervision of 
microfinance organisations by central bank authorities has little effect on the 
performance of those organisations (Hartarska, 2005: 1640). As I introduced in 
the previous chapter, a fledgling regulatory system has been established for the 
microfinance sector in Malawi, but, as will be explored and argued in later 
chapters, I observed the primacy of financial partners’ interests and demands in 
shaping the work of Cloud Loan, and also the limited influence of the national 
regulator in Malawi. 
Globally, various international initiatives have been established to 
compensate for perceived failings and weaknesses in national regulation of 
microfinance. The Smart Campaign, for example, was established by CGAP and 
Accion International, as a means of promoting ethical, transparent practice 
across the global microfinance sector which will, they claim, “help the 
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microfinance industry remain both socially focused and financially sound” (The 
Smart Campaign, ND). The Campaign have sought to establish themselves as a 
kite mark for good practice in microfinance, and in so doing encourage 
accountability beyond financial arrangements. Chuck Waterfield, CEO of the 
now defunct ‘Microfinance Transparency’, however, talked of the Campaign in 
his address at the 2014 Microfinance Summit. In his speech, he raised the lack 
of verification, questioning whether signatories of the campaign were, in reality, 
adhering to the standards that it prescribed. In particular, he raised that one of 
the microfinance organisations proudly proclaiming its adherence was the 
recently disgraced Mexican MFI, ‘Compartamos’, whose actions differed widely 
from the Campaign’s ideals (Militzer, 2014). Sinclair (2012) documents his 
engagement with another microfinance transparency initiative, Africa 
Microfinance Transparency (AMT). Seeking to raise concerns regarding the 
operations of an MFI with whom he was working, Sinclair approached AMT. 
Despite having his study and findings supported and verified by academics, 
including David Roodman, a former Senior Fellow at the Center for Global 
Development, and the issues raised in this study being documented in the 
popular press, AMT took no action, and the MFI’s verification was not 
withdrawn. While such examples have led many to criticise the value of such 
initiatives, these issues also serve to reinforce the previous observations, that 
when an actor cannot threaten to withhold funds or essential permissions, their 
ability to encourage certain behaviours, and hold agencies accountable for their 
actions, is limited. 
Downwards Accountability 
A second distinct area of discourse around NGO accountability concerns 
relationships between NGOs and their beneficiaries, or the communities in 
whose name work is being undertaken. As the Humanitarian Accountability 
Partnership (HAP), now part of the CHS Alliance, describe, 
“Accountability has many meanings. Traditionally, it was understood 
as the way in which those who authorised others to act on their 
behalf made sure that authority was being used as agreed. 
Accountability is now more often understood to also be a right of 
anyone affected by the use of authority.” (HAP, 2010: 1) 
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As this quote describes, downward accountability can be seen as an evolution in 
thinking on accountability, and the result of growing dissatisfaction with the 
prioritisation of donors, and the marginalisation of beneficiaries and their 
communities (Edwards & Hulme, 1996). Reflecting the previous discussion of 
upwards accountability, however, writing almost 20 years after Edwards & 
Hulme, Walsh observes that this imbalance persists, describing that, a “common 
thread in [accountability literature] is the view that accountability in NGOs is 
skewed towards donors and away from beneficiaries” (Walsh, 2014; 93). The 
Lord Ashdown led, DFID Humanitarian Emergency Response Review similarly 
acknowledges an ongoing deficit in downward accountability, stating that, "The 
people who are on the receiving end of our assistance are rarely if ever consulted 
on what they need, or able to choose who helps them or how" (Ashdown, 2011: 
8).  
 Issues raised in the previous discussion on upwards accountability offer 
one explanation for this imbalance: The recipients of aid, or beneficiaries of 
interventions, rarely are in a position to withhold funding, or other vital 
permissions, without which the project could not proceed. Smith & Miller (2018) 
also raise the connection between upwards and downward accountability, 
observing that NGOs are facing ever greater demands from donors in terms of 
reporting and assessment, and with finite capacity and resources, servicing 
these demands can come at the direct cost of initiatives focused on beneficiaries. 
Bongasu (2015) similarly observes that mechanisms of accountability differ 
between the two groups. While the demands of donors tend to involve tangible, 
formal reporting, engagement with communities is more likely to take the form 
of conversation and the creation of ongoing opportunities for participation and 
feedback. As Civicus observe of accountability, “It is a process, and the result of 
a process, not an end in itself. It defines the quality of relationships between 
those effecting and those affected by power” (Bonbright & Batiwala, 2007: 4). 
Such efforts, as Chapter 8 explores, require ongoing investment of time and 
resources, which organisations may find prohibitive. Furthermore, the way in 
which programmes and NGOs are funded can also create a barrier to 
undertaking such processes in a meaningful way. It is, for example, not unusual 
for plans to be made and agreed before funds or time are made available to 
55 
 
undertake engagement activities. Community consultations are therefore too 
often subject to what Najam (1996) describes as ‘aspiration manipulation’, with 
agencies entering in to engagements with a pre-existing agenda, selecting to 
hear only what confirms or corresponds with their already identified priorities 
and plans. Similar critiques can also be levied at organisations which only offer 
one form of intervention, such as Cloud Loan’s sole focus on microfinance. In 
such cases, however high quality the engagement activities, and whatever issues 
and priorities are identified, the outcome will be a binary choice between that 
organisation’s specialism, or nothing. 
While investing in relationships with beneficiaries may not be essential 
in terms of securing funding, there is an increasing recognition that, as Jacobs & 
Wilford raise, “In order to be effective, NGOs need to maintain the trust and 
support of various stakeholders, including the intended beneficiaries of their 
work” (Jacobs & Wilford, 2010: 799). Featherstone (2013), in a study on behalf of 
HAP members, draws similar conclusions, observing that,  
“Accountability mechanisms improved the targeting of assistance, 
the nature of supported interventions and the location of services. 
Community participation provided agencies with a better 
understanding of local vulnerabilities and increased the usefulness of 
projects to communities” (Featherstone, 2013:5).  
This is a theme that will also be raised in this thesis, where I argue the 
importance of communicating with, and facilitating feedback from, clients, as a 
means of ensuring that interventions are appropriate and effective, and 
operations are ethical and efficient.  
Internal Accountability 
Just as an individual NGO will have multiple and various relationships with 
other groups and organisations, so too will there be myriad connections and 
exchanges within that NGO. The importance of understanding and supporting 
internal relationships is emphasised by Roberts, in his articulation that,  
“Those whom an individual works alongside or encounters elsewhere 
in the organization become the network through which an individual 
shares and builds a common understanding” continuing that the 
“unsurveilled spaces of organizational life…all become the contexts 
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for an alternative form of accountability in which the sense of events 
is negotiated” (Roberts, 1996: 49) 
Ebrahim (2005) similarly observes, of accountability practices in NGOs, that, 
“while serving the necessary function of providing basic data on NGO 
operations, [mechanisms and processes] emphasize upwards 
accountability to funders, with only limited indication of the quality 
of NGO work and almost no attention to downward accountability to 
local communities. These are external approaches to accountability, 
enforced through punitive threats such as the loss of funding. While 
important, this external and upwards approach has only limited 
potential for encouraging NGOs and funders to take internal 
responsibility for shaping longer-term performance for impacting 
problems of poverty” (Ebrahim, 2005b: 158-159). 
As both writers raise, these internal relationships and processes form an 
integral part of the way in which programmes are delivered, and 
information is processed. Paradoxically, however, these vital processes are 
often ill-considered in the context of accountability.   
Emphasising the importance of effective internal relationships and 
processes, Dixon et al (2006) further raise that, where systems of internal 
accountability have failed, the results can include resources being wasted, 
as decisions are being made based on incomplete or inaccurate 
information. Furthermore, such failings can have consequences for forms 
of external accountability, as if flawed or incomplete information forms the 
regime of truth within an organisation, then this is what will be conveyed 
to other actors. As O’Dwyer (2005) observes, tools of accountability are 
only as good as the organisations and people using them. If bad habits and 
misconceptions remain unchallenged, and sufficient resources are not 
invested, then they will not be effective (O’Dwyer, 2005). Hartarska (2005), 
in her work with microfinance agencies, makes similar observations, 
arguing that the governance and internal arrangements of MFIs are 
inextricably linked to the impact that they are able to achieve in the world, 
and the degree to which they can ensure that an appropriate product is 
effectively delivered to target groups. Citing studies such as Campion 
(1998), Rock et al (1998), and McGuire (1999) she continues by 
highlighting that despite this link, internal issues and processes often go 
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unexplored in studies of microfinance, and in monitoring and evaluation 
and impact assessment exercises. 
As discussed in the context of upwards accountability, hierarchical 
relationships can manifest at a range of levels, including within an organisation. 
As Crack (2013b) describes, accountability within organisations is commonly 
characterised by lines of hierarchy, meaning that just as accountability for the 
achievement of specific objectives can be demanded of NGOs by donors, so too 
can leadership within an organisation require compliance with, and reporting 
on, a prescribed set of behaviours and achievements. The influence of 
managerialism on such processes is highlighted by Wallace et al¸ who state that, 
“Accompanying the rise of economic neoliberalism, there has 
developed a particular ideology that managers and particular 
techniques of management have a privileged role in shaping social 
activity and organizational life…managers are considered to be a 
uniquely qualified cadre of professionals to promote the changes that 
neoliberalism espouses” (Wallace et al, 2013: 51).  
The geography of international NGOs can offer a complex space for such 
hierarchies. As greater numbers of staff, and proportions of functions, are 
located and being undertaken further from the centre of an organisation, Suzuki 
warns that, “Offices may lose a sense of sharing the mission of the organization 
as a whole” (Suzuki, 1998: 72). Roberts (2001) raises this as a challenge where 
systems of internal accountability can be a valuable solution, offering the 
potential for core values and ambitions to be shared across an organisation, and 
for individuals and teams to be held accountable for their adherence and 
delivery. Through internal management processes, he continues, people can be 
made to see how they fit in to the wider goals of the organisation. McPeak 
(2001), however, urges caution in this regard, observing that excessively 
controlling systems of accountability can, in contrast to their intended benefits, 
have a deleterious effect on trust and relationships within organisations, 




Building on the conceptualisation of accountability as being essentially 
relational, a fundamental component is that it also involves the giving of an 
account Mulgan (2000). As Hilhorst articulates, there must be a, “report, story, 
calculation or compilation that presents the performance to be accounted for” 
(Hilhorst, 2003: 125). As the previous discussion has raised, the form and 
content of an account is shaped to a significant degree by the question of to 
whom an actor is seeking to be accountable.  
Scott (1998) and Wallace et al (2013) observe that a focus on 
accountability to donors has created a demand for audit and evaluation 
processes which enable complex phenomena and achievements to be simplified, 
and presented in a form that is accessible to remote audiences. In seeking to 
fulfil the demand for management information, a particular appetite for 
quantitative reporting has been observed, a proposed rationale for which is that 
it enables the production of consistent, comparable data. Garbarino & Holland 
(2009) note that through the employment of considered methodologies and 
approaches, such research can engage communities, opening up spaces for 
meaningful dialogues, and generating high quality, insightful reports. Such 
benefits and attributes, they caution, are not, however, automatic, and must be 
prioritised and built-in to approaches and methodologies. 
This veneration of the quantitative can be seen in much contemporary 
discourse, and project infrastructure in the development sector. Logical 
Frameworks, or ‘logframes’, for example, with their associated targets and 
milestones have become central planning and accountability documents. 
Similarly, the growing focus on proving value for money to powerful actors, such 
as donors, has initiated a range of methodologies that also seek to produce 
numerical values, such as Social Return on Investment (SROI), alongside more 
traditional economic measures. Numbers, it seems, are aspirational for their 
objectivity and transparency, though Hilhorst cautions against any such 
perception of neutrality, stating that,  
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“The accountability process itself is as vulnerable to power, 
hierarchy, conflicting interests and interpretations, and as much 
informed by culture, as the ‘real’ situation it aims to provide an 
account of” (Hilhorst, 2003: 144). 
Wallace et al (2013) cite Porter (1995) in drawing particularly strong links 
between a focus on collecting and communicating quantitative data, and a desire 
for increased transparency. They propose that a focus on quantitative methods 
and approaches is generated in situations where there is an absence of trust, 
opining that, “where there is less trust in people, there is greater emphasis on 
impersonality, discipline, and rules” (Wallace et al, 2013: 52). As O’Neill 
contends, however, what is needed is ongoing, active inquiry, not simply the 
collation of figures (O’Neill, 2002a). McGee (2013) further argues that until 
monitoring and reporting efforts move beyond such quantitative disclosures, the 
clarity and usefulness of what they generate will be limited. In the context of 
microfinance, these latter views are reflected too by Simanowitz (2000), who 
raises his concerns of a growing trend in the sector to rely on abstracted, 
quantitative reports, which lead actors to equate simple metrics, such as client 
numbers and repeat borrowing with a positive social impact. 
For what are MFIs Accountable? 
The stories told of microfinance are undeniably compelling: here, advocates 
claim, is an intervention that will boost the incomes of clients and their 
communities, empower participants, and all through an approach that will pay 
for itself, promoting sustainability and reducing reliance on donor assistance. 
Charismatic pioneers and advocates such as Muhammad Yunus have gone so far 
as to claim that microfinance has the potential to eradicate poverty to the point 
of necessitating poverty museums, in order that future generations might 
understand the scale of achievements that have been made (Yunus, 2003). As 
Roodman describes, “Almost no development project has held such strong and 
multidimensional appeal as microcredit. It appeals to the left with talk of 
empowering women and the right by insisting on individual responsibility” 
(Roodman, 2012: 271). It is a technology, however, that has also been the source 
of much criticism and controversy.  
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The challenges of overcoming extreme poverty, and achieving development 
goals, continue to exceed the resources that we have to address them, meaning 
that there is an inherent opportunity cost in the decision to fund or support any 
initiative or programme. This cost is amplified if the chosen approach does not 
deliver the promised impact. As Duvendack et al observe,  
“Microfinance activities and finance have absorbed a significant 
proportion of development resources, both in terms of finance and 
people…There are many other candidate sectors for development 
activity that have been relatively disadvantaged by ill-founded 
enthusiasm for microfinance” (Duvendack et al, 2011: 75) 
Roodman similarly concludes that microfinance has been supported beyond its 
capacity to deliver, exacerbating the failures and challenges in the sector, a view 
he summarises with the statement that, “Less money for microcredit and more 
for bed nets would be a double win” (Roodman, 2012: 274). In the context of 
microfinance, he continues, the opportunity cost of this overinvestment in the 
sector is compounded, as not only are donor and agency resources being diverted 
from alternative interventions, but the savings and income of clients are also 
diverted from other potential uses towards meeting lenders’ savings 
requirements and loan repayments. As I observe in this thesis, clients are also 
required to invest their time, when participating in a microfinance programme, 
to attend training sessions and repayment meetings, and in undertaking other 
related tasks. 
 Such conflict and debate over what microfinance can and does achieve 
make it a sector where the previously raised questions of accountability can 
valuably be considered. While this thesis explores the questions of what one 
specific microfinance organisation, Cloud Loan, seeks to hold themselves 
accountable for, in this section I explore four frequently raised aspirations for 
the microfinance sector more generally. Two of the areas discussed, poverty 
reduction, and business creation and development, are also presented by Cloud 
Loan as core ambitions, and as such are explored in more detail in chapters 4 
and 5. While the subjects of empowerment and financial self-sufficiency are not 
achievements about which Cloud Loan makes as overt claims, the issues raised 




Bateman (2010) recounts the story of Jobra in Bangladesh. Jobra appears often 
in Yunus’ telling of the Grameen Bank’s origins, as he describes that it was on 
visits to the village in the 1970s and ‘80s that he met with aspiring 
entrepreneurs living in extreme poverty, frustrated in their efforts to establish 
and grow businesses by a lack of access to capital. It was this experience, he 
tells, that generated the central concept around which the Bank would operate, 
and the village was the location for early pilots of the Grameen Bank’s approach. 
In 2006, when Yunus was to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his 
contribution to reducing world poverty, a Dhaka newspaper, the Bhorer Kagaj, 
published an article revisiting Jobra, and exploring the effects of the village’s 
long relationship with the Bank, and with microfinance. The sobering article 
found that poverty remained pervasive and extreme in the area, and told the 
stories of number of clients, held up by Grameen as model micro-entrepreneurs, 
who had not experienced the hoped-for gains from participation. The article 
continues by noting that while certain members of the community had 
experienced an improvement in their livelihoods, and were no longer classified 
as living in extreme poverty, these changes had been attributed to their family 
members’ travelling to work in the Gulf states, and sending home remittances, 
rather than any success stemming from microfinance (Bateman, 2010). 
 Just as microfinance has been adopted by agencies around the world, so 
too has it gained the attention of researchers and evaluators. Despite this focus, 
however, evidence to justify the sector’s claims is not overwhelming. A DFID 
systematic review, of impact assessments and evaluations of microfinance 
interventions, for example, observes that, “Despite the apparent success and 
popularity of microfinance, no clear evidence yet exists that microfinance 
programmes have positive impacts” (Duvendack et al, 2011:2). This assertion is 
indicative of broader concerns that the impact of microfinance is not well 
understood due to a lack of data. Sinclair (2012) argues that a lack of rigour in 
monitoring the impact of microfinance programmes on client poverty exists in 
large part down to a lack of clarity on what microfinance agencies are seeking to 
achieve, and therefore what should be measured. Cheston & Reed (1999) 
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similarly explore this issue of inadequate impact data in the microfinance sector, 
recounting issues around quality and cost of impact assessment and wider 
monitoring and evaluation activities. The pair’s discussion is largely 
summarised in their use of a quote from Elisabeth Rhyne, and her assertion 
that,  
“For the most part, evaluations of credit programs are still based on 
the old-view ideas about causality. They are centered on the 
presumption of a direct line of causation between receipt of credit by 
individual borrowers and a particular desired response, for example, 
changed borrower income resulting directly from receipt of a 
particular loan.” (Cheston & Reed, 1999: 23).  
Bateman & Chang are similarly critical of such simplification, observing that, 
“‘More microfinance’ became fully interchangeable with ‘more poverty 
reduction’” (Bateman & Chang, 2009: 2).  
 Interest in overcoming this perceived lack of data and evidence has been 
demonstrated by both practitioners and academics. In Chapter 5 I discuss the 
Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI) tool, developed by the Grameen Bank, and 
employed by Cloud Loan as a means of measuring their impact on the poverty 
level of their clients. Randomised Control Trials (RCTs), often considered the 
gold standard for impact assessment, have been employed by the likes of 
Banerjee et al (2014) in their highly regarded Hyderabad study, and while this 
approach can only tell the story of a particular group at a particular time, and 
extrapolation of findings must be done with caution, their study challenges the 
poverty reduction claims made for microfinance, stating that while some 
differences were noted between the test and control groups, where microcredit is 
available, “it does not appear to fuel an escape from poverty” (Banerjee et al, 
2014: 27).  
 In place of robust data, much of the ‘evidence’ to support claims of 
microfinance comes in the form of specific stories and anecdotes. Roodman 
(2012) opens his own discussion of microfinance with the contrasting tales of two 
micro-entrepreneurs, Murshida and Razia. While Murshida’s participation in a 
microfinance programme was a positive experience, transforming her and her 
family’s lives for the better, Razia’s was quite the opposite, as found herself 
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selling-off assets, including her family’s home, to meet the repayments on her 
loan. Both stories are compelling, and could be well used to justify the 
arguments of both proponents and opponents of microfinance, yet such an 
approach ignores issues of context and scale. All development interventions are 
likely to be experienced differently by different actors, and to reflect only on the 
specific experience of one individual gives little insight into the wider 
intervention and its impact. Drawing on such diversity, Roodman (2012) reflects 
that it is perhaps not that microfinance cannot achieve poverty reduction, but 
that it cannot achieve poverty reduction for everyone, making careful client 
selection a significant, but often overlooked, factor in a programmes’ success. 
This issue of client selection is, therefore, similarly true when giving an account 
of how an intervention has been experienced. 
Freedoms and Empowerment 
As Noeleen Heyzer, then Executive Director of the United Nations Development 
Fund for Women (UNIFEM) observed,  
“Microcredit is about much more than access to money. It is about 
women gaining control over the means to make a living. It is about 
women lifting themselves out of poverty and vulnerability. It is about 
women achieving economic and political empowerment within their 
homes, their villages, their countries.” (Mayoux, 2002: 1).  
Ideas of empowerment and agency, such as Heyzer’s, are tightly woven into the 
microfinance story, and while definitions of empowerment vary, the term was 
defined by the World Bank, in their 2002 publication, ‘Empowerment and 
Poverty Reduction: A Sourcebook’, as “the expansion of freedom of choice and 
action to shape one’s life” (Narayan, 2002: xviii). In ‘Development as Freedom’, 
discussion of similar concepts can be found as Sen puts forward the argument 
that freedoms are integral to development, and that the enhancement of 
freedoms are a means of addressing and alleviating poverty. Roodman (2012) 
draws closely on Sen’s work, arguing that microfinance can bring financial 
freedom, enabling wider opportunities to be realised: children are sent to school, 
for example, and the family are healthy and able to participate in society. Debt 
allows an individual to spend beyond their immediate needs, thereby increasing 
their options and opportunities, and using Sen’s terms, their freedom.  
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 Just as a loan can increase opportunities, however, so too can it reduce 
freedom, acting as a bond that ties the client in to commitments that restrict 
their ability to seize other opportunities. The Grameen Bank have faced 
particular criticism for limiting the freedom and agency of their clients through 
their controversial ‘16 Decisions’, which represent 16 commitments that clients 
must make in order to remain eligible for Grameen Bank loans (Grameen Bank, 
ND). These Decisions include commitments go beyond loan management to 
include, for example, a commitment to keep their families small. As such, they 
go well beyond the requirements clients face when borrowing from more 
mainstream financial institutions. Similar criticisms have been made of 
microfinance’s capitalisation of social relationships through the group lending 
model, which can result in clients who find themselves unable to make 
repayments compounding their financial concerns with social losses (Banerjee et 
al, 2018). Bateman (2010) is among those who make a more fundamental 
challenge on the relationship between microfinance and freedom, as expressed 
in his assertion that microfinance is a means of limiting options and 
opportunities for people living in poverty. Rather than seeking to challenge or 
alter power relations, he observes, microfinance conforms to, and even 
entrenches, the norms and preferences of elites. As Bateman & Chang (2009) 
further contend, microfinance is viewed by some as a deliberate means of 
diverting attention and resources away from more radical initiatives, and 
deliberately disempowering the workforce by steering them in to informal 
enterprise.  If poverty is about power and privilege, Bateman (2010) contends, 
then failing to address these issues will automatically limit the impact of an 
intervention on reducing poverty, and the long term capacity of developing 
countries to fully exploit their own resources and potential. 
Supporting Enterprise and Economic Growth 
Blowfeld & Dolan (2014) describe microfinance as being one of a range of 
initiatives which seek to promote ‘bottom billion capitalism’. Their ambition, 
they continue, is to support greater integration of people living in poverty into 
markets, and to, “harness the mechanisms of private enterprise for 
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developmental ends by repositioning business as a development agent” 
(Blowfield & Dolan, 2014: 23). 
The private sector playing a role in development is not a new 
phenomenon. The size and influence of the global private sector makes it 
unavoidable that its actions and decisions will impact lives and livelihoods, for 
good or for ill. Blowfield & Dolan (2014) however raise that since the 1990s, the 
engagement of the private sector in development has become more deliberate 
and overt, reflecting the wider prominence of neoliberalism. Kramer & Kania 
(2006) similarly explore this trend, documenting the evolution from corporations’ 
initiatives to reduce harm in their operations, such as adhering to minimum 
standards for working conditions and environmental sensitivity, through to 
their engaging in deliberate efforts to address development issues. While it is 
occurring on the micro scale, it is this idea that businesses can be agents of 
development that sits behind the rationale for microfinance as a tool for 
development, as microfinance offers a means by which people living in poverty 
can be integrated into the private sector and markets (Chapter 4). There are 
those who question, however, whether the private sector’s impact can go beyond 
generating wealth to address the more complex issues of development. 
 While Bateman (2010) and Sinclair (2012) are among those who estimate 
that 50-90% of microfinance loans are used to fund consumption spending, 
rather than entrepreneurial development, enterprise remains central to the 
commonly espoused theory of change for microfinance. As previously recounted, 
it was Yunus’ belief that the entrepreneurial abilities and intentions of people 
living in poverty could be released through the provision of investment capital 
(Yunus, 2003). In so doing, individuals could be empowered, and through them, 
whole communities lifted out of poverty. Whether the inherently micro-nature of 
businesses enabled and supported by micro-loans can achieve this scale of 
change, however, has been called in to question. In a powerful piece of imagery, 
Sinclair (2012) compares microfinance to the favelas of Brazil. People, he says, 
flock to these settlements as points on route to the realisation of greater 
aspirations. The ambition of making it big in the city, he continues, is the goal 
that compels this behaviour, just as the dream of building a vibrant and 
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profitable enterprise is projected by MFIs. While there will be some success 
stories among those who follow these paths, in both cases the majority will not 
progress beyond their initial stepping-stone. 
 Exploring the limits of success through microfinance, Bateman (2010) 
raises that, while it is common for loans to be made on a group basis, businesses 
are pursued individually. As such, microfinance overwhelmingly tends to 
support a limited range of informal, accessible economic activities. Increasing 
investment in microfinance therefore, Bateman claims, drives a ‘primitivisation’ 
of the country’s economy, as those living in poverty are encouraged to see their 
best opportunity for change as being through “petty market interaction” 
(Bateman, 2010: 208).  Illustrating the scale of this issue, Bateman & Chang 
(2009) discuss Bangladesh, a country almost synonymous with microfinance, 
and cite a 2003 UN Habitat report which estimated that 63% of the employed 
population of Dhaka are engaged in the informal sector, representing a 
significant capture of human energy and potential. Reflecting on this figure they 
state that, “It is striking that compared to its neighbouring South and East 
Asian countries, Bangladesh is one of the least successful in sustainably 
reducing poverty and promoting ‘bottom-up’ productive enterprise development” 
(Bateman & Chang, 2009: 12). Citing Chang (2006), the pair account for this 
discrepancy by raising that funds equivalent to those invested in 
microenterprise in Bangladesh were invested instead, by their more successful 
neighbours, in industries with greater potential for growth. This, they continue, 
highlights a ‘fundamental fallacy’ within the concept of microfinance: that an 
unlimited number of microenterprises will find demand for their goods and 
services.  
 As Bateman & Chang argue, “informal microenterprises increasingly do 
not raise the total volume of business so much as redistribute or subdivide the 
prevailing volume of business” (2009:10). Bateman (2010) further contends that 
there is a minimum level of production, below which operations are inefficient 
and unlikely to be sustainable. Through their disproportionate receipt of 
subsidised finance, he continues, unsustainable micro-enterprises are able to 
undercut the SME sector, which could offer a more sustainable and powerful 
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engine of economic growth. Bateman & Chang (2009) also describe this issue, 
introducing the concept of ‘adverse selection bias’, whereby those seeking 
investment for more sophisticated initiatives find themselves ineligible for the 
majority of funds available. The pair go on to recount examples from Bosnia 
where the inability to attract appropriate funding led innovative entrepreneurs 
to downgrade their ambitions to match the available funding, or relocate to 
Germany. Both outcomes resulting in a loss to the Bosnian economy. It was 
experiences such as this that led Bateman to assert microfinance interventions 
in the western Balkans actually undermined wider economic recovery efforts, 
and his statement that, “microfinance is largely antagonistic to sustainable 
economic development, and so also to sustainable poverty reduction” (Bateman, 
2010:1). 
 Bateman & Chang (2009) further contend that focusing support on 
uncoordinated, individual enterprises can hinder wider connectivity in the 
economy, with larger enterprises unable to source inputs or sub-contractors to 
enable them to deliver and expand their work. Through a coordinated, collective 
endeavour, they argue, micro-enterprises could make a greater contribution to 
the economy than through competitive individualism. The failure to achieve 
such coordination therefore not only reduces the potential benefits and returns 
for the micro-entrepreneurs, but can have implications for the economy more 
widely, as industries face limits to their expansion, or become increasingly 
reliant on imports to source what they cannot domestically.  
 To return to Sinclair’s analogy, clients are therefore not only finding 
themselves unable to move on from the economic favela of the informal sector, 
but are also finding that space to be becoming increasingly crowded, with the 
expansion of microfinance organisations and services supporting a stream of 
newcomers to invest in similar, competing enterprises. Following basic laws of 
supply and demand, this crowding of the market can have an impact on profits. 
With the tight margins common among informal enterprises, this in turn can 
lead to clients finding themselves unable to manage their loan repayments, let 
alone realise the promised development gains (La Porta & Schleifer, 2008; 
Breman, 2003; Davis, 2006).  
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Financial Self-Sufficiency and Sustainability 
As previously raised, it is frequently argued that microfinance organisations 
differ from other charitable bodies in that they have a greater potential to 
become financially self-sufficient. While certain other forms of aid can be given 
only once, as loans are repaid, the initial sum can be repeatedly lent, arguably 
enabling the intervention to reach more people. This creates an expectation that 
microfinance organisations will go beyond the financial prudency expected of all 
NGOs and development actors, and work towards a state of financial self-
sufficiency. This can create a complex and challenging operating environment, 
as an organisation’s leadership must balance interests of social impact, and 
financial viability (Hartarska, 2005). As Roodman contends, “on any given day, 
in any given place, the immediate business interests of the lender conflict with 
the agency of the borrower” (Roodman, 2012: 219). Bateman & Chang (2009) 
further argue that financial self-sufficiency in microfinance goes beyond being a 
desirable characteristic, and is in fact essential to the legitimacy of an 
intervention. The pair assert that the success of microfinance organisations has 
been, and continues to be, “overwhelmingly” judged on their ability to achieve 
financial sustainability, with relatively little attention given to the social 
impacts of interventions, or effects on reducing poverty. As Bateman (2010) 
continues, if a strategy to achieve profit, or at least financial self-sufficiency, is 
pursued, this is likely to be achieved only at the expense of many of the elements 
that made microfinance so initially attractive as a tool for poverty reduction. 
This echoes the previous observations of an assumed automatic link between 
microfinance and poverty reduction, but as Cheston & Reed describe,  
“just knowing that we increased the debt of 100 million people will 
not tell us that we accomplished what we set out to do, even if we 
delivered that debt in a financially viable manner” (Cheston & Reed, 
1999: 23). 
 The delivery of microfinance services does, however, cost money. If a 
deliberate strategy to reduce reliance on external support is pursued, and these 
costs are not met through subsidies or donor support, then they will have to be 
met by clients. Dehejia et al (2012) examine the relationship between reduced 
subsidies and accessibility of microfinance services, finding that increasing 
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interest rates by 1% led to a reduction in borrowing of over 1%, suggesting that 
while such a move may enhance financial self-sufficiency, even a small increase 
in the cost to the client could prove prohibitive, and reduce poverty outreach. 
Morduch (2000) similarly highlights that an increase in interest rates may alter 
the viable business opportunities for clients, raising the issue of compound 
charges for those who seek to make medium to long term investments, such as 
cultivating crops or livestock rearing. Bateman & Chang (2009) also raise this 
concern, citing the preference of many microfinance organisations for clients 
engaged in businesses with quick turnarounds; a preference which, at scale, can 
severely damage national agricultural sectors, as the pair observe has occurred 
in Cambodia and Kosovo.  
 More broadly, an increasingly corporate approach may encourage MFIs 
to cut interaction time with clients, reducing opportunities for training, or 
feedback and engagement. They may also, in the interest of efficiency, be 
attracted to operating in locations where large numbers can be accessed at 
relatively low ‘unit cost’, often peri-urban areas where the need is not 
necessarily greatest. This can result in microfinance organisations clustering in 
particular communities, leading to an over-accumulation of capacity, driving 
competition between MFIs, and increasing the risk over indebtedness among 
clients through multiple borrowing.  
 Increasingly competitive interests and behaviours, Bateman & Chang 
(2009) claim, can result in capture or corruption of the MFI, turning it into a 
vehicle for private enrichment rather than one for wider public gain. In 
exploring such issues of corruption. Bond (2007) also raise questions about the 
transparency and wider business practice of a number of MFIs, including the 
Grameen Bank, quoting J.D. Von Pischke, then of the World Bank, in his 
assessment that, "[the] Grameen Bank had been at best lax, and more likely at 
worst, deceptive in reporting its financial performance" (Bond, 2007: 231). 
 The benefits of an intervention that is able to be financially sustainable 
should not, however, be ignored: It is widely accepted that a responsible 
development agency should work towards their own exit strategy and avoid 
creating dependency on external support. The impact of an organisation cannot, 
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however, be judged purely on its ability to be financially self-sufficient. 
Discussing this issue, Bateman (2010) offers the tobacco industry as a 
comparison, outlining that this is a profitable, self-sufficient industry, but one 
that cannot be said to boast a net benefit for society. Furthermore, as Roodman 
(2012) raises, sustainability of an endeavour is dependent on more than just 
funding, with political dimensions of space and legitimacy to operate being 
essential. Finally, Morduch (2000) goes beyond discussing whether financial 
self-sufficiency is desirable, and questions whether it is possible, describing that 
the majority of microfinance programmes with which he has engaged have been 
in receipt of subsidies in some form. Morduch goes on to estimate that, “little 
more than 5% of all [microfinance] programs today will be financially 
sustainable ever” (Morduch, 2000: 618). 
Conclusion 
While it is a principle of this research that I sought not to enter the field with a 
pre-conceived framework of accountability, against which to compare my 
observations and findings, in the planning and analysis, I sought to engage with 
the existing work and literature on accountability and on microfinance. In this 
chapter, I have introduced the work that shaped the questions and ideas that 
inspired my research design, and that I took with me in to the field. In so doing, 
this chapter provides an introduction to key concepts that I return to throughout 
this thesis.  
 In Chapter 1, I introduced that while across international development, 
and wider public policy and discourse, there has been widespread acceptance 
that accountability is an ambition towards which all actors should be working, 
and that more accountability will bring benefits to society. Despite this 
agreement, however, a unified definition of what accountability is, and how it 
can be achieved, remains elusive. In this chapter, I argued that what unties 
various conceptualisations of accountability is that they are fundamentally 
concerned with relationships, or the interactions between, and giving of account 
to, different actors, within or outwith an organisation. In my time with Cloud 
Loan, three broad groups of relationships emerged; those with donors and 
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regulators, with beneficiaries and communities, and within the organisation. 
These groups correspond with ideas of upwards, downward, and internal 
accountability, and in presenting an overview of research on and ideas around 
accountability to these groups, I raised several themes that emerged in my 
observations of Cloud Loan. In particular, I raised that there is often a 
prioritisation of upwards accountability, and for accountability efforts to be 
effective and meaningful, sufficient investments of time and resources must be 
made, particularly when considering accountability to beneficiaries. This latter 
theme is one that emerges strongly in Chapter 8’s discussion of downward 
accountability. 
 In this chapter, I also reflected on microfinance. From my review of the 
literature on microfinance as a tool for development, I identified four commonly 
raised ambitions held by microfinance organisations; reducing poverty, 
promoting freedoms and empowerment, supporting enterprise, and achieving 
financial self-sufficiency. While these were often repeated, in my exploration of 
these subjects I raised questions about whether they are ambitions that are, or 
even can be, achieved through microfinance. Two of these ambitions, reducing 
poverty and supporting enterprise, were also articulated objectives of Cloud 
Loan, and as such are explored further in Chapters 4 and 5. In these later 
discussions I build on concerns raised in this chapter, in observing deficiencies 
in the tools and processes employed by Cloud Loan to achieve, monitor and 
report on these objectives. Furthermore, in the context of financial self-
sufficiency, I questioned in this chapter whether it is appropriate for 
microfinance organisations to seek to achieve this objective, raising that it may 
conflict with ambitions of achieving social impact. This again is a theme that 
emerges throughout this thesis, as I observe the frequency with which decisions 
were made in the interest of attracting funds or reducing expenditure, to the 








Chapter 4: Business Creation and 
Development 
 
As we watch a celebrity entrepreneur walking through a bustling, Malawian 
market place, her voice joins the image. “I have spent my life in business” she 
explains, “and one thing that I’ve learned is that even the best ideas often need 
a helping hand to succeed.” Now looking directly at the camera, she continues, “I 
have great belief in the power of business to create opportunity and wealth…I 
want to show you how this charity is helping women in Africa to turn their lives 
around by providing small loans and practical business training”18. 
Hearing that their organisation had been selected to feature in this 
media appeal had been the cause of much excitement in the London office. A 
national broadcaster had offered to arrange for a celebrity to travel to Malawi 
and make a short film about the organisation’s work, which would then be 
televised and featured on various websites, all accompanied with details of how 
viewers could support Cloud Loan’s work. The news had come in during my time 
working in the London office, and was the result of a bid developed by the 
fundraising team some weeks previously. Nina, the fundraising officer who had 
led on this work, was delighted not only at this opportunity for raising funds 
through the appeal, but also that the celebrity partner she had proposed in the 
bid had agreed to participate. “She’s a strong, female entrepreneur” Nina 
explained, “and that’s what we want to communicate. That’s how we want 
people to see our clients, to see our work…That’s what we do, we help our 
women be strong, successful entrepreneurs, like her”. This was not the first time 
that Nina had used such imagery in her work. Within the fundraising team, 
Nina held responsibility for managing relationships with Cloud Loan’s corporate 
supporters, and several times a month would visit current and prospective 
supporters and partners to present on Cloud Loan’s work. In telling me about 
these engagements, she explained that she would often only have about 10 or 20 
                                               
18 Cloud Loan Appeal Video (Cloud Loan Source 4.1) 
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minutes to present, and so would focus on sharing a particular success story, 
telling how a client had been able to grow her business and in so doing improve 
her own life and those of her family members. Despite the engagements being 
short, she reflected that these presentations were often effective, with a number 
of partners including support for Cloud Loan year after year in their staff giving 
and corporate philanthropy schemes. “People are really sympathetic to this 
concept of supporting women to build businesses” she explained, “It’s an idea 
that they understand, it makes sense... People who are in business in the UK 
see the benefits of business overseas”.  
Beyond corporate supporters, these stories of transformation through 
enterprise are ubiquitous across Cloud Loan’s promotional materials. The 
appeal video, for example, was created to attract support from individual 
members of the public, yet follows a similar format to Nina’s corporate 
presentations. Just as Nina focused on specific stories of transformation, rather 
than more general statistics on reach, impact, and effectiveness, the celebrity 
entrepreneur goes on to meet two Cloud Loan clients, who tell their stories of 
how obtaining loans and building their businesses have transformed their lives:  
“My life is good now” the first client comments, “I am comfortable. I 
am able to buy things for my household. Now we have food, my 
children no longer go to bed on an empty stomach. My children’s 
education has improved, now I can afford the things they need to stay 
in school. I can now fend for my family; it gives me hope for the 
future”. 19 
Later, one of Cloud Loan’s branch managers joins the screen, explaining to the 
viewers that such results are possible because, “This is a different approach to 
charity, we are giving them hope, not handouts”20. This was a mantra often used 
by the London based fundraising team, with a member of the team reflecting 
that, “There are a lot of charities. It can be hard to be seen. We want people to 
see that what we do, it’s different”. 
                                               
19 Cloud Loan Appeal Video (Cloud Loan Source 4.1) 




As was discussed in the Introduction Chapter, accountability is frequently 
promoted as a means of ensuring that organisations are doing what they say 
that they are doing. It is this dimension of accountability that inspired the 
question, for what are Cloud Loan accountable? Over the next two chapters, I 
will seek to address this question, this time considering Cloud Loan’s objectives 
around supporting clients to establish and grow profit making enterprises. With 
the creation and development of micro-businesses featuring so prominently in 
Cloud Loan’s presentation of itself, and its theory of change for poverty 
reduction, this chapter explores how the organisation seeks to deliver on their 
articulated ambitions in this area, and hold itself for accountable for 
achievements and impact. 
 This chapter begins by introducing the concept of Bottom Billion 
Capitalism, and how neoliberal ideas of conceptualising poverty as market 
failure underpin the focus on business support in microfinance. Controversies 
around this approach to development will also be introduced, in particular, that 
the relationships between growing businesses and reducing poverty are not 
always as automatic as some purport, necessitating ongoing vigilance and 
assessment. 
In my engagement with Cloud Loan, two core areas of work emerged as 
being the means by which Cloud Loan seeks to achieve its ambitions of 
supporting the creation and development of profit making enterprises: business 
appraisal, and client training. This chapter will consider each of these areas in 
turn. Considering first businesses appraisal, these were presented to me as the 
processes by which Cloud Loan seeks to ensure that clients are investing their 
loans in appropriate, viable enterprises, yet I found there to be a significant gap 
between policy and practice in this field. In this section I present my findings 
that the organisation knew little about how clients used their loans and had 
only superficial information on their businesses. In the face of this lack of 
information, I observe, it becomes difficult for the organisation to evidence and 
understand their impact on clients’ business activities. I further suggest that the 
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organisation’s seeming lack of interest in developing their processes for 
understanding and appraising their clients’ businesses, juxtaposed with the 
prominence of these themes in their external and fundraising literature, is 
indicative of such policies being adopted more for their narrative value and 
appeal rather than intention and commitment to integrate them in to practice. 
 I then move on to consider Cloud Loan’s client training programme, 
where similar observations emerge. Built in to the regular repayment meetings, 
all Cloud Loan clients receive training on matters including the business 
planning, budgeting, and the importance of saving. This training programme is 
presented as being a key means by which the organisation seeks to achieve its 
ambitions of social impact, and set itself apart from the commercial financial 
services sector. Here again, however, I observe that while time consuming for 
both the organisation and clients, the impact of this training programme is ill-
understood. Furthermore, I raise that a lack of flexibility in the curriculum 
means that matters of particular interest to clients may not be raised, and that 
this and the wider mode of delivery contribute to the positioning of clients are 
passive recipients or subjects in their interactions with the organisation which, I 
argue, may be a more compelling motivation for providing training than the 
purported business benefits. 
Microfinance and Bottom Billion Capitalism 
Supporting entrepreneurship and business development are integral themes in 
the way in which Cloud Loan talks about itself: In a 2010 report, for example, 
the organisation’s CEO and Founder describes that the mission of the 
organisation is, “to help poor rural women set up businesses to generate income 
to feed and look after their families”21. Beyond Cloud Loan, this is also, more 
broadly, a central component of the global microfinance narrative. It is this focus 
which leads Blowfield & Dolan (2014) to describe microfinance as being one of a 
range of initiatives which comprise ‘Bottom Billion Capitalism’. A movement 
which Roy defines as being, “the integration of the billion or so people living 
                                               
21 Cloud Loan 2010 Impact Report (Cloud Loan Source 4.2) 
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under conditions of extreme poverty into global circulations of finance capital” 
(Roy, 2012: 132). Inherent to this movement is a particular understanding of 
what poverty is, and therefore how it can be overcome, which is grounded in 
market interaction (Li, 2007). With poverty being conceptualised as an issue of 
market failure or exclusion the solution, as Roy (2010; 2012) raises, becomes 
reintegrating people into those markets, with microfinance offering a means of 
engaging people living in poverty into the global financial and capital markets. 
Reflecting the client’s testimony in the appeal video, when Cloud Loan 
clients were asked why they were taking a loan, or what they hoped to achieve 
through growing their business, the majority would respond that they hoped to 
be able to send their children to school, to improve their homes, or to access 
health care and support for family members. These are aspirations which recur 
frequently across international development initiatives, but within the 
neoliberal approaches of Bottom Billion Capitalism, they are framed not as 
rights, but rather as the rewards for the judicious use of a loan, and the 
founding of a thriving enterprise. Immanent within this understanding are 
assumptions of meritocracy and equality, with the expectation that every 
participant has an equal chance of succeeding, if they work hard enough.  
Conversely, failure to achieve these hoped-for transformations, having been 
given the tools to do so, implies a lack of effort or will (Miller & Rose, 1990; 
Rankin, 2001). The focus is on the individual, with wider structural issues all 
but removed from consideration. It is this characteristic of microfinance which 
leads Rankin to describe the technology as being an “aggressive self-help 
approach to development” (Rankin, 2001: 18). 
Devolving responsibility in this way is alternatively framed as a means of 
democratising opportunity. Consideration of client selection, however, 
challenges how democratic this process really is. Within Cloud Loan, following 
concerns being raised internally that the organisation was not reaching the 
poorest and most marginalised in Malawian society, which are discussed further 
in the next chapter, one loan officer explained to me that a new loan product had 
been piloted, offering smaller loans, and integrating mentorship from more 
experienced clients. These products had, however, only been launched in a small 
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number of branches, and the officer explained that many recipient clients had, 
“not managed their loans well”, continuing that they required more time and 
support from loan officers, and repayment rates had been much lower than from 
clients with other types of loans. As a result, Cloud Loan was, during my time 
with them, phasing out the product, with a member of the SPM team explaining 
that they would look at alternative means of reaching these individuals in the 
future. This raises a major critique of Bottom Billion Capitalism, namely that 
interventions bring with them concerns beyond social impact, and seek to focus 
their efforts of working with what Blowfield & Dolan term, “the ‘viable poor’” 
(Blowfield & Dolan, 2014: 33). This group incorporates those who are easiest to 
reach and work with, and those who are best placed to make good use of the 
support that can be provided. As Banerjee et al (2014) observe in their RCT of 
microfinance programmes, those most likely to benefit are those who already 
have some education and business experience, suggesting that the viable poor 
excludes some of the poorest and most marginalised.  
Beyond such concerns over outreach, there is also no consensus around 
the relationship between microfinance and business success.  Mtsitsi et al (2016) 
observe, in their study of the effects of microfinance on certain Malawian 
microenterprises, that while loans frequently improved the productive efficiency 
of the client’s enterprise, the debt incurred necessitated even greater 
enhancement of productivity and efficiency to enable the client to manage the 
loan, counter the risk that such debt incurred, and increase their own income. 
Blowfield & Dolan similarly raise that, “there is little indication that any of 
these models [of Bottom Billion Capitalism] has yielded positive impacts that 
are scalable” (Blowfield & Dolan, 2014: 28). Despite such debate, this 
relationship, so integral to the organisation’s presented theory of change, 
remained untested by and within Cloud Loan. 
The Malawian MSE Sector 
Before going on to examine Cloud Loan’s work on business creation and 
development, it is valuable to reflect on the context in which this work is being 
undertaken. As I relayed in Chapter 2, Cloud Loan describe that they offer very 
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small, or micro, loans, to entrepreneurs in the micro and small enterprise (MSE) 
sector. Precise definitions of what constitutes a micro or small business vary, 
though drawing on definitions used in various socio-economic surveys of Malawi, 
Darroll (2012) offers that businesses employing four or fewer people can be 
considered micro, while those with 20 or fewer, are small. All of the clients that I 
met in this research were engaged in business which can thus be categorised as 
micro-enterprises, employing few, if any, people. 
Malawi’s MSE sector was heavily constrained prior to the processes of 
economic liberalisation that were seen in the 1990s. As such, it is less well 
developed than those of neighbouring countries. Nonetheless, studies 
undertaken by the National Statistical Office of Malawi and FinScope estimate 
that some 1.7 million people in Malawi are employed in MSEs, accounting for 
c.38% of the country’s working age population (NSO, 2000; BFP, 2014). Within 
these numbers, women are increasingly playing a role, making up c.46% of those 
employed by the sector in 2014 (BFP, 2014). Johnson (2005), however, also notes 
that despite this figure steadily rising, it does not compare favourably with the 
estimated 75% of MSEs that are owned by women in neighbouring and 
comparable countries (NSO, 2000; Johnson, 2005). 
MSEs frequently co-exist alongside agricultural activities; many 
businesses are themselves related to agriculture, while others are pursued as a 
means of topping-up income during lean periods in the farming cycle (Darroll, 
2012). The balance of income from micro-enterprise and agriculture varies 
across the country. The Southern Region, Orr & Orr (2001) describe, is the most 
economically developed in the country, and there MSEs contribute 17% of 
income, with agriculture accounting for 36%, in contrast to 2% and 50% in the 
Central Region (Orr & Orr, 2001; Johnson, 2005).  
Malawi’s MSE sector is frequently described as having the potential to 
play a major role in the country’s economic development. It is, for example, 
discussed in the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (GoM, 2002b) as 
being an area of development where women can play a particularly significant 
role. It is also, however, widely acknowledged to be a particularly vulnerable 
and volatile sector, and the extremely small profit margins of these MSEs leaves 
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many business owners unable to mitigate against this volatility. As Johnson 
(2005) observes, micro-businesses will often fail after a relatively short period of 
time. Exploring the reasons behind this high rate of failure, Darroll (2012) 
reviews various studies looking at constraints to growth of the Malawian MSE 
sector, and highlights a weak culture of entrepreneurship, lack of access to 
capital, inappropriate or unhelpful Government policy, and crowded competitive 
markets as among the prominent issues. As I explore in more detail in Chapter 
6, many parts of Malawi are also increasingly vulnerable to extreme weather 
events, such as floods, which can further decimate economic activity. Johnson 
(2005) also goes on to note the particular vulnerability of micro-enterprise in the 
Central Region, observing that not only are business owners operating at 
smaller scales than their contemporaries in the Southern Region, but that they 
are also subject to fluctuations in the incomes of their customers, themselves 
commonly reliant on seasonal income from agriculture.  
Darroll (2012) also observes that MSEs tend to remain MSEs, describing 
what he refers to as a ‘missing middle’ in the Malawian economy. Here he notes 
that businesses in the country tend to be polarised between large scale industry, 
and small or micro enterprises. Efforts to remedy this gap, he continues, have 
largely been unsuccessful, and have left micro-entrepreneurs stuck in small-
scale businesses generating little, if any profit. 
Business Selection and Appraisal 
At the start of every loan cycle, whether it was a new or returning group, the 
loan officer would convene a meeting, attended by every member who wished to 
apply for a loan. Addressing each member in turn, the officer would ask the 
clients how much they would like to borrow, and the nature of the business into 
which the funds would be invested. One of several such meetings which I 
observed was in the first Central Region branch. “55,000: fish” answered the 
first client, “45,000: groceries, 10,000: tomatoes, 60,000: beans”. The process 
continued until all 17 clients had given their information, which the officer 
brought back to the office, adding the details to the loan application paperwork 
for his Regional Manger’s approval.  
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While the investment of loans in establishing or expanding a profit-
making enterprise is a central feature of Cloud Loan’s work, I had been 
surprised that in the loan application and approval process, exploration of the 
nature, strength and viability of clients’ businesses rarely went beyond this 
simple, often one-word description. Cloud Loan state on their website that at the 
start of the loan cycle, each group will have their business ideas appraised22. 
This term ‘appraisal’, however, did not reflect the processes that I had observed, 
connoting as it does an impression of interrogation and judgement. Asking one 
loan officer23 about how clients’ proposed business ventures were assessed, he 
paused before replying that, “I know what kind of businesses to expect and what 
will be reasonable. If they are in that kind of business, then it is okay”. I pressed 
for more information, but none was forthcoming. In my engagements with loan 
officers more widely, they too did not seem concerned about the nature or 
viability of their clients’ businesses, beyond these one-word descriptions. As I go 
on to explore in this chapter, this was an early indication that these matters 
were not prioritised by Cloud Loan.  
At the African Head Quarters, I also raised the subject of business 
appraisal with the Social Performance Management team. In response, Simon, 
the Senior Social Performance Management Officer, explained that Cloud Loan’s 
appraisal process had two parts: Training for clients on how to prepare a 
business plan, and random business checks by the SPM team. Before a group 
receives its first loan, and at every subsequent repayment meeting, Cloud Loan’s 
loan officers deliver a prescribed programme of training to their clients, a 
component of the organisation’s work which will be discussed more fully later in 
this chapter. In one module, Simon described, clients were encouraged to 
develop a business plan. I had the opportunity to observe different loan officers 
delivering this module, and while this process did not produce the formal, 
written documents that one might envision when thinking of business plans, I 
watched as the officers talked through various issues which could affect the 
success and profitability of clients’ business, such as the importance of 
                                               
22 Cloud Loan Website (Cloud Loan Source 4.3) 
23 Loan Officer in the first central Region branch 
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understanding the market for the goods or services that they sought to supply, 
and of ensuring secure and sustainable access to any inputs required. As later 
discussions of client training will raise, the quality of these sessions varied with 
the differing skills and confidence of each loan officer. During the training, 
clients were encouraged to break into small groups of three or four, and reflect 
on the issues raised in the context of their own business. Sometimes these 
interactions were long and animated, with the loan officer circulating between 
the groups, asking questions and offering guidance. Other times, there would be 
no small group discussions, or the officer would call the group back together 
after only a couple of minutes, encouraging members to continue the 
conversations after the meeting. What I found striking, however, was that these 
sessions were not followed by any formal review of the clients’ businesses, so 
there was no way of knowing whether the discussions had raised issues or 
questions that had caused the clients to reconsider their chosen venture. 
Similarly, as will be returned to later, loan officers confirmed that they made no 
attempt to measure the impact of this training on clients.  
Following one session, I asked the officer about whether he thought that 
clients found this training useful in making key decisions on their business and 
business plan. He responded that clients would usually stay in the same 
business, often selecting a venture in which they already had some experience, 
or knew others who were already involved. Another loan officer similarly 
reflected that client’s options were often limited when it came to selecting a 
business, continuing that even if they identified an issue or challenge, they 
would be unlikely to deviate from the familiar. Neither of these officers saw this 
as something that they could change, but were also not concerned by such 
tendencies. As the first articulated, “If they are repaying their loan. If they are 
returning for another loan, then the business is working”. This became a 
recurring theme throughout this work: clients repaying their loans and 
returning for future loans was taken as a signal that the intervention was 




The second part of the business appraisal process, Simon explained, was 
that he would visit branch offices and undertake random ‘business checks’. The 
purpose of these was, he explained, to verify that the client was engaged in the 
activity that she had declared on her loan application, and was investing her 
loan in that business. At no point, however, did I observe such visits being 
undertaken, and while some branch staff were familiar with this process as a 
policy, none could give examples of recent checks having occurred. On asking 
Simon and his colleagues for more information on recent and planned visits, he 
confessed that this area of the team’s work had been neglected recently, as other 
demands on the team’s time had required sacrifices. It is worth noting that the 
SPM team, identified as being responsible for undertaking these checks, was the 
same small unit responsible for managing the constant influx of PPI data, 
discussed in Chapter 5, and work to support the Client Hotline, discussed in 
Chapter 8. This situation was exacerbated when, by my third visit to Malawi, 
Simon had been promoted to a different role, leaving just one member of staff in 
the African Head Quarters’ SPM team for the remainder of my time with the 
organisation. While this process of ‘business checks’ exists in theory, therefore, 
insufficient time and resources had been allocated to enable its achievement, 
and it was not prioritised by individual staff members24, or the wider 
organisation. This issue of under-resourcing is one that emerges throughout this 
thesis, and, I argue, is reflective of the organisation’s priorities. 
Selecting Businesses 
Despite the client training including an emphasis on market research, with 
encouragement that clients should ensure that there is sufficient demand for 
their goods or service, in observing the loan application and disbursement 
processes, I was struck by the lack of diversity in clients’ businesses. In the 
second Central Region branch, for example, I attended a disbursement meeting 
for a new loan group. These meetings had been added to the loan disbursement 
                                               
24 As I go on to explore in Chapter 6, branch staff were encouraged to prioritise certain 
tasks through a system of KPIs and associated bonuses. In this discussion I note that 
matters such as the success of clients’ businesses are not considered in this performance 




process as a means of combatting loan officer fraud, particularly the issue of 
officers creating ‘ghost clients’25, which is discussed in Chapter 7. At the 
beginning of each loan cycle, before funds were released, clients were required to 
come to the Cloud Loan branch office, where branch managers would verify the 
details of their group’s application. Assembling on the thin strip of concrete 
which ran along the front of Cloud Loan’s office, and offered the only available 
shade, the group were met by Patrick, the Branch Manager, carrying the 
paperwork that his loan officer had compiled. Mirroring the previously described 
meeting in the first Central Region branch, Patrick began to read the names of 
group members, who would raise their hand and respond with the nature of 
their business, and the size of loan that they had requested. In this process, all 
but two clients repeated that their business was selling tomatoes. While the 
nature of the business would vary, I would see this dynamic repeated across the 
offices that I visited, with it being common that a substantial proportion of each 
group was involved in the same venture. With groups being formed of 
neighbours and kin from within the same community, this raises concerns about 
whether these communities can support several businesses of the same sort, or 
whether clients are limiting each other’s potential for profit and growth. I raised 
this concern with one of the loan officers in the second Central Region branch, 
asking whether he or his colleagues ever offered guidance to clients on the 
nature of the business that they should establish, or encouraged them to look for 
alternatives to their neighbours. He replied emphatically “No! We cannot 
interfere. If the business does not work, and we told them to do it, then it is our 
fault!”. This behaviour seemed to me to be an evasion of responsibility for the 
outcome of clients’ engagement with Cloud Loan. In later chapters, I consider 
further to whom loan officers sought to be accountable, and observations such as 
this support my argument that they prioritise what is demanded of them by 
their superiors above the needs presented to them by clients. 
Chirwa (2008) also identifies this issue of saturated markets, in his study 
on the profitability of MSEs in Malawi. In this work, Chirwa’s analysis shows 
                                               
25 ‘Ghost Clients’ refer to fictitious clients created by fraudulent loan officers. The officer 
would take the loan, and then claim to Head Office that the client had disappeared 
without making any repayments.  
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competition to be second only to marketing as the most influential factor in 
determining the profitability of a female-led MSE. It is notable that he identifies 
this as a more significant factor for MSEs led by women than those run by men, 
suggesting that this matter should be of particular concern to agencies such as 
Cloud Loan, who primarily seek to support female entrepreneurs. Such 
constraints to growth contribute too to what Darroll (2012) refers to as a 
‘missing middle’ in the Malawian economy, and what Sinclair (2012) describes 
as a ‘poverty favela’, where micro-entrepreneurs find themselves unable to grow 
their business beyond the level of generating little, if any, profit. 
Concerns around the nature of clients’ businesses were also raised by 
Adwell Zembele, the Chief Economist in the Malawian Ministry of Finance, 
Economic Planning and Development, who was sceptical of the contribution that 
disconnected micro-ventures could make at the individual, community and 
national levels. When we met in his office, in Lilongwe’s Capital Hill, he 
elaborated on these concerns, reflecting that the country’s microfinance sector 
was a significant recipient of incoming, international aid and wider financial 
support, and that these funds were supporting the creation of a vast number of 
discrete, micro-enterprises. Reflecting Sinclair’s 2012 observations on this 
theme, Adwell considered that only a very small number of microfinance clients’ 
enterprises would or could ever grow beyond their micro size. Commenting on 
Cloud Loan’s work in particular he reflected that, 
“You could visit some loan groups which have been taking loans 
maybe 14 times, maybe 14 cycles… Sustainability, I mean, is a 
problem, because you are dealing with very small, small, small, small 
enterprises. Very, very small, and the amount of the loan that they 
are getting would not really help them.” 
The alternative, he suggested, was that donors and MFIs should move away 
from supporting individual entrepreneurs, and instead encourage collective 
endeavours around industries such as cotton and oil seed production. Such 
ventures, he continued, had the potential to offer greater personal income for 
microfinance clients, and at the same time could contribute to wider national 
objectives around economic growth and export targets. These were sectors which 
had been identified as priority areas for investment in various Government 
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strategies and policies, including the 2013-2018 Malawi National Export 
Strategy (GoM, 2012a), which also identifies that for wider growth in these 
sectors to be possible, more of the raw, agricultural inputs need to be reduced. 
The strategy goes on to raise the particular contribution that microfinance can 
make in encouraging and supporting such production. Having recounted these 
potential benefits, however, he reported that having raised these suggestions 
with various microfinance organisations and international donors such as the 
Scottish Government and DFID, he had received a similar response to the one 
that I had received in the second Central Region branch, that clients should 
have the freedom to select their own business venture. This feedback from 
donors resonates with themes that I discuss in Chapter 7, where I argue that 
much of the popularity of microfinance is found in the sector’s appealing 
narrative of self-help, rather than in the impact on poverty that it has achieved. 
Other Priorities 
A conversation with Alex, Cloud Loan’s Director of Operations, provided another 
perspective on Cloud Loan’s loose business appraisal processes. Alex had joined 
the organisation several months previously, from a larger African MFI. I had 
asked him about his first impressions of the organisation and its operations, to 
which he responded that, 
“There is often a lack of understanding about what microfinance is 
and what it can really achieve. Microfinance, done well, can put 
bread on the table…but businesses fail, clients use loans to pay 
school fees, and that’s okay…For some, loans help clients to balance 
their lives, not build businesses.” 
Continuing on this theme, he explained that business appraisal therefore wasn’t 
a priority for him. As the direct line manager of Cloud Loan’s Regional 
Managers, and through them, all branch staff, he was well positioned to 
encourage branch staff to think similarly, offering one explanation for the way 
that I had observed these processes being deprioritized. As one of the most 
senior members of staff in Cloud Loan, with responsibility for operational 
strategy and delivery, Alex speaking so candidly had seemingly created 
something of an informal, policy, in contradiction to the official policy and 
external messaging. If, as appeared to be the case, the informal policy was 
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considered by staff to be more effective, this raises questions as to why the 
contradictory formal policy continued to play a central role in the organisation’s 
narrative. The first explanation that I propose is that staff responsible for 
crafting these messages are removed and disconnected from the reality of the 
programmes that they are describing. It is this issues of internal accountability 
and relationships that I discuss in the next chapter, arguing that poor 
information flows and relationships internally can undermine efforts to be 
accountable to external stakeholders. The second explanation links back to 
Nina’s comments, and the wider appeal of Bottom Billion Capitalism, that the 
inclusion of business support distinguishes microfinance from other NGOs and 
approaches to development, offering an appealing narrative to potential donors 
and supporters. 
Venture Loans 
Within the walled complex that was home to both Cloud Loan’s African Head 
Quarters, and the first Central Region branch office, there was a large room, 
with the size and layout of a school classroom. On my first visit, the room 
already had an abandoned feel to it, with no working bulbs in the light fittings, 
and cobwebs on the windows. This was an impression that grew over subsequent 
visits, as it seemed to become a store for broken tables and chairs. As discussed 
in the previous chapter, the then three-person Social Performance Management 
team had been working in a tiny cramped office, with other staff working in 
similarly confined quarters, and commenting that they not only didn’t have 
sufficient space to work, but also had nowhere to store their paperwork and 
files. Over my time with the organisation, construction began on a third 
building, behind the two existing structures, which would, I was told, go some 
way to addressing these issues by providing additional staff offices. Despite 
these pressures and concerns, however, this large, spacious room remained 
unoccupied. During my second visit to the complex, I asked Harriet, a member of 
the Head Office staff, about the room. She explained to me that this room had 
been built to accommodate meetings and training sessions for clients 
participating in Cloud Loan’s Venture Loan programmes. This was the first time 
I had heard of this programme, and asking for more information she continued 
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to explain that the venture loan programme was an umbrella term used by 
Cloud Loan to describe a range of initiatives in which the organisation had been, 
and was currently, involved. Like the normal loan products, these initiatives 
centred around giving loans to clients for the purposes of business investment, 
but unlike the normal products, these loans were accompanied by strict 
instructions on the nature of business into which they should be invested. 
Similarly, while with normal loans, clients are free to spend the funds as they 
wish, venture loans were usually granted in the form of inputs rather than cash, 
with the value of these supplied inputs being repayable over the period of the 
loan. By the time I started this research, the only venture loans still being 
offered were to support agriculture and aquaculture, but in the early 2010s a 
range of loans had been offered, additionally supporting ventures in solar 
technology, and sewing and knitting. These wider activities had, however, not 
officially ended. Harriet continued to explain that part of the room was still 
designated for venture loan activities was that some of the venture loan 
initiatives has ended because the volunteer coordinating activities had left and 
not been replaced, or because a phase of funding had ended, and there had been 
no word on the future of the project. As such the wider programme was in limbo. 
Having heard loan officers and other staff speak so fervently against the 
idea of providing guidance on the nature of business in which their clients 
should engage, I had been surprised to encounter such an interventionist 
initiative. These represented two markedly different approaches to achieving 
the organisation’s objectives around business creation and development. The 
existence of these loan products also appeared to challenge my theory that the 
organisation was not overly interested in the business activities of their clients, 
or how they used their loans. Discussing these initiatives with Alex, however, 
perspectives arose that altered my perception of the products, and brought out 
that as well as being a different type of loan, these initiatives also brought with 
them new sources of funding, seeming to confirm a greater interest in securing 
funding than supporting businesses. A complaint frequently raised by Malawi 
based staff was that the UK team would too often launch new initiatives without 
giving sufficient consideration to how they would be implemented by staff in-
country, and how compatible they were with wider operations. These venture 
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loan products were common sources of complaint in this regard. One initiative of 
which Alex was particularly critical was the solar technology project. This 
project had involved recruiting specially selected clients, chosen by Cloud Loan 
for their proven ability to manage and repay normal loans in previous cycles. 
These clients would then be given solar panels, and were encouraged to 
establish a business based on charging customers to recharge phones or other 
appliances using the panels, or renting them out to other homes and businesses. 
Cloud Loan had been approached to be the implementing partner in Malawi for 
this wider international initiative and, Alex explained, the invitation had been 
accepted without consultation with the staff and teams who would be 
responsible for overseeing the project. Reports on the initiative portray the solar 
loans as having had a positive impact on the lives of participating clients, with a 
2014 study of the project documenting one client’s claim to have, “made so many 
sales that she had ended up being able to build three houses: one in her village, 
one for her family and one in her parents’ village.” (Davies, 2014: 215). For Alex, 
however, while he confirmed that such achievements were possible, his concern 
was that they were not achievable at scale. “It’s a distraction”, he described, 
“We have too many little projects. They bring funding, but they take 
a lot of time. We need to be strengthening and consolidating what we 
do, not always adding new things…that doesn’t work for funders 
though, they want new and exciting. Innovative, that’s what they 
always ask for.” 
A loan officer in a participating branch similarly commented that these loans 
required a far more hands-on approach with clients. The additional time that 
this demanded, he explained, was substantial, and caused other areas of work to 
be neglected. “If this is how they [Cloud Loan Head Office] want us to work, 
then they need to give us more resources”, he commented. Chapter 5 further 
explores some of the internal tensions created and exacerbated by these venture 
loan products. I had asked to see the project documents for these venture loan 
initiatives, but was told by all those whom I asked that they did not know where 
such records were held. As such, I was not able to access the budgets for these 
programmes, and see how funding had been allocated. In Chapter 6, however, I 
discuss Cloud Loan’s engagement with online funding platforms, and observe 
that while these platforms brought in additional income, they also increased the 
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workload of staff in participating branches, yet these branches were not given 
additional funding to manage these demands. The loan officers’ complaints 
about the additional burden that these venture loans imposed on branches 
suggests a similar lack of devolved resources, supporting the observations of 
loan officers, raised in Chapter 5, that head office staff, in London and the 
African Head Quarters, do not understand the demands of the organisation’s 
frontline service delivery. 
The preservation of resources for venture loans, such as the training 
room that I describe in this chapter, despite uncertainty about if or when future 
funding will come to support this work, also illustrates some of the issues with 
this funding model, as particularly extolled by Alex: while it may be superficially 
cheaper than commercial borrowing, these projects placed demands on already 
stretched resources, and fuelled frustration between teams.  
Client Training 
Alongside these processes of business appraisal, the second means by which 
Cloud Loan sought to support successful, income generating businesses was 
through their provision of client training. As the organisation describes in a 
report to a major donor, 
 “A crucial part of [Cloud Loan’s] work and something that 
differentiates us from other microfinance organisations is the 
training and mentoring we provide our clients…The training is 
designed to be simple, interactive and fun, and can quickly and 
effectively stimulate productive changes in clients’ businesses, 
leading to long-term social and economic outcomes.”26   
In contrast to the business appraisal processes which, as the previous section 
described, were not prioritised by individual staff or the wider organisation, 
client training was among the most visible components of Cloud Loan’s work. As 
described in the introduction, Cloud Loan clients repay their loans in regular 
instalments, with the group gathering together, usually every two weeks, to pool 
their contributions. At each of these repayment meetings, the Cloud Loan loan 
                                               
26 Cloud Loan 2012, report requested by a major donor (Cloud Loan Source 4.4) 
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officer also delivers a module of the organisation’s client training programme. 
Echoing the pride with which Cloud Loan talk of their use of the PPI tool, 
descriptions of their training offer feature prominently in the organisation’s own 
literature and reports, and it was one of the first components of the 
organisation’s work that Matilda, the London based SPM Manager, introduced 
me to, prior to my first visit to Malawi. It had been she who had led on the 
development of these standardised modules, which were being delivered by loan 
officers across Malawi. One of the challenges that the organisation faced, she 
explained, was that their clients may not be accustomed to managing money in a 
way that would enable them both manage repayments, and make the most 
effective use of their loans. Working with external consultants, therefore, she 
and her team had sought to devise a curriculum that would build clients’ 
capacity to run their businesses more effectively, and plan how to save and 
reinvest generated profits. Such concerns around financial illiteracy were also 
raised in my meetings with representatives of the Reserve Bank of Malawi27, 
and the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, with the 
latter’s Principle Economist, Golden Nyasulu, raising that this was both one of 
the greatest barriers to financial inclusion in Malawi, and also one of the 
greatest risks of microfinance. While he believed that the technology offered 
many benefits, debt could, he continued, cause great harm to clients, socially 
and economically, if they did not receive support and training to manage that 
loan effectively. It is within these ambitions of protecting their clients and 
enhancing the impact of their loans that Cloud Loan frame their client training 
offer.  
Why train clients? 
While the provision of such training by MFIs is not uncommon, it does represent 
a source of some controversy within the microfinance sector. In his writing on 
experiences in rural Bangladesh, which inspired the establishment of the 
Grameen Bank, Muhammad Yunus describes; 
                                               





“I firmly believe that all human beings have an innate skill. I call it 
the survival skill. The fact that the poor are alive is clear proof of 
their ability. They do not need us to teach them how to survive; they 
already know how to do this. So rather than waste our time teaching 
them new skills, we try to make maximum use of their existing skills. 
Giving the poor access to credit allows them to immediately put into 
practice the skills they already know” (Yunus, 2003: 225). 
Yunus is clear in his assertion that it is a lack of access to finance that is 
constraining entrepreneurial activity, which, in turn, is perpetuating poverty. 
Stopping this cycle can, he proposes be achieved by addressing the lack of access 
capital, and allowing the natural entrepreneurialism of clients to flourish. 
Karlan & Appel, however, levy particular criticism at Yunus for promoting a 
romanticised notion of the micro-entrepreneur, which, they argue, pervades 
much of the popular discourse on microfinance. The pair continue that drawing 
comparisons between highly successful business people and microfinance clients, 
as Cloud Loan sought to do in their televised appeal video, obscures that fact 
that “most microfinance clients are entrepreneurs not by design but by 
necessity” (Karlan & Appel, 2011: 92), and as such, it would be foolish to assume 
that they will all have the skills required to manage a thriving and profitable 
business. Blowfield & Dolan (2014) similarly argue that supposedly natural 
qualities of latent entrepreneurs are, in fact, produced. Having identified 
poverty as a technical issue, they continue, initiatives of Bottom Billion 
Capitalism create a particular role for experts and expertise in this production 
process (Blowfield & Dolan, 2014).   
Sievers & Vandenberg (2007), Mosley & Hulme (1998) and Gulli and 
Berger (1999) are among those who also promote the importance of client 
training, arguing that if the ambition of the organisation is to bring about social 
change, then the provision of credit alone will be insufficient. Building on this 
argument, Field et al (2010) and Karlan & Valdivia (2011) propose that it is 
often not a lack of access to credit that is constraining women’s business 
activities, but rather it is the lack of a means to utilise that credit due to 
deficiencies in opportunity and knowledge. Fisher & Sriram (2002) expand on 




“While credit may initially be the ruling constraint for micro-
enterprises, for them to grow beyond a certain size, other constraints 
come into play, for example of markets and managerial capacity. 
Microenterprises are therefore unlikely to grow significantly without 
inputs that can address these additional constraints” continuing that 
where such additional support is not provided “The availability of 
credit has taken the entrepreneurs beyond their capacity to manage 
their businesses effectively” (Fisher & Sriram, 2002: 75)  
Among the four other Malawian MFIs with whom I engaged in this 
study, opinions on client training were similarly split. While two of these 
organisations included programmes of client training, similar to Cloud Loan’s in 
their work, representatives from the other two lenders aligned themselves more 
closely with Yunus’ view, with the Managing Director of one organisation 
commenting that she saw the role of her organisation as being, “to make credit 
more accessible, not to interfere with the ways in which it was used”, and that, 
“we trust our clients”. This comment illustrates a contradiction in Cloud Loan’s 
work in this area. While loan officers expressed surprise at the thought of 
offering clients guidance on the nature of business that they should pursue, on 
the grounds that doing so would be overly interventionist, the offering of credit 
in the form of business loans, and the requirement that all clients attend regular 
training on how they should manage their business, and wider financial affairs, 
represent a selective approach to such interference. 
Measuring Effectiveness 
The client training programme represents a significant investment of time and 
resources for Cloud Loan. As the account of a repayment meeting in the 
following chapter demonstrates more fully, the delivery of training is one of the 
key tasks required of loan officers in their often lengthy meetings with clients. 
Beyond this direct delivery, however, Matilda reported that the development of 
the training modules had been a major task for her and her team across several 
months, and the creation and production of teaching aides similarly consumed 
time of staff in branches and the African Head Quarters. While, as Karlan & 
Valdivia (2011) raise, such investment can be valuable if it enables the 
organisation to build the capacity and knowledge of their clients, such benefits 
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are not automatic. Rather, to be effective, the training must be relevant, 
understood and acted upon. 
 In my early conversations with Matilda, I had asked whether the 
organisation had any processes for tracking and evaluating the impact of these 
training sessions, and after a short pause, was told simply that, “We know that 
when this programme of training is completed, the clients benefit”. While the 
organisation had, she continued, sought to integrate best practice in the design 
of the training, no research or routine monitoring and evaluation had or was 
being undertaken around this area of the organisation’s work. Despite the 
theoretical support for client training, as outlined in the previous section, its 
effects are not necessarily as automatic as Matilda suggested. Karlan & Valdivia 
(2011), for example, document a randomised control trial of a client training 
programme, undertaken with a Peruvian MFI, FINCA-Peru. From this work 
they concluded that, “We find little or no evidence of changes in key outcomes 
such as business revenue, profits, or employment.” (Karlan & Valdivia, 2011: 
510). As discussed in the context of business appraisal, however, the lack of 
information that Cloud Loan capture on their clients’ businesses would make 
tracking change, let alone attributing impact from training, almost impossible 
within their current monitoring and evaluation and knowledge management 
systems. Phrased differently, Cloud Loan do not seek to hold themselves 
accountable for the impact of their client training. 
Client Input 
My observations of the client training programme also raised questions around 
the degree to which Cloud Loan were accountable to their clients in this area of 
work. Just as the training programme represents the dedication of significant 
time from members of staff across Cloud Loan, so too does participating in 
training sessions require a regular time commitment on the part of clients. As 
was illustrated on a group visit in the Southern Region, however, Cloud Loan 
did not always show respect for the time and wider commitments of clients. On 
this visit, only six of the group’s 16 members arrived for the meeting. I asked the 
loan officer after the meeting why so few had been present, and he explained 
that for this group, that was normal, as the timing of their regular meeting 
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coincided with that of a market in a nearby town. Attending the meeting would 
therefore have meant missing-out on the opportunity to sell at the market which 
would have been a particular problem for the many members of the group whose 
businesses centred around selling produce, clothing, or other items. When I 
asked why this schedule had been established, and was continuing in the face of 
a known conflict, the officer explained that this was the only time that he had 
available to meet with the group. The branch, he continued, was short-staffed, 
and he had had to squeeze this group in to his already full schedule, following 
the sudden departure of one of his colleagues. This encounter was not unique, as 
on several group visits clients voiced their frustration at being called away from 
work at particularly busy times. Such frustration was exacerbated by being kept 
waiting by loan officers who, as is discussed throughout this piece, would often 
arrive late for meetings, due to issues of over-scheduling. Building on the 
previous observations that little is known of the impact of client training, it is 
similarly difficult to assess whether training constitutes a valuable use of 
clients’ time, or whether this form of delivery is the most appropriate and 
effective.  
Considering further the matter of accountability to clients, and to the 
achievement of ambitions around business development, a question that I had 
was whether Cloud Loan’s training offer included matters that were relevant, 
useful, and of interest to their clients. The modules themselves had been 
developed without input from clients, or those closest to clients, the loan officers. 
Matilda relayed that she had herself spent considerable time working from 
Cloud Loan’s offices in Malawi, and had drawn on this experience to craft the 
curriculum, but the programme was developed in a context removed from where 
it would be delivered. The training was also standardised, with the same 
sessions being delivered across the country, regardless of the clients’ context or 
experience. While some modules contained exercises where clients were invited 
to reflect on how the issues raised applied to their own businesses, there was no 
opportunity for an individual or group to raise a particular issue that they had 
encountered or were struggling with, and receive specific training on how that 
matter could be dealt with. Furthermore, no information on previous training 
that the individual may have received from other organisations, or their level of 
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education is solicited. Such variables Field et al (2010) discuss can influence 
greatly what training content the individual will find most useful, and the 
means of delivery that will be most effective. Finally, while is common and 
encouraged that clients will return for multiple Cloud Loan loans, in every loan 
cycle, they will receive the same training programme. When I questioned 
Matilda on the decision to repeat content, rather than offer a graduated training 
programme, her response was to explain that clients would take different 
messages from the training as their business and experience grew, and that 
repeating the content enabled a greater depth of understanding. Abeysekera 
(2015), however challenges the effectiveness of such an approach, emphasising 
that the needs of clients who are setting-up and launching their business will 
differ greatly from those of clients with more mature enterprises that they are 
seeking to expand. No one training offer, he continues, can hope to adequately 
service both groups. 
Through this process, clients are positioned as passive recipients of the 
service, rather than as active agents. Though Cloud Loan present the creation 
and development of micro-businesses as being at the heart of their ambitions, 
this is not an objective that any MFI can achieve without the input and support 
of other actors. Most significantly, it is the clients who must translate the loan 
and support into business outcomes, and for the client the loan will be only one 
of a number of inputs and influences that shape their business and its 
productivity. For the ambitions to be effectively achieved, actors must therefore 
seek to collaborate and coproduce the desired outcomes. Abeysekera highlights 
the importance of client training as an arena in which such coproduction is 
essential if desired outcomes are to be achieved. Improved client participation in 
the design of training would, he continues, better enable clients to receive 
appropriate support, which will help them to achieve greater productivity and 
success in their businesses (Abeysekera, 2015; Abeysekera et al, 2017). These 
issues of downward accountability are explored further in Chapter 8. 
This effective elimination of the individual in favour of routinization and 
mass processing reflects Lipsky’s 1980 observations of street-level bureaucrats. 
While, he observed, personalised and tailored support is often what is most 
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needed by the client, frontline workers will often find themselves forced to 
engage with their clients as collective units. Echoing observations made in this 
chapter, and throughout this thesis, constraints such as the undertaking of 
prescribed tasks, resource constraints, and the prioritisation of certain key 
performance indicators can encourage this tendency to overlook complex 
individual needs, in the interests of efficiency. 
Staff Skills and Capacity 
In accordance with Cloud Loan policy, all training was delivered by branch staff 
during repayment meetings. While it was most commonly the loan officer who 
would manage these meetings, on occasion branch managers would work 
directly with groups, usually when their team was short staffed. Simon, the 
Senior SPM Officer, had explained to me that this was considered to be the most 
efficient means of delivering the training as, as was recounted in the previous 
chapter, a loan officer could undertake multiple tasks in a single visit. These 
tasks ranged in nature: Some were administrative, requiring careful recording 
of information around loan details or client case studies. Some required the 
officer to act as a mentor or counsellor, helping clients to work through tensions 
either within the group, or with Cloud Loan. Others, including the training, 
required presentation and facilitation skills, as well as subject knowledge. 
Within such a broad skill set, it is to be expected that each loan officer will be 
stronger in certain parts of the role than others. In the context of training, the 
skills and experience of the loan officer have been shown to play a significant 
role in the effectiveness and impact of that training. Abeysekera et al (2017), for 
example, cite the findings from a 2001 study of a Colombian MFI, where the 
skills and experience of those delivering client training were raised as key 
factors and determinants of the initiative’s success. It is argued that such factors 
influence not only the impact of that training, in terms of conveying knowledge 
to clients, but also the degree to which the training will be collaborative and 
responsive. These latter issues, as previously discussed, can be influential in 
enabling clients to demand the training that they need and want, but also, as 
Gibb (2009) and Abeysekera et al (2017) also argue, clients may find the 
opportunity to learn from their peers as valuable as the formal training 
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delivered by the loan officer. Without appropriate facilitation by the officer, 
however, opportunities for such interaction may be lost. 
 While Matilda had explained that the standardised training programme 
was a means of overcoming such variabilities, in my time with Cloud Loan, I 
observed the difference that the officers’ skills, confidence, and experience could 
make on the client training sessions. The group meetings that I attended 
usually lasted between two and two and a half hours. Within this time, the 
training component would typically take between 20 and 30 minutes. During my 
time in the first Southern Region branch, however, I visited several groups with 
Thomas, one of the office’s recently hired loan officers. As was the case with 
many of Cloud Loan’s loan officers with whom I met, this was Thomas’ first role 
in microfinance, and his first job since completing qualifications in business and 
finance. On our first visit, we travelled to meet a group that he had recently 
taken over from one of the branch’s other officers, and whom he had only met 
with once previously. It took us some time to find the group’s meeting place, 
which was in a large but completely empty hall, hidden behind an ornate 
Catholic church. As a result, we were approximately 30 minutes late to meet the 
group, and as we arrived, Thomas seemed flustered. Prior to formally opening 
the meeting, there was none of the informal chatter and interaction that had 
preceded other group meetings that I had attended. Instead, the members sat in 
silence while Thomas unloaded his files, and began systematically working 
through his list of tasks. These completed, proceedings moved to training, which 
this week was to cover pricing. I had seen this module delivered several times 
previously, in other offices. Usually, the loan officer would distribute laminated 
sheets with symbols reflecting key areas of consideration when calculating the 
costs of running a business: a seed to represent inputs, a van for transporting 
goods, a stall for selling, and Cloud Loan’s logo to represent loan repayments. 
Clients would be encouraged to use dried beans, stones, or leaves allocating each 
a monetary value, and placing them next to the relevant symbols in numbers 
that reflected the costs they incurred at each stage. In previous sessions, the 
group had split into smaller groups of three or four, discussing the various costs 
incurred in their own businesses. This had tended to be one of the more 
interactive training sessions, with the groups’ engagement in the tasks evident 
99 
 
in the chatter, and the movement of the counters around the sheets. In this 
session, however, the same laminated sheet was used, but rather than it being a 
tool for group interaction, it was held up by the Thomas, who, using the sheet as 
a visual aid, proceeded to explain the importance of considering all costs 
incurred in running a business, and ensuring that the price charged would cover 
these costs and still allow a profit. While this was the same basic message that 
had been conveyed through the more interactive approach, Thomas later told me 
that he preferred his style as it was more time efficient. In particular, he felt 
that standing at the front and lecturing allowed him more control over the 
session as, he continued, it could be difficult to bring the group back together if 
they were all involved in their own, small group discussions. Following the 
presentation, there were no questions or comments from the group, and in total 
the training component of the meeting had taken no more than 10 minutes. This 
experience illustrated the difference that a loan officer could make to even a 
standardised training, but also raised the potentially conflicting priorities that 
loan officers were faced with. At no stage is clients’ feedback on the performance 
of their trainer, or their experience of the session, proactively sought. While 
there is a phoneline service that can be used by clients to raise concerns with, or 
feedback on, any aspect of Cloud Loan’s work, as Chapter 7 discusses, this is 
little used, and the records to which I had access showed no contacts regarding 
training. In contrast, as will be discussed further in the following chapter, staff 
are constantly encouraged to reach more clients and disburse more loans, with 
financial incentives being offered for such achievements. It was such 
quantitative achievements that loan officers were held accountable for 
delivering through Cloud Loan’s performance management and KPI systems, 
rather than matters related to how their work supported the creation and 
development of their clients’ businesses, or poverty reduction.  
 In my conversation with the CEO of another microfinance NGO in 
Malawi, we also discussed the diversity of tasks undertaken in the field, and the 
competing demands faced by loan officers. His organisation, he explained, had 
made the decision to divide the activities equivalent to those undertaken by 
Cloud Loan’s loan officers, across two roles. As in Cloud Loan, loan officers 
worked with specific groups, taking responsibility for all matters related to loan 
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applications, management and repayment. Working alongside them, however, a 
dedicated team of training officers had been created. These training officers 
would visit loan groups separately from their loan officer colleagues, and deliver 
the organisation’s client training programme. This division, the CEO explained, 
served two purposes. Firstly, it enabled the organisation to be more focused in 
their recruitment, engaging those with particular skills in delivering training 
and supporting micro-entrepreneurs into those roles, and for these specialist 
officers to deliver the training without distraction of other responsibilities. 
Having previously worked in and with other MFIs, the CEO opined that this 
model offered the most effective means of supporting clients in their business 
endeavours, but conceded that they had not undertaken significant research or 
evaluation on its impact.  
The second benefit, he continued, was that dividing responsibilities in 
this way meant that clients were regularly interacting with two different 
representatives of the organisation. As will be discussed in later chapters, my 
time with Cloud Loan coincided with the organisation responding to multiple 
instances of staff fraud. The majority of these cases had occurred at the branch 
office level, with various staff reflecting that clients’ engagement with the 
organisation was largely through their loan officer and away from Cloud Loan 
offices, giving the loan officers significant freedom and power. Some officers, it 
had been discovered, had abused this power, creating ‘ghost clients’ in order to 
access loans for themselves, or on rare occasions, stealing from clients. In 
Chapter 8, I raise that Arthur, Cloud Loan’s Head of Internal Audit, had 
proposed introducing a model similar to this other NGO’s, as, he explained, 
having two staff regularly engaging with clients would lessen the power and 
autonomy of the loan officers, providing a regular check on activities and 
engagements in the field. This proposal had, however, been rejected by Cloud 
Loan management, with Arthur surmising that the additional cost that the 
change in approach would incur had been the most significant factor in the 
decision. Here again, therefore, the conflict between achieving social impact and 
financial efficiency can be observed, with an approach that may result in more 
impactful training, and bring wider benefits for the clients and organisation, 




 In the previous discussion of business appraisal, I proposed that these 
processes could be seen as being more integral to the organisation’s image, and 
external presentation of itself, than reflective of the ambitions of those 
responsible for delivering Cloud Loan’s services. As the above describes, my 
observations of Cloud Loan’s client training programme bring to light many of 
the same issues. Here again, therefore, questions must be asked about why the 
training is being done.  
Given the prominence of accounts of training in donor reports and wider 
materials, I propose that its inclusion may be an effort to conform to the 
expected and appealing Bottom Billion Capitalism narrative. As Golden 
Nyasulu raised, there are risks associated with loans and debts, of which 
individuals and institutions in the global north are all too aware, so the 
inclusion of support through training allows the organisation to reinforce their 
narrative commitment to supporting entrepreneurialism, and signal to potential 
supporters that these risks have been considered and are being managed. To 
explore this idea, I had hoped to include a survey of Cloud Loan’s supporters in 
this research, but despite the organisation being initially supportive of this 
work, permission was later refused by senior management. Nonetheless, 
conversations with various members of the fundraising team lent credibility to 
this theory, describing as they did the appeal of, and positive feedback that they 
had received from supporters on, this dimension of the organisation’s work. In 
the branch offices too, I observed that officers were more attached to the idea 
than the practice of training. In the second Southern Region branch, for 
example, where several group members were repeatedly missing their 
repayment meetings and training sessions, the loan officer had commented that 
their being present for training was not a priority for him, and that as long as 
they sent their repayment contribution with another member, there was no 
reason for him to take action. In contrast, however, when asked directly about 
whether training was important, another loan officer’s response that, “The 
training and support is what sets us apart from banks. We are not only 
interested in their money” was typical. Its existence seemed to be a way of 
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signalling the organisation’s ambitions of social impact, regardless of whether or 
not it contributed to their achievement. 
Beyond such benefits, in exploring the issue of client training, Sievers & 
Vandenbeg (2004) observe that its inclusion in programmes can also bring 
benefits for the organisation. “An MFI may benefit” they explain, “if [training] 
helps its clients to better service their loans...This, in turn, could improve the 
quality of the institution’s loan portfolio and its overall sustainability” (Sievers 
& Vandenberg, 2004: 1). Such an interpretation positions the clients as subjects 
to be governed, whose behaviour must be regulated and discipline imposed as a 
means of mitigating the risks to the lender (Roy, 2012; Maurer, 1999). Such 
sentiments can be seen reflected in the previously raised assertions that clients 
may be unfamiliar with managing the sums of money that they receive in the 
form of loans, making training and support essential. Looked at another way, 
however, this training, rather than being valuable for its content, provides the 
location and space for clients to be produced as subjects (Rankin, 2008; Roy, 
2012). As Blowfield & Dolan (2014) raise, in delivering training the loan officer 
is positioned as the technical expert and authority figure. With loan officers 
reporting that they had little in the way of incentives and penalties to offer and 
impose on clients as a means of ensuring that timely repayments were made and 
rules followed, such authority could be invaluable in enforcing order. 
Conclusion 
In this Chapter, I explored the means by which Cloud Loan seeks to hold itself 
accountable for one of its two articulated ambitions: supporting the creation and 
development of profit making enterprises. As was raised in the discussion of 
Bottom Billion Capitalism, such work is a defining feature of this popular 
approach to microfinance, stemming as it does from an understanding of poverty 
as being the result of market failure and exclusion. These are ideas that have 
permeated Cloud Loan’s narrative of their work, as they seek to distinguish 
themselves from wider, charitable endeavours, emphasising that they are ‘giving 
hope, not handouts’. In their promotional materials and presentations, there is 
an emphasis on telling the stories of individual clients who have been able to 
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change their own lives, and the lives of their family members, through making 
judicious use of a loan, and establishing a thriving, profitable business. 
I argue in this chapter that, despite the frequent repetition of this 
ambition, aims of supporting the creation and growth of micro-enterprises exist 
as part of the organisation’s efforts to create a compelling and attractive brand, 
rather than as ambitions central to operational decision making and activities. 
While these priorities informed, to a significant degree, the interactions between 
Cloud Loan and their clients, structured as they were around tasks such as 
client training, what I observed what that, with few exceptions, Cloud Loan had 
minimal understanding of their clients’ business ventures. When clients take 
their first loan, for example, the organisation does not capture information such 
as the current scale and profitability of the venture, or the experience of the 
client. As such, it becomes impossible for the organisation to systematically 
track, and claim credit for, the impact of loans in these ventures. Furthermore, 
Banerjee et al (2014) observe that the existence of a business before a loan is 
taken is a key determinant of the success and impact of microfinance. By not 
collecting such information, from clients, opportunities to target and tailor 
interventions are being lost. Similarly, while significant staff and client time is 
devoted to the delivery of training modules, designed to support clients to 
establish and grow their businesses, there is no evaluation or understanding of 
whether these modules are appropriate, or effective. The requirement for loan 
officers to devote time to training and related tasks, and the wider pressure 
faced by branch staff to reach greater numbers of clients, also means that 
officers have less time to get to know their clients, and understand their 
business ventures and challenges. 
Despite the prominence of imagery and stories of business creation and 
support in the organisation’s public narrative, these were not ideas prioritised 
by Cloud Loan’s Director of Operations, who instead asserted that loans helped 
to, “balance lives, not build businesses”. This assessment was indicative of my 
argued explanation for Cloud Loan’s voiced ambitions in this area, namely that 
it offered a compelling and attractive narrative for donors. As Nina has raised 
on this subject, business people understood business, and found the idea of 
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supporting people in poverty through supporting their business ventures to be 
compelling. In the face of high profile criticisms of aid being unsustainable or 
even harmful, business focused microfinance can offer an alternative story, 
attractive to new and existing donors. As Roodman observed, “If the donors 
respond more to stories than statistics, then aid forms that generate better 
stories will get more money” (Roodman, 2011). 
This leads to a quandary, faced by actors across international 
development, and beyond. On the one hand, there is a mismatch between what 
Cloud Loan say they are doing, and the reality of their priorities and actions, 
leading to the conclusion that they are not being accountable to their donors and 
supporters. On the other hand, by constructing this story, Cloud Loan are able 
to access and win funding. Conversely, as Gray (2001), Owen et al (2001), and 
O’Dwyer (2005) raise, being truly accountable often requires an organisation to 
accept a degree of ‘hurt’, in that they must face the consequences, in terms of 
funding and support, if they deviate from a more appealing story. 
Such a decision would have consequences too for the organisation’s 
clients. While the next chapter raises further questions about whether funds are 
reaching the poorest and most marginalised people in Malawi, it is undeniable 
that those they do reach are living in poverty, and are in need of support. 
Furthermore, clients are returning, cycle after cycle, and it would be deeply 
patronising to assume that they would be returning if they didn’t find the 
product in some way valuable. Given the amount of time and resources 
channelled into constructing this story of business support, however, there are 
questions to be answered about whether this form of microfinance represents 





Chapter 5: Poverty Reduction 
In the first weeks of this research, as I sought to familiarise myself with the 
organisation’s work, I took the opportunity of being in London to visit Cloud 
Loan’s Head Office. Located in an affluent, London suburb, the organisation’s 
home was a small office, in a picturesque row of converted houses, which Cloud 
Loan was soon to outgrow and leave behind for a larger, commercial unit, 
further out of the city. Arriving at the office, I was met by Liam, Cloud Loan’s 
then Head of Operations. While Liam was based in the UK, he held direct 
management responsibility for Cloud Loan’s country managers, and was also 
responsible for programme strategy. Clearly knowledgeable and passionate 
about microfinance, Liam started our conversation by offering an overview of 
Cloud Loan’s history and work, repeating many of the stories and claims that 
populated the organisation’s website. Central to these was the claim that while 
supporting business and enterprise was how they did it, what Cloud Loan were 
doing was reducing poverty in the communities where they worked. The case 
that he presented for such action was compelling: Echoing many of the issues 
and statistics that I raised in Chapter 2, he talked of the country’s low ranking 
on the UNDP Human Development Index, the high proportion of the population 
deemed to be living in poverty, and the vulnerability of large parts of the 
country to worsening poverty. At the individual level too, Liam shared stories of 
the clients whom he had met on his visits to Malawi. With clear emotion, he 
talked of the impact of disease, particularly HIV and AIDS, which had affected 
many of those with whom the organisation worked, either directly or indirectly. 
It was common, he explained, for Cloud Loan’s clients to be responsible for the 
children of family members and neighbours, who had been orphaned by disease, 
putting additional pressure on already stretched households. He also spoke of 
the limited opportunities open to those living in poverty, reflecting that with 
education being prohibitively expensive for many, he saw limited hope for 
improvement without intervention and assistance. 
 Providing such assistance, and addressing these challenges of poverty 
was, Liam reiterated, the reason for Cloud Loan’s existence, continuing that the 
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organisation’s approach in this regard had been highly effective. Building on 
this comment, I asked Liam more about this claim of effectiveness, and the 
organisation’s approach to monitoring and evaluation and impact assessment. 
His fast response what that the organisation used the PPI tool, and that the use 
of this tool was, “an indicator of the quality of our organisation’s work, and our 
commitment to ensuring social impact”. The PPI tool to which he was referring 
was the Progress out of Poverty Index, which he went on the describe as being 
“the gold standard in social performance management” in microfinance. “We are 
leading the sector in Malawi”, he continued, “we have made managing and 
achieving social impact central to our purpose and operations through the 
creation of a Social Performance Management team”. As I pressed for more 
information about the use of PPI, and the organisation’s social performance 
management more generally, however, Liam became evasive, before conceding 
that he did not know the detail of work in this area as it was led by his colleague 
Matilda, the London based Social Performance Manager, who worked directly 
with a small team in the African Head Quarters. Matilda had, however, recently 
started her maternity leave and the decision had been made not to cover her 
post for the year that she would be away. Instead, Simon, the Malawi based 
Senior Social Performance Management Officer, had taken on lead 
responsibility for work in this area, and an intern in the London office, Anna, 
was to be promoted to a paid Programme Officer position, acting as a link 
between Simon’s work in Malawi, and operations in the UK, among other 
responsibilities. 
This presented a puzzling contradiction. Having heard Liam speak with 
obvious pride about the organisation’s commitment to poverty reduction, and to 
using a technique that he considered to be ‘best practice’ as the means of holding 
themselves accountable for achievement in this area, I had now learned that 
resources for this work had been reduced, with a particular loss in technical 
expertise, and that it had been distanced from the strategic centre of the 
organisation. While I would see in my time with Cloud Loan that both Simon 
and Anna brought great commitment to their work, as is raised in this chapter, 
and this thesis more generally, Simon’s role in particular came with an already 
impossible workload, even before the addition of these new responsibilities. 
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Anna too had other demands on her time, and was herself new to using the PPI 
tool, so could not provide the support and expertise that Matilda had brought to 
the role. Furthermore, as had become clear in my conversation with Liam, he, as 
the senior officer responsible for operations and in-country activity, was not 
familiar with the intricacies of PPI, instead relying on Matilda’s input to inform 
practice and policy where necessary. In Matilda’s absence, I would see, and 
others confirmed that, the requirements and outputs of this work had less 
visibility and status in the strategic and fundraising concerns which occupied 
the Head Office. In discussing this issue, two different Cloud Loan staff 
members would later, separately tell me that the reason Matilda’s post was not 
being covered was down to costs, and a desire to save money. This raises the 
question that is at the heart of this chapter: while Cloud Loan repeatedly 
express their commitment to reducing poverty, and evidencing their impact in 
this area through the use of PPI, does their practice in this regard reflect these 
aspirations, or have the ambitions and tools been adopted as a means of 
conforming to the expected and appealing narrative of microfinance? 
Introduction 
Following my meeting with Liam, and his introduction of PPI, I sought to learn 
more about the tool, and how it was used at Cloud Loan. In reviewing various 
publicly available reports and media, I encountered frequent references to the 
approach. On Cloud Loan’s website, for example, I found an explanation that the 
Progress out of Poverty Index was the means by which the organisation could 
measure how poor their clients were, and whether poverty levels changed over 
the course of an individual’s engagement with the organisation. The statement 
continues by emphasising that with such information, Cloud Loan are able to 
ensure that their products and services are designed in such a way as to 
maximise contribution to poverty reduction28. This description highlights the 
importance of PPI in understanding accountability in Cloud Loan, raising as it 
                                               
28 Cloud Loan Website (Cloud Loan Source 5.1) 
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does that this it is the means by which the organisation seeks to know whether 
or not they are doing what they say that they are doing: reducing poverty.  
 This Chapter will begin by exploring Cloud Loan’s ambitions around 
poverty outreach and impact, before moving on to introduce the origins of social 
performance management work in the organisation, and how this work was 
inspired by dual ambitions of better understanding outreach and impact, and of 
making the organisation more attractive to larger donors. Following an overview 
of the tool itself, I then present my observations of all stages of the PPI process 
in Cloud Loan, from the data collection by loan officers in the field, through 
processing in the African Head Quarters, to how the information is ultimately 
used. Through this discussion, I observe that recurring themes of time and 
resourcing re-emerge, as do concerns around internal communication within the 
organisation. I end this chapter by arguing that PPI is most valuable to, and 
valued by, Cloud Loan as a means of signalling their commitment to poverty 
reduction, and that they are an accountable organisation, over and above the 
outputs and insight that the tool offers. 
Aspirations of Outreach and Poverty Reduction 
As Liam raised in our meeting, the establishment and development of profit 
making enterprises was not something that Cloud Loan sought to undertake as 
an end in itself, but rather as a means of achieving poverty reduction. Central to 
the organisation’s theory of change was that by offering loans and training to 
support the establishment of such businesses, clients could increase their 
income, and bring about change for themselves, their families, and their wider 
communities. These ambitions are reflected in Cloud Loan’s articulation of their 
mission as an organisation, which is given on their website as being to support 
the poorest women in Africa to lift themselves and their families out of 
poverty29. This statement echoes the ambitions of Bottom Billion Capitalism, 
discussed in the previous chapter, placing responsibility, as it does, on 
individuals to help themselves and their communities out of poverty. The 
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statement also sets out a clear ambition about who the organisation aims to 
help: the poorest women in their countries of operation. Targeting this group, 
however, requires a clear understanding of who ‘the poorest’ are. 
Like ‘accountability’, despite it being the subject of much study, discourse 
and writing, there is no simple, universally agreed upon definition of what 
‘poverty’ is, or how it can be reduced (Ravallion, 2008; Alcock, 2006). “Poverty, 
like beauty” Orshansky reflects, “lies in the eye of the beholder” (Orshansky, 
1969: 37), or as Walker (2015) observes, “While people generally recognise 
poverty instantly when they encounter it, they often find difficulty in saying 
precisely what it is” (Walker, 2015:1). Highlighting the range of issues 
commonly captured within the term, the report from the 1995 UN World 
Summit on Social Development states that, 
“Poverty has various manifestations, including lack of income and 
productive resources sufficient to ensure sustainable livelihoods; 
human hunger and malnutrition; ill health; limited or lack of access 
to education and other basic services; increased morbidity and 
mortality from illness; homelessness and inadequate housing; unsafe 
environments; and social discrimination and exclusion. It is also 
characterised by a lack of participation in decision making and in 
civil, social and cultural life” (UN, 1995: 38) 
Given such breadth and ambiguity, actors can define and frame the concept in 
the manner most appropriate or conducive to their experience, priorities, and 
wider perceptions of the world. The understanding adopted in turn has 
implications for the approaches to poverty reduction pursued. As the previous 
chapter explored, Bottom Billion Capitalism, and microfinance, tend to present 
an understanding that poverty is the result of market failure and exclusion, 
thereby giving legitimacy to market-based interventions as the most appropriate 
means of reducing poverty. Those approaching the same contexts with a 
different understanding may identify different drivers and experiences, 
prompting alternative forms of intervention (von Maltzahn & Durrheim, 2007).  
Duvendack et al (2011) are among those who raise the vital importance of 
measurement and data in efforts towards poverty reduction, and arguing that if 
agencies don’t have a strong understanding of the contexts in which they are 
working, the people whom they wish to benefit, and the impact of actions taken, 
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this can lead to inappropriate, inefficient, and even harmful interventions being 
pursued. The diversity and multidimensionality of understandings of poverty, 
however, present a challenge when it comes to measurement. As von Malzahn & 
Durheim (2007) contend, measurement requires specificity, and without an 
agreed definition, a common metric is similarly elusive. As a result, various 
understandings are applied, and methods of measurement pursued. The specific 
measures that an organisation uses are significant when seeking to understand 
poverty and impact reports, as they will affect on the number of people that they 
consider to be poor, and who the poorest are deemed to be. As Shimeles & 
Thoenen (2005) observe, the same scenario can be judged quite differently 
through the lenses of different poverty indices, making careful consideration in 
the selection of appropriate tools essential. 
A commonly encountered criterion used to designate those living in 
poverty, particularly in high level development strategies and reports, remains 
the income based poverty line, which sets a level of income below which 
individuals are considered to be unable to meet the basic needs of a safe, healthy 
and dignified life. It is, however, a tool that has increasingly been challenged for 
its narrow focus, and flawed assumptions of a linear relationship with wider 
dimensions of poverty, such as those raised in the 1995 UN report (von 
Maltzahn & Durrheim, 2007; Dercon, 2005; Appleton & Song, 1999). It is in 
reference to poverty lines that Cloud Loan measure their poverty outreach. 
Within their strategies and literature, however, some confusion exists around 
specific targets and aspirations. 
  Every month, information was drawn up from all branch offices on their 
achievements against key performance indicators (KPIs), and collated by Anna, 
the London based Programme Officer. This monthly Performance Report was 
then distributed to Senior Management in the UK and Malawi, for their 
consideration. Within this report were targets for ‘Poverty Outreach & Impact’, 
the data for which was provided by Simon in the SPM team. The report 
expressed an ambition that the majority of Cloud Loan clients in Malawi, 55%, 
should be those living on less than $1.25 a day, and 91% should be living on less 
than $2.50. In January 2015 the organisation was reporting 49.8% and 84.3% 
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respectively30. These ambitions and achievements were, however, not shared 
outside of the organisation, and are contradicted in some of Cloud Loan’s 
external representations. On their own website, for example, a page detailing 
the organisation’s ambitions around poverty reduction explains that they are 
seeking to reach the ‘poorest of the poor’, defining this group as those living on 
less than US$1.50 per day31. Similarly, Cloud Loan’s profile on one of the online 
funding platforms with whom they work explains that, “Business starter loans 
provide women living below the poverty line of $1.25/day with startup capital for 
small businesses”32. While not inaccurate, this latter description does give the 
false impression that Cloud Loan’s services are targeted exclusively at those 
who fall under the $1.25 a day figure, rather than this group representing c.50% 
of recipients. As Chapter 7 expands upon, this is consistent with the often-
misleading representations made on these platforms. 
I raised the $1.50 figure given on Cloud Loan’s own website with both 
Simon and Alex, the Director of Operations, both of whom seemed baffled by its 
inclusion, as this was not a category against which measures were taken or 
figures reported, publicly or internally. Alex suggested that the figure was most 
likely the result of a misunderstanding or miscommunication between the 
operational units of the organisation, and the London fundraising team, who 
were responsible for managing the website. This explanation resonated with my 
observation in the London office that it was Jennifer, a recent graduate who 
volunteered with Cloud Loan three days a week, who was primarily responsible 
for managing the website. Jennifer had raised in one of our conversations that 
not having direct access to programme and country reports, she was reliant on 
second hand information from previous fundraising literature, and on several 
occasions, this had resulted in the publication of inaccurate or out of date 
information. This issue of poor information sharing within Cloud Loan 
hindering accountability and transparency to external actors is one that will be 
                                               
30 Cloud Loan Performance Report January 2015 (Cloud Loan Source 5.3) 
31 Cloud Loan Website (Cloud Loan Source 5.4) 
32 Cloud Loan, Kiva Profile (Cloud Loan Source 5.5) 
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returned to later in this chapter, in the context of the way in which PPI was 
communicated to clients, and also re-emerges throughout this this thesis. 
Social Performance Management 
Cloud Loan began using the PPI tool in 2010. Earlier that same year, an 
external, social performance management consultant had been commissioned to 
undertake a review of the organisation’s work, as a means of identifying, “any 
gaps between [Cloud Loan]’s social mission and the reality on the ground, and 
recommend actions to improve the organisation’s translation of the social 
mission more effectively into practice”33. In discussing this work, a senior 
manager at Cloud Loan told me that there had been a number of motivations for 
instigating this review. Internally, she explained, it was felt that the 
organisation had gone through a period of rapid growth and expansion, and that 
the time was right to take stock, and review whether current operations and 
practices remained effective and appropriate at this new scale. Furthermore, she 
continued, Cloud Loan’s funding at this time was largely based on the personal 
and community relationships of the organisation’s CEO and Founder. The 
recent and ongoing growth in the organisation had meant that these sources 
were no longer sufficient, and the team were keen to make themselves 
competitive in applying for funds from institutional donors. In early efforts to 
access such funds, however, the organisation had been unsuccessful, and 
received feedback that their practice around monitoring and evaluation, and 
evidencing impact, were areas where improvement was needed. Nina, one of the 
London fundraising officers, would later tell me that while many of the 
Founder’s contacts continued to give generously to Cloud Loan, they demanded 
little in the way of reporting and accountability, so the step-up to the demands 
of donors such as DFID had been a significant one. The consultant was therefore 
also asked to suggest means by which practice in this area could be enhanced. 
I first learned of this review when I came across a summary report of the 
consultant’s findings in Cloud Loan’s internal files, during my time volunteering 
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in the London office. Though the manager with whom I spoke had seen the full 
report, neither she nor her colleagues could locate a copy when I asked if I could 
see it. The summary, however, offered useful insight into the consultant’s 
findings, presenting areas that had been identified for improvement and action. 
Foremost amongst these were his comments around poverty outreach, with the 
consultant identifying that, “A disconnect [existed] between the stated goal of 
reaching poor and very poor women, and the impression that poorer women 
were mostly not being reached”34. The report continued that, as has been raised 
previously in this chapter, developing a means by which the organisation could 
learn more about their clients would better enable them to reach their target 
group, and also provide the data and evidence required for funding applications 
and donor accountability. It was to take these tasks forward that Cloud Loan’s 
Social Performance Management team was created, and Matilda recruited as 
the SPM Manager. As Cloud Loan describe on their website,  
‘Social Performance Management is how we ensure that we are 
achieving our ambition of helping the poorest women in rural Africa 
to lift themselves out of poverty, transforming their lives and those of 
their families.’ 35 
The Progress out of Poverty Index 
The way that Matilda, and her newly formed SPM team, chose to assess the 
poverty level of their clients was by use of the Progress out of Poverty Index, the 
approach that Liam had introduced me to in our first meeting. PPI is a tool for 
assessing poverty that has its roots firmly in the microfinance sector, though it 
is now used more widely, with the origin of the approach being attributed to a 
scorecard developed by Prizma, a microfinance organisation operating in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, in 1997 (Desiere et al, 2015; Matul & Kline, 2003). The tool 
caught the attention of, and was further developed and popularised by, the 
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Grameen Foundation36, bestowing upon it a certain prestige, and best practice 
status within the sector. From there, its popularity has continued to grow, with 
tailored scorecards now available for more than 60 countries37. It was this 
associated popularity and prestige which attracted the team to the approach. As 
one of Cloud Loan’s objectives in developing this area of their work was to 
appeal to donors and other powerful actors, the adoption of an approach that 
was known and highly regarded by this group was seen to be essential. 
Mark Schreiner, the author of the Malawi Simple Poverty Scorecard, 
from which Cloud Loan’s own tool is adapted, describes PPI as being a tool that,  
“pro-poor programs in Malawi can use to estimate the likelihood that 
a household has consumption below a given poverty line, to measure 
groups’ poverty rates at a point in time, to track changes in groups’ 
poverty rates over time.” (Schreiner, 2015: 1) 
The premise of the tool is that by understanding the makeup of, and assets held 
by, a household, an assessment can be made as to whether they are likely to be 
living under a particular poverty line. Central to the approach is a scorecard 
made-up of 10 context specific questions, each of which relate to themes that 
have been deemed highly indicative of wealth or poverty in the country in which 
the scorecard is being used. These scorecards are designed to be used as the 
basis for an interview with the client or individual who is being assessed. Each 
of the questions are multiple choice, and points are allocated against the various 
possible answers, weighted according to the perceived significance of the subject 
of the question. The result is a numerical score, which, using accompanying 
look-up tables, can be translated into a percentage probability that the 
respondent is living under a specified poverty line. As well as producing an 
initial poverty assessment, by repeating the interview periodically over time, 
changes in scores, and therefore poverty levels, can also be tracked. 
                                               
36 While the Grameen Foundation coined and popularised the ‘Progress out of Poverty 
Index’ (PPI) label, this is used interchangeably across organisations with the moniker 
‘Simple Poverty Scorecard’. In late 2017, the Progress out of Poverty Index was 
rebranded as the Poverty Probability Index, using the same PPI acronym. 




 The PPI tool was designed as a means of assessing poverty at the 
household level, but Cloud Loan made the decision to adapt the tool, using it to 
assess poverty of whole credit groups, rather than constituent clients and their 
households. This was, a 2010 report reflected, thought to be a more “feasible and 
accurate”38 means of data collection as, unlike the Grameen Foundation, Cloud 
Loan did not engage with their clients in their individual households, only at the 
group level. Harry, a consultant working with Cloud Loan in the African Head 
Quarters to oversee the set-up and launch of a new management information 
system, more prosaically explained to me that the organisation’s current system 
simply did not have the capacity to record information at the individual client 
level, making such aggregation essential. As a result, while all clients were 
interviewed individually, an average score was then taken and used to 
determine the probability that members of a group were living under the 
specified poverty lines. In the previous chapter I observed that loan sizes could 
vary significantly within groups, suggesting different scales of enterprise, and 
therefore income and wealth, between members. On raising this issue with 
Simon, however, he reflected that the efficiency of the approach made up for 
such “minor” loses in detail. This rationale of efficiency is one that recurred 
throughout my time with Cloud Loan, and was most commonly used in the 
context of saving money, even if those savings impacted quality. In Chapters 2 
and 4, I referenced works such as Chirwa (2008) and Johnson (2005), which note 
the importance of ensuring that clients and their contexts are well understood 
by MFIs, in order to design and deliver appropriate and impactful microfinance 
products and services. By choosing to aggregate data in this way, rather than 
invest in a more sophisticated management information system, Cloud Loan 
were missing an opportunity to gain this deeper understanding of their clients, 
which could potentially inform more effective programming. 
 
                                               




A copy of the questionnaire used by Cloud Loan, formulated by the organisation 
in collaboration with an external social performance management consultant, is 
included below39: 
 
Context is essential when crafting these scorecards, with particular 
assets and circumstances carrying greater and lesser significance in different 
locations, meaning that questions and associated scores are not necessarily 
internationally transferable (Sahn, & Stifel, 2000). As such, they are created by 
PPI specialists, with close reference to wider research, conducted by the likes of 
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the World Bank or national governments (Schreiner, 2010; Desiere et al, 2015). 
The scorecard for Malawi draws particularly on findings from the country’s 
2010/11 Integrated Household Survey (World Bank, 2012b). Despite such 
engagement with local research, however, the significance of various assets and 
circumstances is widely decreed by experts, who are usually themselves 
removed from the day to day realities of those living in poverty. This leaves the 
tool open to criticism that meaning is being constituted by the auditor rather 
than those whose lives are being audited, with complex and diverse experiences 
being reduced to a simple checklist (Dolan, 2008).  
A further area of concern with the scorecards is that they are constructed 
for use at a national level. As described, the weightings of various assets and 
circumstances are determined according to national level data, but in so doing, 
they fail to accommodate the diversity of households across different regions of 
the country, and also within communities. As I described in the previous 
chapter, there are notable differences in the economies and cultural norms of 
different regions of Malawi. Communities in the central region, for example, 
tend to be more reliant on agriculture, while in the Southern region, a greater 
proportion of households follow matrilineal traditions. Such factors are 
significant determinants of the assets held by, and demographic make-up of, 
specific households, but the PPI tool does not allow for these contextual 
considerations to be integrated into calculations. While a certain type of building 
material, for example, may be indicative of relative poverty in one part of the 
country, it may be the norm in another. Dorward et al (2003) offer a typology of 
various Malawian households which indicates significantly different norms in 
the make-up of, and assets held by, different types of Malawian households. 
They observe, for example, that poor female headed households typically held 
assets of 105MKW, almost half the value of poor male headed households’ 
208MKW (Dorward et al, 2003: 11). They note too that the potential for changes 
of the type that would influence PPI scores are also limited by sub-national 
context and circumstance. 
As previously raised, PPI is just one of a myriad range of approaches to 
poverty assessment. While the perceived prestige of the PPI brand was the 
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explanation that I most commonly received for its adoption, Matilda also 
emphasised that it was attractive for the relatively light and fast data collection 
requirements. This was also an aspiration held by the developers of the tool, 
with Desiere et al (2015) highlighting that PPI was specifically designed as a 
means of assessing poverty in a way that provided timely data in a cost effective 
manner, requiring, as it does, significantly less information and researcher time 
in the field than other approaches to poverty assessment (Ravallion et al, 1991; 
Desiere et al, 2015). Reflecting Simon’s comments on diversity within groups, 
Schreiner (2014) concedes that this lighter approach may result in a drop in 
detail and accuracy, but argues that this is more than compensated for by its 
simplicity, encouraging more consistent use. 
PPI at Cloud Loan 
I first had the opportunity of seeing the PPI scorecard in use during my time 
with the second Central Region branch. Having previously spent time in the 
Malawian Head Quarters, this was my first visit to a Cloud Loan branch office. 
As described in the previous section, one of the key motivating factors for the 
organisation’s adoption of PPI over other methods of poverty assessment had 
been that it was considered to be a ‘quick and easy’ means of collecting relevant 
data. This visit would demonstrate to me, and subsequent branch office visits 
would confirm, that speed and ease were essential, given the many demands 
placed on loan officers in the field.  
As was their norm, my day with the second Central Region team started 
in the office at 7am, with the Branch Manager meeting with his loan officers to 
review tasks and itineraries for the day ahead. During this discussion, it was 
decided that I would spend the day with Lawrence, as he had the busiest 
schedule, with plans to visit three groups. The team were responsible for a large 
geographic area, and on this day, we were to visit some of the branch’s most 
remote clients. As such, after collecting the documents and files that Lawrence 
would need for the day, we were quickly out the door to begin the two-hour 
journey to meet our first group.  
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Arriving in the village, we disembarked, and made our way to the 
wooden benches, shaded by a nearby building and a large tree. Four women, two 
with their children, were already gathered at the benches, and on hearing the 
arrival of our bike, several more began to emerge from their homes and the 
fields overlooked by the meeting place. As we waited for the other members to 
arrive, Lawrence explained to me that this was one of his more experienced 
groups, having recently begun their sixth loan cycle with Cloud Loan. “We’ve 
never had problems [with this group]” he continued, “they have never fallen into 
arrears”. As the rest of the group arrived, they exchanged friendly greetings 
with Lawrence, who in turn introduced me, and explained that I was there “to 
learn more about where [Cloud Loan’s] real work happens”, soliciting laughter 
from the clients. After approximately half an hour, all 12 members were 
gathered, and Lawrence stood to open the meeting by leading the group in the 
Cloud Loan song, the lyrics to which, Lawrence later told me, were reminders 
that through working hard at their business and looking after each other, they 
could all succeed. 
Following the energetic singing and dancing that had opened the 
meeting, proceedings took a more sedate turn, as Lawrence took a thick green 
file out of his bag, from which he drew a large bundle of papers. The group 
waited in silence until, after several minutes, he found the one he was looking 
for, a group register, and recorded on the form that all members were in 
attendance. Returning to the papers, he drew out the record of client training 
that this group had received, telling me that the previous session had been a 
discussion of business plans, meaning that this week, they were focusing on 
market research. Lawrence delivered the training as a lecture, with no 
interjections from the clients, and on opening the floor for questions, he was met 
by silence. Turning again to his pile of papers, he began to complete the training 
record, signing the page to confirm that the module had been delivered as 
required. As he did so, several clients raised questions, unrelated to the 
training. One asked why they were required to make savings deposits alongside 
their loan repayments, while another asked when she would be able to apply for 
a larger loan. Both questions prompted some discussion across the group, with 
Lawrence translating his explanations that savings were there to protect clients 
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from misfortune, and to enable them to invest in their businesses and take care 
of their families. By saving regularly, he continued, and repaying loans in a 
timely manner, they would soon be eligible for larger loans. The discussion 
around these themes continued for some time, with Lawrence drawing the 
conversation to a close several minutes later, in order to move on to the next 
stage of the meeting.  
His next task was to collect information for a case study that would be 
used on an online funding platform, with whom Cloud Loan worked. These 
platforms were a means by which individuals from around the world could 
access information on, and provide support to, Cloud Loan’s work, and will be 
discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7. Officers in participating branches were 
required to submit case studies of clients to feature on these platforms, and 
Lawrence, in consultation with his branch manager, had identified this group as 
one of the case studies that the team would put forward. As such, Lawrence had 
been given a case study template, on which he recorded general information 
about the group, including their location, and the number of members. He also 
singled-out one member of the group, whom he had selected in advance, in 
consultation with his manager, to be the front-person for the case study, and 
took more detailed information from her about her business and family, which 
was also recorded on the form. To conclude, Lawrence took a camera from his 
bag and took a photo of the group together, before walking with the selected 
front-person to her nearby grocery stall, and taking a photo of her standing in 
front of her business. 
By this time, we had already been with the group for over two hours, but 
were yet even to discuss that week’s repayments. It was at this point that 
Lawrence’s attention turned to PPI. The interviews, he explained, should have 
been done at the first meeting of the loan cycle, but on that occasion, they had 
run out of time, so he was going to do them now. As the PPI interviews involve 
questions around clients’ households and assets, it was Cloud Loan policy that 
all conversations were undertaken one on one, away from the group, as it was 
felt, Simon had explained, that this approach would elicit more full and candid 
responses. This was the process that I saw unfold with Lawrence, as he took up 
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a position on the other side of the building to where we were assembled, and 
called each member to him in the order that they appeared on the group 
register. When I had spoken to Simon about this process, he had explained that 
all new clients were interviewed at the start of their first loan cycle, and that 
subsequently interviews were repeated with returning clients approximately 
every three loan cycles, as a means of ensuring that information was up to date, 
and to enable any changes in clients’ circumstances to be noted and tracked. In 
this group, two new members had joined in this loan cycle, and the time had 
come to re-interview returning members, hence all clients were to be 
interviewed. While I was aware that the questionnaires were short, while I sat 
with Lawrence as he asked the 10 questions, recording the responses of each 
client on a pre-printed form, I was surprised by the speed of the interviews. 
Most notably, there was no preamble, or context given about why the questions 
were being asked, or how the information provided would be used.  
Having completed the interviews, Lawrence re-joined the group, 
explaining that the remaining task was to coordinate the fortnightly repayment. 
As the group began to produce their own piles of banknotes, which were collated 
and counted by one of the members, Lawrence explained that he would normally 
stay to oversee this process, but as the meeting had run-over, we were already 
late for our next group which, it turned out, was over an hour away. As a result, 
we made our apologies and bad hasty farewells as the group proceeded with 
their business. Our subsequent meetings, as all Cloud Loan repayment meetings 
that I attended would, followed a very similar format, with the major difference 
being that time pressures became more acute as the day progressed, resulting in 
activities being shortened, and in some cases dropped, at the end of particularly 
busy days. 
Branch Officers 
As the previous discussions have raised, while the decision to adopt PPI was 
made at a high level within the organisation, it was the loan officers who were 
responsible for generating the data that the tool required. Despite this integral 
role, however, my experience was that the tool was the source of much mystery, 
confusion, and frustration in the branch offices. 
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The nature of the loan officer role meant that during the week they spent 
very little time in the office, and had limited opportunities to interact with their 
colleagues. On Friday afternoons, however, it was policy in all branches that 
officers should avoid scheduling appointments with clients to enable them to 
complete their paperwork, and attend a weekly team meeting. Among the key 
tasks for these Friday office days was to pull together the responses from any 
PPI interviews that they had undertaken that week, and type these up using the 
group report template. Once completed, these would be printed and bundled into 
packages, and sent to the SPM team based in the African Head Quarters for 
processing. On one such afternoon, I was sitting with two loan officers as they 
sorted through their notes and documents from the week’s meetings, and waited 
for their chance to use the office’s one computer. Discussing PPI, I was surprised 
when one officer asked me, “Do you know where these questions came from? 
Were they created by [Cloud Loan]?” On hearing his colleague’s question, the 
other loan officer also looked-up from his work, and the pair listened with 
interest as I relayed what I had learned about the tool’s origins. As we continued 
to talk, I asked them what they perceived the purpose of the scorecards to be. “It 
helps to identify the success of the programme”, one loan officer responded, 
though he continued that while he knew that sending the PPI data to the SPM 
team was important, he wasn’t sure how it was used to achieve this purpose. 
Others in the office, who had by now joined our conversation, murmured in 
agreement, with one officer commenting, to the amusement of her colleagues, 
that Head Office asked so many things of them that it was easier to just comply 
with requests than question them.  
In the 2009 evaluation of Cloud Loan’s poverty outreach and social 
performance, one of the concerns raised by the consultant was around the 
capacity of staff to deliver on the organisation’s aspirations. As part of the roll-
out of PPI, Matilda explained to me that she had spent almost a year based in 
Malawi, and that she and Simon had between them spent time in every branch 
office testing the scorecard and training staff in the approach. Since this time, 
however, there had been a natural turnover in staff, and new branches 
established, meaning that this one-off period of intensive training was 
insufficient to sustain knowledge across the organisation. Seeking to embed 
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understanding of PPI, client training, and related matters across all offices, 
Matilda had recently led on the development of two new training programmes 
for branch staff. The first of these was a new induction programme for incoming 
loan officers. Delivered over several consecutive days in the African Head 
Quarters, this programme offered an overview of the values and practices of the 
organisation. The second programme was designed as a series of independent 
modules to be delivered on a rolling basis. These would be open to all branch 
staff, regardless of how long they had been with the organisation, and would 
focus on subjects such as IT skills, or motorbike safety. New branch managers 
were also encouraged to participate in these programmes, but the Staff Training 
Officer40 raised that in the wake of recent issues of fraud and malpractice in 
various branches, the Director of Operations and senior HR staff had identified 
the need to develop a more specific training offer for managers, to build capacity 
around staff management and supervision. This work was still at a conceptual 
stage by the time I left the organisation.  
As part of the development of these training programmes, Abigail, a 
purchasing assistant with Cloud Loan, was promoted to the newly established 
role of Training Officer, with responsibility for coordinating all staff training 
events. On starting her new role, she had been given one of the large, vacant 
offices in the complex, which became a designated training suite. On my second 
visit to Malawi I spent several weeks in the African Head Quarters, and as 
Abigail was the only permanent occupant of this large office, I soon made a 
regular home at one of her spare desks. During this time, Abigail shared with 
me the overview of Cloud Loan’s induction programme, and unsurprisingly, 
given the pride with which the tool had been discussed by various staff 
members, I saw that PPI featured prominently, with a whole day devoted to the 
subject. In the morning, the guide explained, a member of the Social 
Performance Management team would talk through how and why the tool was 
used, and the specific responsibilities of the loan officers, including guidance on 
how to undertake the PPI interviews and record responses. In the afternoon, 
attendees would then accompany an experienced loan officer from the first 
                                               
40 Based in in the African Head Quarters 
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Central Region branch office, which was located in the building adjacent to the 
training suite, and observe the use of the tool in practice. 
In contrast to what I had learned about these training programmes, 
however, over the course of my three visits to the in the African Head Quarters 
during this research, I never saw any training being delivered. Furthermore, 
during my time with various branch offices, only once did I see staff leave the 
office for training, with three loan officers from the second Central Region 
branch travelling to Lilongwe for a day of IT training. The majority of loan 
officers, and branch managers, that I met who had been with the organisation 
for less than two years reported that they had never received any training 
beyond that delivered by their branch manager and colleagues, including the 
loan officers who had questioned me about the PPI tool. Speaking to Abigail on 
my final visit, I had asked to see the programme for upcoming staff training, 
and any records available on training that had been delivered: she explained 
that none were available. As we continued to talk, Abigail revealed that it had 
been “several months” since any training activities had been undertaken, which 
was in large part due to the costs incurred by loan officers travelling to, and 
staying near, the African Head Quarters, and the difficulty of clearing the 
required time from loan officer schedules, without impacting operations. I raised 
the concern about whether staff in the field were fully trained on procedures and 
operations, such as those around PPI, and she responded that as long as there 
was one staff member in the team who understood the approach, then they 
would be able to provide guidance and training to their colleagues. In every 
office that I visited, however, I encountered loan officers who had questions 
about PPI, raising that a lack of understanding around PPI was a pervasive 
issue. 
While these issues of training and communication were significant 
contributors to the confusion that I observed around PPI, I argue too that it 
reveals more fundamental dynamics of power relationships within Cloud Loan. 
The adoption of the PPI tool, as I described, was initiated by senior staff in the 
organisation’s London headquarters, with responsibility for data collection and 
processing assigned to staff and teams in-country. This tendency for policies and 
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procedures to be developed centrally, and passed down to branch offices with 
little if any consultation, engagement, or feedback from frontline staff, is one 
that I explore more fully in Chapter 6. In this chapter, I frame the relationship 
between the strategic centre of the organisation, and workers in the field, as 
being one of Principal and Agent, observing the tendency for policies and actions 
to be initiated and developed by the CEO and Founder, and those closest to him, 
with in-country staff generally, and branch staff particularly, conceptualised as 
passive agents whose only responsibility is to follow received instructions. I also 
go on to propose that this dynamic is, whether consciously or unconsciously, 
replicating and perpetuating power disparities that have been the source of 
much criticism of the aid sector. 
As Crewe (2017) cautions, power can give the false impression of wisdom, 
and this too I observed in examination of PPI. As I continue to present in this 
chapter, there are many reasons to be cautious and sceptical about Cloud Loan’s 
claims for PPI, and frequently, I observed, concerns were also held by staff in 
branch offices. In one branch, for example, I was accompanying an officer, 
David, on a group visit, and as we were waiting for the clients to arrive, he ran 
through the tasks and activities for this meeting. Among them was the 
undertaking of PPI interviews with several new members who had recently 
joined the group. David didn’t like doing these interviews, he explained, as 
clients would, on occasion, challenge the questions that were being asked. 
Asking him to expand on this reflection, David commented that the relevance of 
several questions didn’t make sense to him. In particular, he noted, they had 
been instructed to record assets held by clients, even if they didn’t work or were 
not usable: “If I have a radio, but that radio is not working, I have no radio!” he 
exclaimed. When I asked whether he had raised this question with his manager, 
or anyone else in Cloud Loan, he shrugged, responding that he did not fully 
understand the tool in general, and so did not see the point of raising one area of 
confusion over others. These were valid and relevant concerns and questions 
about the tool, yet the culture within the organisation was such that loan 
officers did not raise them. In part, this was due to communications issues and a 
lack of opportunity, which I explore more fully in later chapters. I argue too that 
the perceived status and expertise of UK and senior staff was also a major 
126 
 
factor. Where branch staff saw elements of plans and procedures that did not 
make sense to them, there was a tendency to assume that this was due to their 
own lack of understanding and expertise, rather than because the instructions 
that they had been given were flawed: PPI was, I observed, deemed valuable and 
important because of its international provenance, which also put it beyond 
questioning. This, as Crewe (2017) also notes, contributes to a hierarchy of 
knowledge which persists in the aid sector, and privileges the expertise of 
international actors above front-line, in-country workers. 
Overlooked Sensitivities 
As I also explore in Chapters 6 and 8, it is the loan officers who, among Cloud 
Loan staff, hold the greatest knowledge and understanding of clients’ 
circumstances and experience. As such, this failure to engage branch staff in the 
design of tools such as PPI means that this intelligence is not being captured or 
considered. This was a particular concern in the context of PPI, involving as it 
did the collection of information on assets held, which is a deeply personal line of 
questioning. Furthermore, it is a subject that I learned held particular 
sensitivity for microfinance clients in Malawi, where incidents of assets being 
seized in lieu of payment remained prominent in the public consciousness. In my 
interview with representatives of the Reserve Bank of Malawi, concerns about 
such behaviours were raised as having been influential in the decision to 
develop closer regulation of the country’s microfinance sector, with the most 
senior official stating that, 
“The activity of 2010 [the passing of Malawi’s first Microfinance Act] 
was, in part, prompted by queries and complaints from the public 
about the behaviour of various MFIs, with reports that institutions 
were forcing people to take extreme measures to make their 
repayments. The problems were most pronounced among 
programmes based around group liability, where there were reports 
of group members who were unable to pay their share having assets 
grabbed, being physically assaulted, being detained until they or 
family members could provide funds, or even, allegedly, being forced 
to surrender their children or wives in lieu of payment. There were 
also reports of clients being driven to suicide.” 
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Such behaviours are not, however, merely a thing of the past. In their 2014 
study of microfinance in Malawi, Chirwa & Mvula found that 54.98% of those 
questioned agreed with the statement that MFIs "take your property if you do 
not pay your loan" (2014: 58). Similar issues are also raised by MacPherson et al 
(2015), in their discussion of encounters with clients from a number of unnamed 
MFIs in Malawi. Here, the team observe that, 
“One aspect of the group formation that arose consistently during 
interviews was that groups required members to register their 
household property at the start of the loan cycle. Some of the 
participants discussed groups appointing an auditor to confirm that 
the property they had registered was in their possession and that it 
was worth what the participant had claimed it to be. Participants 
reported registering items such as livestock, kitchen utensils, 
bedding and furniture. The purpose of this property registration was 
that if the participants were unable to repay their loans the group 
could confiscate the property and sell it to recover the money.” 
(MacPherson, et al, 2015: 423) 
Cloud Loan itself is not immune from these issues. While the 
organisation has a strict policy against loan officers seizing clients’ assets, and I 
never encountered any cases of such behaviour having occurred, an internal 
report highlights that clients are not themselves bound by the same rules. The 
report, produced as part of a pilot initiative, trialling the undertaking of exit 
interviews with clients who chose not to take further loans, interviewed 31 
former borrowers about their decision to withdraw from the programme. In 
documenting their responses, the report highlights the case of an, “individual 
who was a victim of threatening behavior [sic] when other members of her group 
came to demand money after the death of her mother and daughter in law” 41.  
 A conversation with Rose, the Southern Regional Manager, also raised 
the concern that PPI was being actively misrepresented by clients themselves. 
One of the loan officers in the second Southern Region branch had reportedly 
met with resistance when seeking to undertake PPI interviews with a number of 
new clients. Rose had decided to visit the group herself to explore the issue 
further, speaking individually to new and more experienced clients about their 
                                               
41 Cloud Loan Exit Study (Cloud Loan Source 5.9) 
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concerns. In these conversations, she relayed, the new clients had been told by 
longer standing members of the group, that the loan officer was asking these 
questions in order to identify what assets they had, that could be seized if loans 
were not repaid. This, she continued, had made the new clients nervous, and 
reluctant to answer the loan officer’s questions. Following this discovery, she 
spent some time with the whole group, explaining the purpose of the tool, which 
was the first formal introduction that some members had received on the 
purpose of the PPI interviews. After the meeting, however, she reported that the 
group’s Chair had complained to the loan officer, saying that now the new 
clients were no longer afraid that Cloud Loan may seize their assets, they may 
be less diligent in their loan repayments, exposing the whole group to the risk of 
having to make up any shortfall. Misrepresenting PPI had therefore here been a 
deliberate effort on the part of some clients to manage the behaviour of their 
fellow group members. These examples raise that there is experience and fear 
among microfinance clients in Malawi, of having their assets seized by an MFI, 
or their fellow group members, if they do not repay their loans. Without 
explanation, it is easy to imagine that clients may perceive PPI as a means of 
collecting information to enable such practices in the future. Such concerns may, 
in turn, impact the accuracy of information disclosed by clients in PPI 
interviews, particularly as Cloud Loan do not verify information provided in any 
way. It is notable that the ways in which clients could perceive the tool were not 
considerations in the decision to adopt PPI, and the potential sensitivities 
involved have not subsequently been considered or managed.  
Despite having been made aware that there were clients who had been 
threatened, or had their assets seized, by fellow group members, Cloud Loan 
retains a policy of allowing groups to manage their own affairs, to the extent 
that loan officers frequently reported being actively discouraged by their 
managers from getting involved in internal debate and disagreements, unless 
they were impacting loan repayments. The ethics of this policy are worthy of 
scrutiny and further study. Relationships between members of loan groups are 
much discussed in microfinance literature, with the Grameen Bank emphasising 
the potential for such groups to act as spaces where social capital in 
participating communities could be built. Bateman (2010), however, is among 
129 
 
those who argue that, on the contrary, microfinance has exploited and weakened 
existing social capital. By framing the route out of poverty as being through 
individual entrepreneurial success, he explains, solidarity in communities is 
broken down, and self-interest promoted. Rahman (1999) similarly observes that 
the high interest rates charged by so many microfinance institutions, and the 
pressures of debt, can cause members of loan groups to exert extreme pressure 
on one another, to ensure that repayments are made. This form of lending, he 
continues, while more secure for the lender, leaves clients risking not only their 
business and finances if they can’t make repayments, but also their social 
networks. By choosing to adopt this model for their lending, Cloud Loan had 
similarly exposed their clients to such risks, and through their work on PPI, 
they had normalised the collection of information on assets held by borrowers. 
The organisation’s active disregard for the consequences of these decisions, and 
the issues that they could create within groups, was striking. As I have argued 
throughout this thesis, understanding clients is essential, to ensure that 
services are appropriate and effective, and here I add that it is also vital in 
ensuring that clients are protected. As I return to in Chapter 7, however, 
accountability to, and engagement with, clients was not prioritised in Cloud 
Loan’s operations. 
Resources and Infrastructure 
Before my first branch office visit to the second Central Branch office, I had 
arranged to spend a week in the in the African Head Quarters, to introduce 
myself to staff and teams based in the Head Office, and learn more about 
strategic operations at the country level. I had arranged this visit through Elsie, 
the office’s Head of HR and Administration, and having heard about PPI from 
Liam, I had expressed a particular interest in learning more about this area of 
work. So it was that she and Simon, the Senior Social Performance Management 
Officer, had agreed that I would spend the week of my visit with the SPM team. 
Arriving on my first day, Elizabeth, an assistant working with the HR team, 
gave me a tour of the complex, which the African Head Quarters and first 
Central Region branch office occupied. She showed me to a room at the front of 
the main building, and on entering, I discovered a tiny office, in to which had 
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been squeezed two desks, four chairs, and a computer. Around and across these 
were several precarious towers of paperwork, rendering movement around the 
room near impossible. Seated at the desks were Simon and his colleague Louisa, 
the SPM Assistant. 
 As discussed previously, responsibility for collecting PPI data fell to loan 
officers, who would make handwritten notes of clients’ responses, in the field. At 
the time of my visits, only the first Central Region branch office had permanent 
internet, as they were able to access the in the African Head Quarters’ Wi-Fi. As 
such, loan officers would have to type up and print out their reports, sending the 
hard copies back to Simon and his team. It was these received reports that 
made-up the precarious towers of paperwork that I had seen on entering the 
SPM office. Once received, Simon and the SPM Assistant would upload the 
details of every group on to the Cloud Loan Management Information System 
(MIS). Until this task was completed, the information collected in the field was 
inaccessible to, and therefore unusable by, the wider organisation. Gesturing to 
the piles of reports, I asked Simon how long this process of inputting and 
uploading the data took. He responded that it was often a slow task, and that 
some of the documents currently in the office had been submitted several weeks 
previously. It was not unusual, he continued, for groups to have moved on to 
their next loan before data from their last cycle had been processed. As such, the 
system could not offer ‘real time’ information on clients. As previously raised, 
PPI was selected over other means of assessing poverty, in part because it was 
considered to be ‘quick and easy’. While I had seen that the initial data 
collection was indeed quick, and argued in the previous section that this speed 
was not inherently positive, the process that Simon had described, of turning 
this data into usable information, was a slow and arduous one. Simanowitz 
(2003b) emphasises that for social performance management initiatives, such as 
PPI, to be effective and valuable, appropriate and efficient supporting systems 
are essential. In my time with Cloud Loan, I observed that under-resourcing of 
the SPM function in Malawi created a significant block in the process of 
converting raw, PPI data into usable information. Furthermore, inadequate 
technology also impeded the sharing of data between branch offices, the in the 
131 
 
African Head Quarters, and London, and limited what information could be 
captured and used. 
 Returning first to the way in which data is recorded, as described, loan 
officers carry out PPI interviews in the field, recording responses in handwritten 
notes. On returning to the office, these notes are typed-up, printed, and sent to 
the in the African Head Quarters. This process relies on there being functioning 
IT equipment in branch offices which, as the next chapter also discusses, was 
often not the case. Frequently, I would visit offices where computers or printers 
were not working, and officers therefore had to either wait for replacement 
equipment, wait for their Regional Manager to visit, and use their laptop, or 
make use of machines in local internet cafes. All of which created delays in the 
submission of information. Progress in this area, however, is being made. 
Towards the end of my research, Cloud Loan were awarded a grant from one of 
their existing corporate supporters to furnish all loan officers with tablets, 
enabling them to record the outcomes of PPI interviews electronically, and 
therefore avoid the transcription process. Building on this important step, the 
organisation hopes in the near future to provide internet connections in all 
branch offices, enabling collected data to be uploaded directly to the MIS. Until 
such connectivity is established, however, the hard copies must still be printed 
and sent to the in the African Head Quarters, where the SPM team bear 
responsibility for uploading information to the system, raising the issue of this 
function being under-resourced. 
As Chapters 4 and 8 also discuss, PPI was only one area of responsibility 
for the SPM team, along with coordinating client training and business support, 
and managing the Client Hotline. During our initial meeting, Simon explained 
that recently, he had been pulled away from these standard tasks to support 
other projects in the organisation, thereby further slowing the rate at which 
incoming data could be processed. Later in my research, Simon was promoted to 
a Regional Manager position, and his post not backfilled by the time I left the 
organisation, leaving Louisa to manage the PPI data along with other areas of 
responsibility, with only occasional support from temporary data entry 
assistants. This extremely limited capacity to process PPI data created a major 
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blockage in the flow of PPI information. This situation reflects the issue of 
insufficient staff time being allocated to tasks, which recurs throughout this 
thesis. In this case, the prominence of PPI in the organisation’s literature, and 
the pride with which it was discussed by senior managers, was not being 
matched by the investments and resources required to deliver upon promised 
benefits. As was raised in the previous chapter, this suggests a mismatch 
between the externally articulated priorities of the organisation, and those that 
drove internal resource allocation and decision making. 
This insufficient investment in systems and processes is also reflected in 
the way in which PPI information is made available to the wider organisation. 
Cloud Loan’s work on PPI was, as described previously, partly initiated as a 
means of making the organisation more attractive to larger, institutional 
donors. In this pursuit, they have been successful, having been awarded grants 
through DFID’s Global Poverty Action Fund, and the Scottish Government’s 
Malawi funding round, among others. Reviewing applications and reporting for 
such funding, I saw that PPI featured prominently, with frequent allusions to 
the high esteem with which this tool was held in the microfinance community, 
and the insight that it could offer Cloud Loan on their outreach and impact. 
Despite such promises, however, in recent years the organisation has 
experienced issues in fulfilling their commitment to report to donors using the 
tool. In a 2014 report to DFID, for example, Cloud Loan noted that they were 
unable to include figures on their achievements over the reporting period, 
stating that they had,  
“encountered challenges regarding PPI datasets” continuing that the 
tool “represents a huge volume of data and data management is 
complex. Unfortunately, we have encountered technical issues with 
the MIS and we cannot currently report the PPI scores. It is a 
temporary problem and we are working with the MIS developer to 
remedy the issue. In the longer-term we are investing in a new MIS, 
for which funding has now been secured.”42  
In contrast to the claims of this being a temporary issue, however, members of 
the London based fundraising team often raised wider concerns about the 
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management information system and PPI. Ash, one of the fundraising officers 
who worked most closely with institutional donors, commented that the 
aggregation of data to the group level was particularly frustrating, reflecting 
that the system, “doesn’t tell us the stories of individuals…Often donors want to 
know about new clients and the journey of clients, and we can’t tell them that”. 
As previously raised, this aggregation was necessitated by the limited capacity 
of the Cloud Loan MIS to hold complex information. The inability to report 
client data to donors was described to me as something of a tipping point for 
these wider frustrations, inspiring the organisation’s decision in 2014 to replace 
the MIS with a system that could better cope with the complexity of data 
demanded by various teams within the organisation. This process, however, 
suffered a setback in 2015, when the organisation installing the new system 
announced that they were withdrawing, with immediate effect, the product 
selected by Cloud Loan, necessitating a new round of research and tendering, 
and delaying the launch of the new system by over a year. Such delays represent 
continued wasted effort on the part of the loan officers and the SPM team, as 
while they continued to devote time and effort to collecting and processing the 
information, it was not producing usable or useful outputs (Guijt, 2015).  
Outreach and Impact 
Returning to the origins of Cloud Loan’s use of PPI, the organisation presented 
that its primary interest was in reducing poverty, but acknowledged that there 
was a mismatch between their aspirations of reaching the poorest in society, and 
the demographics of their client base. A means of rectifying this mismatch, the 
SPM team identified, was to increase their knowledge and understanding of 
poverty levels among their clients. This would, the organisation described, 
enable them to better target the poorest members of society, and ensure that 
loan products and services were tailored to their needs. While the previous 
sections have outlined concerns around the efficiency and ethics of PPI data 
collection, the insufficient investment in staff time and supporting 
infrastructure, and the quality and consistency of information generated, 
perhaps the most significant concern with the tool, and Cloud Loan’s social 
performance management work, is that contrary to the stated objectives of the 
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PPI initiative, poverty outreach appears to have worsened in the five years since 
the tool’s adoption.  In 2010, initial assessments using the PPI tool showed that 
53.5% of clients were estimated to be living on under $1.25 a day, and 85.9% 
under $2.50, but by 2015, these figures had fallen to 49.8% and 84.3% 
respectively43. These changes occurred during a period where the IMF estimates 
that rates of poverty in Malawi were staying the same or worsening (IMF, 2017). 
I argue here that while information was being generated by Cloud Loan through 
PPI, for this information to enable the changes in outreach and impact that the 
organisation sought to achieve, it is not sufficient for information to exist, it 
must be considered and learned from (Guijt, 2015), and these processes were not 
occurring. The way in which information is shared and prioritised internally 
links to ideas of internal communication and accountability, which are explored 
in the following chapter. 
Conclusion 
Understanding, and being able to evidence, the impact that you are making 
through your work is a concept core to accountability. In this chapter, I have 
introduced the Progress out of Poverty Index, Cloud Loan’s flagship 
accountability initiative, and the means by which the organisation seeks to 
achieve these objectives. Presenting my observations and experience of all 
stages of the PPI process, from data collection in the field, through processing in 
the African Head Quarters, to the use of information in internal and external 
reporting, I have argued that the status of the tool in Cloud Loan’s literature, 
reports, and media was not matched by the insight that the tool offered, nor the 
resourcing and support of associated activities. As such, I argue that its greatest 
value to Cloud Loan was performative.  
Cloud Loan’s journey to adopting PPI, and wider social performance 
management practices, reflects Copestake’s 2003 observations on the relative 
status of social impact against other concerns. When a new enterprise or 
initiative is launched, he explains, the implementation of means by which 
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financial and other functional matters can be monitored and managed tends to 
be regarded as essential, whereas when it comes to matters of social 
performance and impact, these are not only seen as lesser priorities, but are also 
areas where less support, and guidance on good practice, is available. So it was 
that Cloud Loan only established mechanisms by which social performance 
could be monitored eight years after beginning operations. By this time, they 
were already attracting over £1.2 million a year in income44, and lending to more 
than 23,000 clients45 in Malawi, despite not being able to convey results or 
evidence of impact beyond anecdotal case studies. Such individual success 
stories, and the wider microfinance brand, can therefore be seen to have been 
sufficiently compelling to win support from individual givers, corporations, and 
philanthropic trusts. 
The impetus for Cloud Loan’s decision to develop their social performance 
management work was presented to me as being two-fold. Firstly, there was a 
recognition internally that the organisation was not achieving the outreach and 
impact that they hoped for, and this belief was confirmed in a 2010 external 
evaluation. PPI was identified as a means by which Cloud Loan could improve 
their outreach, and also learn more about their clients to ensure that products 
and services were appropriate and effective. Against these ambitions, however, I 
saw no progress: As this chapter raised, Cloud Loan’s poverty outreach 
worsened in the five years since adopting PPI. This, I argue, is because while 
information was being generated, it was not being learned from, or used to 
inform operational decision making. Processes by which clients were recruited 
by Cloud Loan remained unchanged, as did the services that they received, so it 
is understandable that no change in the profile of Cloud Loan’s client base was 
observed. Furthermore, while prior to adopting the tool there was concern that 
the organisation was not reaching the poorest in society, senior managers were 
now receiving monthly confirmation that this continued to be the case, and yet 
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still no action was taken: As the previous chapter raised, efforts continued to be 
focused on the ‘viable poor’ (Blowfield & Dolan, 2014).  
This lack of action, I argue, gives greater weight to Cloud Loan’s second 
rationale for adopting Cloud Loan: appealing to institutional donors. The period 
in which Cloud Loan initiated their work on PPI was one where, in the UK, 
public support for international development was showing signs of faltering, and 
the UK Department for International Development was facing increasing calls 
from Government to make themselves more accountable for their spending. 
When, in May 2010, Andrew Mitchell assumed the office of Secretary of State for 
International Development he, as Valters & Whitty describe, “immediately 
positioned results, evidence, value for money and transparency at the centre of 
aid management” (Valters & Whitty, 2017: 9). It was this agenda that Cloud 
Loan was responding to by establishing their social performance management 
team, and work on PPI. From this perspective, the organisation’s efforts can be 
seen as having been effective, as they were able to attract ongoing support from 
DFID and other institutional donors, with various members of the fundraising 
team raising with me that PPI was particularly important in this regard.  
As I described in this chapter, however, PPI may not offer reliable 
information on the impact of Cloud Loan interventions, an observation which 
resonates with wider criticism of the so called ‘Results Agenda’. As Eyben (2013) 
discusses, if results are demanded, then they will be produced, but whether they 
bear any relation to real change is a different matter. In the context of Cloud 
Loan, while donors found it appealing that the organisation could now say that 
they were measuring their outreach and impact, there are questions to be asked 
about the quality of this evidence, and the story that it tells. In this chapter, for 
example, I questioned whether the PPI tool, while offering an appealing 
narrative, was capable of achieving the lofty ambitions set out for it by Cloud 
Loan, particularly around generating an understanding of impact. By 
interviewing individuals at the start of their first loan, I was told, and then 
periodically over the course of their participation in loan groups, changes in 
levels of poverty could be tracked. As Cloud Loan’s website explains, this 
enables the organisation to understand whether their ambitions are being 
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achieved, and to generate evidence of their impact46. I observed, however, that 
the limitations of Cloud Loan’s management information system meant that 
data was recorded at the group level, thereby making it impossible to track the 
progress of a specific client. Furthermore, as group membership changed every 
loan cycle, with new clients joining groups and others withdrawing, the group 
level measurements do not offer like-for-like comparisons, severely limiting the 
validity of observed changes over time. In this chapter, I also raised more 
fundamental concerns about PPI, questioning whether, even with adequate 
resourcing, it can be used to provide the promised evidence. As this chapter 
reported, Simon, the Senior Social Performance Management Officer, explained 
that PPI was attractive for its simplicity, acknowledging that with this 
simplicity came a lack of detail. Poverty, however, as I describe in this chapter, 
is a complex and nuanced experience, and in Cloud Loan I observed a disinterest 
in engaging with this complexity. Instead, the focus was on making simple, 
technical representations, turning diverse experiences into quantifiable 
management information (Dolan, 2008). In this process of simplification, I also 
noted the obscuring of sub-national diversity, and the failure of the PPI tool to 
accommodate varying contexts and norms found across regions and households 
of Malawi. This wilful removal of detail, I argue, significantly limits the insight 
into clients’ circumstances and experience, and the impact of interventions, that 
organisations can hope to gain from the use of PPI. 
Despite the influential role that donors played in Cloud Loan’s decision to 
adopt PPI, I also noted in this chapter that the organisation’s staff and systems 
often found themselves overwhelmed by the task of processing PPI data, and 
unable to provide promised information. Despite this, the fundraising team 
reported that they had not received any negative feedback on these incomplete 
reports, and no funding had been withheld, adding further weight to my 
argument that it was the story of PPI that was more compelling and valuable 
than the outputs or insight that the tool produced. On the part of donors, this 
suggests that while matters around results and accountability are prominent in 
funding agreements and wider policy, their interest in the practices of those 
                                               
46 Cloud Loan Website (Cloud Loan Source 5.1) 
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they fund is more superficial. For both actors, therefore, it is being able to signal 
your commitment to evidence and results that is the highest priority, and for 
Cloud Loan, PPI has acted as means by which they can signal their credentials 
in this regard. This resonates with Bateman & Chang’s assessment that the PPI 





Chapter 6: Internal Accountability 
Arriving at the Cloud Loan office on the morning of my first full day with the 
third Central Region branch, I interrupted a tense exchange between the 
Branch Manager, Calvin, and the visiting Regional Manager, Dziko. Before this 
visit, Dziko had received an anxious telephone call from Angelica, the Projects 
Officer based in the in the African Head Quarters, responsible for coordinating 
Cloud Loan’s work with online fundraising platforms. Branch offices 
participating in these programmes were required to submit regular case studies 
and updates, to be featured on the platforms and shared with supporters, but 
Angelica had complained that this branch’s reports were now several weeks 
overdue. This delay, Angelica continued, meant that she was now being chased 
by the platform who, in turn, were concerned about missing their own 
publication and reporting deadlines. 
 Dziko had begun to convey these concerns, only for a frustrated Calvin to 
interject that the information had been collected, but that he had no way of 
getting it to Angelica. In a similar manner to the PPI questionnaires, discussed 
in the previous chapter, loan officers would use a template to collect the 
information required for the construction of a case study47. Unlike PPI, however, 
rather than sending a hard copy to the African Head Quarters, loan officers 
were then required to scan the completed questionnaire, and email this 
document, along with accompanying digital photographs, to Angelica. This 
process was in part necessitated by the requirement to include digital copies of 
client photographs, but also, as Angelica explained, her predecessor had 
established this process of electronic submissions, as she found it easier to 
process information received in this way, preventing as it did the accumulation 
of paper that I had seen in the office of the SPM team. 
 Calvin and his team had, however, been beset by difficulties when 
attempting to follow this process. Recently, he told me, the African Head 
                                               
47 More information on these templates and this process is provided in Chapter 7 
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Quarters had issued the branch with an internet dongle, to enable loan officers 
to email documents directly from the office. As he explained, however, this 
service had proved costly, and with the funds that he received from Head Office, 
he was not able to maintain sufficient credit on the device. Furthermore, even 
when the dongle had been topped-up, he had found the connection to be 
unreliable, and inadequate for sending large files. Instead, therefore, Calvin had 
taken to saving the scanned reports and photographs on to a memory stick, 
which he would take to an internet café in town, and send the files to Angelica 
from there. This month, however, had also brought additional challenges. As 
well the internet dongle, arrangements had also been made to provide the office 
with a new computer, which would replace the current old, unreliable machine, 
and enable the officers to work more efficiently. The old equipment had duly 
been disposed of, but on receiving the replacement, Calvin had realised that 
several integral parts were missing, making the system unusable. As such, the 
team were now no longer able to scan the case study forms or download 
photographs from the camera. In an exasperated tone, Calvin recounted the 
numerous conversations that he had had with Lumbani, the officer in Cloud 
Loan’s African Head Quarters with responsibility for coordinating the 
organisation’s IT, over the previous weeks. Despite these efforts, however, 
Lumbani was yet to dispatch the required items. In relaying this information, 
Calvin’s anger and frustration was palpable. In exasperated tones, he explained 
to Dziko and I his sense that Lumbani and his team were not taking the request 
seriously, and did not understand how important these items were for branch 
operations. He felt, he continued, that he had done all that he could to fix the 
situation, and was upset that Angelica was complaining about his failure to 
complete a task that he had no means of completing.  
Dziko listened sympathetically to Calvin’s story, later telling me that it 
had not been a surprise. Often, she explained, laughing, it was a fight to get 
everything they needed in the branches. Head Office, she continued, “don’t like 
spending money!” As an interim solution, it was agreed that the collected case 
studies should be scanned at the local internet café, a course of action that 
Calvin had not previously pursued due to there being a cost for each page 
scanned, which he did not have the authority to approve. Recognising this 
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additional expenditure, Dziko emphasised that she would agree to cover the cost 
on this one occasion, but that this could only be a temporary solution. 
In seeking to address the wider IT issues, Calvin once again called 
Lumbani, this time with Dziko listening in. On the call he explained again that 
the team were without a computer, and the inconvenience that this was causing, 
asking when the replacement parts would be dispatched. “Soon, soon”, came the 
dismissive reply. Dziko then phoned Angelica, explaining the interim measure, 
and the reason for the delay. Angelica, whose office was only a few doors away 
from Lumbani’s, offered to go and speak to him directly, and see if there was 
anything that could be done. 30 minutes after ending her call with Angelica, 
Dziko received a call from Lumbani, saying that he had been able to pull 
together all the items requested, and that they would be sent out that afternoon. 
By Thursday of that week, the promised shipment had arrived and was quickly 
set-up, only for Calvin to realise that the software he required to support the 
scanner had not been installed. A similarly confusing round of phone calls 
ensued, leading to a promise that Lumbani would come to the office within the 
next fortnight, to help get the system up and running. Calvin later told me that 
it was over a month after this delivery that the system was fully operational, 
and that a backlog of reports was once again starting to build.  
Introduction 
As I introduced in Chapter 3, accountability is fundamentally a relational 
concept, concerned with dialogue and exchange between actors, yet discussions 
of accountability in this context tend to focus on relationships with those 
external to the organisation (Luxon & Wong, 2017; Ebrahim, 2005a; Weisband 
& Ebrahim, 2007). Fry, however, observes that accountability is also, “an 
intrinsic experience in daily organizational life” (Fry, 1995: 181), emphasising 
that, as this thesis has raised, organisations are not homogenous entities: they 
are dynamic fora, encompassing different locations, interests, and skills, where 
policies and actions are interpreted, communicated, and enacted at different 
times and from different perspectives (Hilhorst, 2003). The relationships and 
interactions across teams and locations will, I argue in this chapter, not only 
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shape the day to day experiences of internal actors, but also have a significant 
bearing both on the effectiveness of the organisation, and their accountability to 
external actors. 
 Cloud Loan is an international organisation, head quartered in the UK 
and operating through 16 hubs across Malawi. As Stephenson Jr. (2005) 
observes of such organisations, “Coordination is essential both to provide 
services effectively and to overcome the barriers implicit in working within an 
environment of at least quasi-autonomous units.” (Stephenson Jr., 2005: 343). 
As I raised in Chapter 1, however, in my early encounters with Cloud Loan I 
had been struck by the disconnection between different teams and locations. 
This is a dynamic illustrated in the discussion of IT equipment in the third 
Central Region branch, where I had seen the difficulty that staff faced in trying 
to share information, such as the case study profiles, across locations, and also 
the frustrations, bureaucracy, and hierarchies which defined and shaped so 
many of these internal interactions. In this chapter I argue that, much as Diallo 
& Thuillier (2005) emphasise the importance of trust and communication within 
organisations to support wider endeavours, failure to address these issues 
internal has the potential to consistently undermine efforts towards 
accountability. 
In the previous two chapters, I explored the question of for what Cloud 
Loan were accountable, and in these discussions observed that insufficient 
consideration had been given to matters of internal accountability. In the 
previous chapter’s discussion of the PPI tool, for example, I raised that many 
loan officers were not able to be fully transparent with their clients on the 
purpose of the interviews, because they themselves did not have a strong 
understanding of the purpose of their questions, or how information would be 
used. Furthermore, systems designed to promote the sharing of information 
across the organisation were shown to be inadequate, hindering both the 
organisation’s understanding of, and ability to communicate, their impact. In 
this chapter, I explore further artefacts and issues of internal accountability in 
Cloud Loan. I begin by reflecting on the means by which staff were held to 
account, and their performance managed, monitored, and incentivised. As was 
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raised in previous chapters, the majority of branch officers’ work was 
undertaken in the homes and communities of clients, meaning that there was 
little opportunity for managers to have direct oversight of their staff. Cloud 
Loan’s leadership, I discuss, sought to compensate for this necessity of managing 
at a distance by using KPIs and other tools of accountability to exert control over 
remote staff and functions. Such efforts have, I argue, contributed to the 
entrenchment of existing hierarchies and centralisation, and been widely 
interpreted by staff in branch offices as signs that they are not trusted or 
respected by their Head Office colleagues. Furthermore, I raise that while staff 
feel subjected to excessive controls, these systems are not supporting the 
identification of harmful behaviours, such as fraud.  
I go on to explore ideas of trust more fully, observing that the further a 
staff members’ geographical proximity from senior management was, the 
greater the control exerted on them was. It was notable, for example, that staff 
within the London Head Office were trusted to discharge their duties and 
manage resources appropriately. Conversely, however, as I explore through a 
discussion of staff travel arrangements, far more rigid controls were imposed on 
staff in-country. While I argue that closeness and familiarity between 
individuals is a powerful force in engendering trust, I also explore that 
disparities in trust can have more insidious roots, observing race and 
nationality, as well as geographical location, to be factors in how staff regarded 
one another. 
Bringing together these observations around trust and communication, I 
end this chapter by discussing Cloud Loan’s Farming Loans initiative: a Venture 
Loan programme that has encountered major challenges and failings in recent 
years which, I argue, can be traced back to failings in internal accountability 




Managing Performance through Control 
Since granting their first loan in 2002, Cloud Loan’s expansion has been 
significant, with loans now being made through 16 branch offices, across 
Malawi. This growth has necessitated a degree of decentralisation and 
specialisation, resulting in diverse clusters of specific expertise and 
responsibilities being found across the geography of the organisation, such as 
the concentration of the fundraising function in the London office, or the loan 
officers’ placement in branch offices. As Suzuki (1998) observes, this is a pattern 
commonly encountered when organisations grow beyond one or two locations, 
and offers certain operational advantages, allowing, for example, units to be 
more internally collaborative, and responsive to the changes and demands of 
their particular responsibility or speciality. Such clustering and decentralisation 
can, however, also create a sense of fragmentation within organisations, where, 
staff can feel a stronger connection to their own team and operating context 
than they do to the organisation as a whole. As Suzuki describes, “Offices may 
lose a sense of sharing the mission of the organization as a whole” (Suzuki, 1998: 
72). Maintaining a balance between local efficiency and empowerment, and a 
sense of collective endeavour, is a challenge that has been much discussed by 
practitioners and academics, particularly in the context of international 
organisations, such as Cloud Loan.  
The response of an organisation’s leadership to these concerns around 
fragmentation can, however, result in actions which undermine the potential 
benefits of decentralisation (McPeak, 2001). Hudson (1995) observes that, afraid 
of ceding control, senior managers may increasingly seek to involve themselves 
in shaping the minutiae of tasks undertaken at the local level. This is an 
observation which resonates with the patterns discussed in the previous 
chapters, where I described that loan officers had little discretion or freedom 
when it came to discharging their responsibilities, required as they were to 
follow a pre-set curriculum of client training, and to undertake a prescribed set 
of tasks. In so doing, the potential for officers to shape services and respond to 
the specific demands of their clients and context was systematically diminished. 
Building on Hudson’s observations, Suzuki (1998) describes that to strengthen 
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their influence and control over devolved activities, an organisation’s leadership 
may seek to establish monitoring and audit systems which further reinforce 
hierarchies within the organisation, and the status of the strategic centre. These 
were dynamics that I also saw reflected in Cloud Loan’s Performance 
Management system. 
The means by which branches and individual officers were held 
accountable for the completion of prescribed tasks was through a set of country-
wide key performance indicators (KPIs). It was these KPIs that formed the 
substance of the Performance Report, produced every month by Anna, the 
London-based Programme Officer, and distributed to senior management in the 
UK and internationally. As such, these KPIs provided the language of 
communication between Cloud Loan’s various locations, offering as they did a 
means by which Head Office could signal their priorities and expectations, and 
branch offices could confirm their diligence and adherence.  
While the Performance Report itself was shared only amongst senior 
staff in London and the African Head Quarters, the constituent KPIs were 
visible and much discussed features of branch office life. Cloud Loan’s first 
Southern Region branch occupied a large unit in a short row of commercial 
properties, not far from the city centre. Unlike most other branches, here the 
Regional Manager and Branch Manager both had their own offices within the 
unit, and two further rooms were shared by the loan officers. On entering the 
Branch Manager’s office for the first time, I immediately saw that three of the 
walls around his desk were completely covered with taped-up sheets of flipchart 
paper. On each sheet, lists and grids had been drawn in colourful markers, and 
on closer inspection I saw that these were being used to track and compare the 
performance of each loan officer against the Cloud Loan KPIs. An example of 




While branch managers were required to submit more detailed monthly reports 
to their managers, these five indicators reflect the themes of the Performance 
Report, capturing as they do the importance that the organisation placed on the 
number of clients, the size of the loan book, and repayment rates48.  
 During my time in the first Southern Region branch, I saw that while 
these pages adorned only the walls of the Branch Manager’s office, this was a 
space regularly visited and used by all the branch’s loan officers, whether for 
team meetings, one on one conversations, or to use the computer. As such, 
officers received constant reminders of what achievements and behaviours they 
should be prioritising, and also of how their performance compared to that of 
their colleagues. This, the Branch Manager told me, was deliberate, explaining 
                                               
48 PAR refers to Portfolio at Risk, a standard measure of portfolio quality used across the 
microfinance, and wider international banking sectors. As CGAP describe, “PAR30 
shows the value of all loans outstanding (principal and interest) that have one payment 
past due for more than 30 days” (CGAP, 2009: 8). 
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that he felt a sense of competition within the team was productive, and would 
inspire improved performance across the branch. Beyond this sense of internal 
competition, the posters on the wall also reminded staff that financial rewards 
were available, in return for specified levels of achievement. As the below image 
shows, for example, officers could receive a bonus of up to 21,000MWK if they 
reached or retained a certain number of clients each quarter, or if a high 
proportion of their clients were repaying their loans as scheduled. Similar 
incentives were also offered to loan officers to who completed all required PPI 
interviews. The levels of performance required to be eligible for these bonuses, 
and the sums available, were set by the senior management team based in the 
African Head Quarters, in consultation with staff in London. 
 
Awareness of these indicators, and of related bonuses, was high when I 
met with the first Southern Region branch’s team of loan officers. Taking 
advantage of all the officers being in the branch one Friday afternoon, we met 
together in one of the team’s offices. In the course of our conversation, I asked 
whether there were aspects of the role that the officers found difficult or 
frustrating, and in their response, the KPIs and associated bonus system 
emerged as particular points of contention.  Summarising his colleagues’ 
frustrations, one officer reflected that they were unfair as they failed to 
acknowledge that the loan officer job was different in different locations. 
Expanding on this point, the example of the case study forms required by the 
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online fundraising platforms49 were raised. Completing these forms, the officers 
explained, like any additional task, would make the meetings longer, thereby 
limiting the number of groups that they could visit in a day, and consequently 
the number of clients that they managed, and the size of their loan book. 
Furthermore, as the example at the beginning of this chapter also raised, the 
process of filing the information captured in the field was also often time 
consuming. This, the first Southern Region branch team contested, put them at 
a disadvantage when it came to achieving the required performance levels to be 
eligible for a bonus, compared to their colleagues in other offices, who were not 
required to complete these additional tasks. Staff in the second Central Region 
branch also voiced similar concerns, raising that the geography and 
demographics of their area put them at a disadvantage, when it came to 
eligibility for bonuses. Operating across a larger, more rural area, they 
explained, meant that they spent greater proportions of their days travelling 
between groups than officers whose client base was more clustered, similarly 
limiting the number of clients with whom they could engage. Furthermore, the 
officers continued, more rural clients would typically request smaller loans than 
their urban counterparts, thereby further limiting the size of the branch’s loan 
book overall. Such observations echo Lipsky’s caution that quantifiable 
outcomes such as these measures do not necessarily correspond to the efforts of 
the practitioner (Lipsky, 1980).  
A palpable sense of frustration emerged in such conversations, with a 
feeling expressed by loan officers that they were being held accountable for 
achievements that did not reflect the reality and demands of their context, 
fuelling a sense that Head Office did not understand the complexity of 
operations in the field. As McPeak (2001) warned, these KPIs had been 
established as a means of encouraging high levels of performance, and the 
pursuit of common objectives across the organisation, yet they had served to 
create and fuel frustrations and animosity between locations. 
                                               




Related to these aspirations of control, Fry (1995) describes the purpose of 
systems of internal accountability as being to reduce incidents of deviance. 
While Cloud Loan’s Leadership sought to manage activity and performance 
across the organisation through use of the KPIs, incurring the resultant 
frustrations and animosity, it was notable that so called deviant behaviour has 
not been quashed by these mechanisms; During my time with the organisation, 
incidents of fraud were uncovered across all levels and locations of operations. 
As Arthur, the then recently appointed Head of Internal Audit, commented 
when we met, in the seven branch offices that he had so far visited, he had 
encountered incidents of serious fraud in all but one. 
 The first Southern Region branch was one of the offices where such 
issues had been identified, and Cloud Loan was, at the time of my visit, 
exploring taking legal action against a loan officer who had recently been fired, 
to recoup money that he had stolen from the organisation. While reluctant to 
discuss the details of this particular case, it appeared never to be far from the 
officers’ minds, and the subject recurred frequently in our conversations. While 
the branch staff all expressed anger and disappointment at the actions of their 
former colleague, none seemed particularly surprised. Probing as to why this 
was, a by now familiar frustration that staff in Cloud Loan’s Head Office did not 
understand or respect the work of branch staff re-emerged. As one member of 
the team articulated, 
 “[Fraud] is wrong and the clients suffer, but sometimes there is too 
much temptation. To live in the city…we are not paid enough. We are 
paid the same as those who can live more cheaply… Here in the city, 
it is not enough, and when you do not have enough, sometimes the 
temptation becomes too much.”  
Implicit in this statement was a complaint, also raised by staff in other branch 
offices, that officers did not feel adequately rewarded for their work. None, 
however, felt that there was any means by which they could raise these concerns 
with senior management, leaving the sentiments to fester, fuelling resentment, 
and, as the officer in the first Southern Region branch had observed, potentially 
contributing to the problems of fraud within the organisation. The issue of 
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reward was also raised in my interview with George Finlayson, a former UK 
High Commissioner to Malawi, who went on to work with Cloud Loan on several 
projects. In discussing his experience with, and impressions of, the organisation, 
he described that Cloud Loan’s CEO and Founder, “is tight”, and that, “He 
doesn’t pay people well”. Describing a recent Venture Loan project, that he had 
worked with Cloud Loan on developing, he continued that the greatest 
frustrations from this work had been around insufficient staff capacity, both in 
terms of not being able to appoint people with the right skills, as Cloud Loan 
would not approve the higher salaries required to attract appropriate 
candidates, and staff in participating branches not having enough time to devote 
to work on the project. Such observations reflect concerns raised throughout this 
thesis, and also emerge in the discussion of the Farming Loans project, later in 
this chapter. 
 An alternative perspective on these incidents of fraud was raised by 
Arthur, the Head of Internal Audit, who claimed that the organisation placed a 
great deal of trust in their loan officers, to go into communities and deliver 
programmes ethically and effectively, without direct oversight or supervision. As 
he explained, 
“Loan Officers have so much power: selecting clients, disbursing, 
recording, and so on…They follow the systems, on the whole they are 
complying, but too much freedom means too much potential for 
malpractice”.  
Expanding on his thoughts around this freedom, he continued that, while 
exploited by some loan officers, it also left all branch staff vulnerable, as he 
believed that he had encountered at least one case of clients claiming that they 
had been defrauded, in an attempt to avoid having to repay their loan.  
“Officers are unprotected”, he told me, “The disbursement system is 
too weak. There is no accountability…if the client says, ‘the Loan 
Officer took our money’, it is hard to prove that he did not. It is hard 
to prove that he did.”.  
This interpretation contrasted sharply with loan officers’ sense of, far from 
having too much freedom, being subject to excessively stringent controls. 
Arthur’s position was also illustrative of the concerns about a lack of physical 
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oversight of operations, and trust in branch staff, that so many in the African 
Head Quarters and London office had reflected, which had led to the paradox of 
decentralisation and control against which McPeak (2001) cautions. 
In previous chapters I observed that while information was being 
generated in the field and submitted to Head Office, it was frequently not the 
information that was needed, or it otherwise wasn’t being used. I argue that a 
similar dynamic can be observed here: while information is being generated, 
ostensibly enabling senior managers to know what is happening in the field, 
major issues, such as harmful and fraudulent behaviours are not being 
identified (Fry, 1995). An imbalance has been created in the actions for which 
loan officers are held accountable, with perceptions of extreme controls in 
certain areas, and the excessive freedom that Arthur raised, in others. 
Furthermore, processes of accountability that have been put in place are serving 
to create and fuel tension between different locations, undermining 
relationships which may offer a means by which greater understanding between 
parties can be obtained. As is observed elsewhere in this thesis, efforts to 
increase accountability have relied on the imposition of a specific tool, in this 
case the KPIs, without sufficient consideration being given to how these tools 
will be perceived, and the impact that they will have on relationships. 
Trust and Autonomy 
At the heart of loan officers’ frustrations with the KPIs, and wider diktats from 
Head Office, was a feeling that they weren’t being trusted to do their jobs 
diligently and responsibly. Beyond being the tools by which Cloud Loan, as a 
responsible organisation, could monitor and manage their performance, 
mechanisms of internal accountability were widely considered by staff in branch 
offices to be means by which management could overcome their lack of trust in 
loan officers. Contributing to this perception was a sense among staff in branch 
offices that they were subject to greater controls than their colleagues in 
different roles and locations who, I heard claimed, experienced markedly 
different levels of trust and autonomy. These claims of difference also resonated 
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with my own experience visiting different Cloud Loan offices, typified by two 
encounters concerning staff travel. 
During my time in the London office, Nina, a member of the fundraising 
team, was planning a visit to Malawi, to help make arrangements for the 
filming of the celebrity fronted appeal video, discussed in Chapter 4. As Nina 
looked at the various flights and options available, she found that she could 
either travel through Johannesburg or Nairobi, with the Nairobi option being 
approximately £300 cheaper. As she searched, she discussed these options with 
the fundraising assistant, who would make the flight bookings and travel 
arrangements for her. Looking more closely at the two routes, the pair found 
that the Johannesburg option would give Nina an extra half day in the office, 
and so asked the assistant to book that flight for her. In a later meeting about 
the filming, she updated the CEO and Founder on her travel plans, explaining 
that the option she had chosen was more expensive, but would allow her more 
time with the team. He agreed that this made sense, and shared that this was 
the route that he also tended to use, when travelling to Malawi, describing that 
it was a faster and “more pleasant” journey. 
This encounter was in stark contrast to my experience travelling with 
branch staff in Malawi. During my time in the Southern Region, I had arranged 
to accompany Rose, the Southern Regional Manager, on a visit to one of her 
branch offices50. Rose was permanently based in the first Southern Region 
branch, but had responsibility for overseeing all Cloud Loan operations in the 
southern region of Malawi, and so, like the other regional managers, she spent 
much of her time on the road, aiming to visit every branch office approximately 
six times a year. While these branch visits would usually last a week, enabling 
the regional manager to spend time with various staff members, address any 
matters of particular concern, and visit a sample of the branch’s loan groups, 
commitments in her home branch had meant that this visit would be shorter 
than usual, as we planned to leave for the office on Wednesday morning, and 
return on Friday. On Wednesday, however, a mechanical issue with Rose’s car, 
coupled with bad traffic coming out of the city, meant that we arrived at the 
                                               
50 The second Southern Region branch 
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second Southern Region branch several hours later than we had planned. We 
had already missed meetings with two of the groups whom we had hoped to 
meet that day, and we were to miss a third meeting as, on arriving in town, we 
were further delayed by a search for accommodation. While we had found and 
stopped at a number of guest houses and lodges on our way in to town, after 
each brief visit we were forced to carry on, finding as we did that none had 
accommodation affordable within the 7,000MWK (c.£10) per night maximum 
stipend allowed by Cloud Loan for such visits. Rose had raised this allowance on 
our drive, explaining that adhering to the limit often required some negotiation, 
as it was lower than the rate advertised by most establishments. As Rose had 
described, the first four places that we visited charged between 8,000 and 
10,000MWK per night, commensurate with the costs that I had encountered on 
all my visits outside of Lilongwe and Blantyre, and it was only on our fifth stop 
that Rose was able to negotiate an acceptable price. 
In seeking to define the concept of trust in relationships, Zaheer et al 
(1998) offer valuable characteristic attributes, including the expectation that an 
actor will fulfil their commitments and obligations, and that they will act 
ethically and responsibly. Reflecting on Nina and Rose’s experiences 
demonstrates the differing degrees to which they were trusted by the 
organisation. Like branch staff, Nina and her team had targets against which 
their performance was measured. For Nina, the areas of achievement for which 
she was held responsible were around the number of fundraising partnerships 
that she was able to establish and maintain, and the funds that she was able to 
generate through this work. These were, however, targets that she herself had a 
role in setting, and in undertaking these tasks, she was free to use her own 
discretion and judgment around the best way of achieving these objectives. In 
making her travel plans, it had similarly been assumed that Nina would do as 
Zaheer et al (1998) describe, and use Cloud Loan resources responsibly, making 
decisions that would maximise her time and effectiveness. This same logic was 
not, however, applied when it came to Rose’s visit to the second Southern Region 
branch. In order to make arrangements that were within the unrealistically 
strict budget that had been set for her, Rose had been forced to forgo spending 
already limited time with her team, and to miss scheduled appointments. As 
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Rose explained, if we had taken accommodation at one of the first lodges that we 
visited, we would have been able to get to the office sooner, but Cloud Loan 
would not have reimbursed her full expenditure. That Rose wasn’t trusted to 
make a judgement about what was an appropriate sum to spend reflects once 
again the issues of micro-management, discussed in the previous section. 
In considering these differing experiences, it is interesting to note that 
Rose was more senior than Nina, in the Cloud Loan hierarchy, had more 
experience in microfinance, and had been with the organisation for longer. 
While Nina was one of a team of fundraising officers, Rose was responsible for 
overseeing all operations in the Southern Region of Malawi, including line 
management of several branch managers. This suggests, therefore, that it was 
not simply hierarchy that determined matters of autonomy and trust. Rather, 
what I saw to be the most significant factors, were geographical location, 
physical proximity to the CEO and Founder, and most troublingly, her personal 
characteristics. Ideas which I explore in the following sections.  
Influence and Discretion through Proximity 
Reflecting on the differential experiences of actors in different locations, Fry 
(1995) cites the work of Bies & Moag (1986) in his assertion that,  
“the greater the familiarity and common ground between principal 
and agent, the wider the zone of indifference and latitude of 
discretion allowed to the agent by the party holding him or her 
accountable” (Fry, 1995: 186).  
This idea of an internal principal and agent model resonated with my experience 
and observations with and of Cloud Loan’s operations. The CEO and Founder 
remains the influential, strategic heart of the organisation. He, and those closest 
to him, act as the principals, to whom the in-country agents are accountable. 
Those with whom the CEO was most familiar were his colleagues in the London 
office, and it was they who, as Fry describes, were granted the greatest latitude 
of discretion, and were considered most trustworthy. In the cases of Nina and 
Rose, for example, it was Nina, known personally to, and in constant contact 
with, the CEO and Founder, who was granted the greatest discretion in how to 
fulfil her responsibilities. In contrast, Rose, geographically more remote and 
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unknown, was subject to more stringent controls. Similarly, as I recounted in 
the previous chapters, it was in London that decisions were made around the 
design of the client training programme, and the organisation’s approach to 
assessing impact. Having made these decisions, specific tasks would be handed 
down to the agents responsible for their delivery, the branch offices, with 
information passed back up to the Principal through the Performance Report. 
Reflecting further on the importance of location, it became clear to me in 
the course of this research that the ability to raise concerns and requests face-to-
face was hugely influential in Cloud Loan’s Malawian operations. In the 
encounter at the start of this chapter, for example, it was striking to me that 
while Calvin had for some weeks been seeking a resolution to the issues that his 
branch was facing, it was only following the interventions of Dziko and Angelica 
that action was taken. Angelica’s role was particularly significant. As I 
recounted, while Lumbani had been dismissive in his phone call with Calvin, 
promising that the items would be dispatched “soon, soon”, Angelica visiting his 
office in person, had resulted in Lumbani dispatching the items that same day. 
Just as in the case of Nina and Rose, the place of these individuals in the Cloud 
Loan hierarchy did not reflect their ability to influence proceedings and resolve 
the matter at hand. Dziko, like Rose, was a regional manager, responsible for all 
operations in the Central Region, and the most senior of the four officers 
involved in this encounter. Calvin too held seniority over Lumbani and was at 
least equal to Angelica, responsible as he was for the third Central Region 
branch’s operations, and his team of loan officers. It was Angelica’s location, and 
ability to speak directly to Lumbani, that was most influential. 
Bstieler et al (2017) similarly observe that over time, trust tends to move 
away from a basis in organisational hierarchy, towards more personal 
connections and interactions, continuing that those who interact most often 
frequently come to behave and respond in a similar manner to one another. This 
too is an observation which resonated with my experience of Cloud Loan: as the 
London staff got to know and adopt the preferences of the CEO and Founder, 
whom they engaged with on a near daily basis, they came to pre-emptively and 
routinely enact these preferences, building his trust that even left to their own 
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devices, they would behave as he would wish. This observation offers a 
compelling argument for staff across locations to interact more frequently, and 
for Cloud Loan to invest in building relationships between staff in different 
functions and offices. While this seems counter to current organisational trends 
towards ‘smart working’, and the use of technology to aid communication, my 
observations here emphasise the enduring importance of face-to-face 
communication. 
These observations similarly encourage caution and reflection, and for all 
members of staff, but particularly those in the most senior positions, to consider 
and challenge their attitudes and motivations when interacting with colleagues 
with whom they are less familiar. Overcoming such a pre-disposition towards 
those whom you know well and interact with most frequently is not a simple, 
nor unusual challenge, yet as I go on to explore in the context of the Farming 
Loans project, failure to address and overcome these challenges can have a 
significant impact on the effectiveness of the organisation. The international, 
multicultural make-up of Cloud Loan adds a further dimension to these matters 
of location and familiarity. As James (2004) and LeMay & Bocock (2012) 
observe, Malawian history and norms play a major role in dictating 
relationships within organisations, particularly promoting face-to-face 
communication as the favoured means of communication and interaction. I 
return to these ideas in my discussion of the Farming Loans project, later in this 
chapter, but here note that these are not insurmountable unchangeable 
preferences, but a reminder of the importance of context and culture. Rather 
than being integrated in to plans and operational structures, however, I noted in 
my time with Cloud Loan that such local preferences were only considered, if at 
all, as deviance from the ‘correct’ way of behaving. I explore these ideas further 
in the following section, considering the roles of race and nationality in 
determining trust.   
Race, Nationality, and Trust 
Reflecting the observed preference for the familiar, it is noteworthy that towards 
the end of my time with Cloud Loan, the organisation began to move away from 
their policy of hiring only local staff in their countries of operation. As I 
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introduced in previous discussions, a new in-country role of Director of 
Operations was created, shortly after my first visit to Malawi. This role, it was 
described to me, was to provide oversight across all operations in Africa, and 
directly manage the country CEOs, who had up until then been the most senior 
Cloud Loan officials outside of the UK. When it came to filling this post, an 
international consultant, who had previously worked directly with the CEO and 
Founder, was appointed. Between my second and third visits to the country, the 
Malawi CEO also left the organisation, and while the Malawian Head of Finance 
was temporarily promoted to the role, it was ultimately filled through another 
international appointment. Across Cloud Loan’s other countries of operation, I 
saw a similar pattern emerge, with individuals whom I had met in the UK office, 
for example, taking on senior leadership roles internationally. 
I don’t know the details of these recruitment exercises, for example 
whether any Malawian applicants were also considered, or their relative 
strengths and weaknesses. The decisions to appoint expatriate staff members, 
however, were reflective of preferences and frustrations that I had heard 
expressed by non-Malawian members of staff; most significantly by the CEO and 
Founder, and Alex, the Director of Operations. In the case of the latter, in an 
early conversation, when he had been in the role for a few months, Alex spoke 
openly about his concerns of a culture of poor performance across the Malawian 
operations, commenting that, “management is a serious issue”. He explained 
that he had found the Malawi CEO to be resistant to making changes and 
enforcing systems and procedures, continuing that he didn’t have time to control 
operations directly, and was frustrated that he couldn’t trust that things would 
be done properly when he was away from the office. Making reference to one of 
the UK fundraising officers, Alex later commented that he would prefer someone 
like him to come to Malawi and take on the role, as he understood what was 
needed and would do as was asked of him. This fundraising officer was one of 
those who was later appointed to a senior role in one of Cloud Loan’s other 
countries of operation. 
The CEO and Founder had similarly talked of his desire to regain control 
over operations in Malawi, not least due to the issues of fraud which, as I 
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discuss throughout this thesis, were pervasive at all levels of the organisation. 
The installation of known, trusted figures in these positions of authority was, I 
argue, a means by which the centre sought to regain this control and combat 
harmful behaviours, without doing the more fundamental work of considering 
relationships and communication within existing structures. Mukasa (1999) 
describes the appointment of expatriate staff for such ends, observing that they 
can be seen as, “impartial gatekeepers for resources… independent from the 
‘corrupting’ influences that local staff are [vulnerable to]” (Mukasa, 1999: 13).  
This is a deeply problematic approach to the organisation’s challenges, 
loaded as it is with assumptions about the relative merits, skills and 
trustworthiness of Malawian versus expatriate staff members. Debates, 
concerns, and controversy around the appointment and reward of international 
versus local members of staff continue to rage across the international 
development sector. One common theme of such discussions is the difference in 
pay. While all roles within Cloud Loan were generally regarded to pay relatively 
poorly, I was told informally that the international staff appointed to these in-
country roles were paid more than their national colleagues, particularly when 
allowances for accommodation and travel were factored-in (McWha, 2011). I 
argue, however, that this matter of pay is a vital component of a more pressing 
issue. Beyond financial considerations, these decisions offer a troubling insight 
into the perceptions and assumptions of the most senior individuals within 
Cloud Loan, and the wider power dynamics within the organisation. Cloud 
Loan’s stated mission, as I present in this thesis, is to improve the lives of people 
in Africa who are living in poverty, and to do this in an empowering manner. 
What I observed in the replacement of senior, influential staff members with 
white expatriates, and the disregard for and distrust of, the majority of 
Malawian staff, contradicts this message of empowerment. In a compelling piece 
for the Open Democracy website, commentator Tindyebwa Agaba alleges deep 
seated racism within the international aid sector, describing “a hierarchy of 
worth, with workers from the Global South, especially if they are black, valued 
the least” (Agaba, 2018). It was such a hierarchy, whether consciously or 




In addition to these concerns around power and prejudice, I also question 
whether the installation of these expatriate members of staff will be an effective 
solution to Cloud Loan’s challenges. A common issue that emerges throughout 
this thesis is that of poor communication, particularly between individuals and 
locations within the organisation. While international staff may be perceived as 
more trustworthy by UK staff, Fee et al (2015) observe, in their work on the 
experience of expatriate NGO workers, that many reported having experienced a 
lack of trust from their national colleagues, citing cultural and linguistic 
barriers as being of particular significance. Fechter (2012) and McWha (2011) 
similarly raise the importance of senior staff being able to converse easily in 
local dialects, as a means of building relationships and supporting open 
communication. They also go on to note that international staff, without 
personal links to the location, are likely to move on from their roles more quickly 
than local appointees. This issue of staff turnover, and a loss of institutional 
memory, is another commonly encountered problem that I raise in this thesis. 
As such, there is a risk that these international appointments may exacerbate 
the organisation’s challenges rather than overcome them.  
A theme that emerges throughout this thesis is the persistent under-
investment in staff and field operations, with essential posts being left vacant, 
teams under-resourced, and an insufficient training offer. Such factors, I argue, 
have contributed to the lack of internal scrutiny and effectiveness, and the 
observed incidents of fraud. More effective means of overcoming these issues 
could therefore include building the capacity of local staff through training and 
enhanced support, or providing the additional resources to enable teams and 
systems to work effectively. The revealed preferences of the CEO and Founder, 
and other senior figures, however, were not to pursue such local options. 
Instead, the organisation has taken what I consider to be a regressive move, 
which further entrenches power disparities within Cloud Loan. 
Farming Loans and Bureaucracy 
Calvin’s experience exemplifies a particular criticism of systems of internal 
accountability, which is how units within the organisation communicate with 
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one another. Cloud Loan is an international organisation, with an expansive 
footprint in their countries of operation, yet, as this example illustrated, 
members of staff were finding it difficult to receive the support and services that 
they required from teams in other locations, without face to face, in person 
interactions. This is a situation which privileges those staff who are clustered in 
the London Head Office or African Head Quarters, while posing an ongoing 
challenge for those in more remote locations, exacerbating tensions between the 
two groups, and hindering the efficiency of operations. As I raised in the 
previous discussions, this is a challenge that has been ill-considered, and 
insufficiently addressed by Cloud Loan, but is a vital area for action. In this 
section, through an examination of the organisation’s Farming Loans initiative, 
I argue that such failures, as well as creating and reinforcing tensions and 
power disparities, are having a major impact on Cloud Loan’s effectiveness.  
 As I have described in previous chapters, while the majority of Cloud 
Loan’s clients hold so called ‘normal loans’, to be invested as the client sees fit, 
the organisation has also offered various ‘venture loans’, where clients are 
supplied with the inputs for a particular endeavour, and required to pay-back 
the value of these inputs. While, as Chapter 4 discussed, many of these venture 
loan products have been withdrawn, during the period of this research, three 
branches were offering Farming Loans. This was not the organisation’s first 
foray into agricultural lending, having in 2010, with support from donors 
including the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), provided loans to 
rice farmers in the northern region of Malawi, to enable clients to purchase 
fertiliser, and boost the productivity of their farms51. A similar scheme had been 
piloted in the southern region of the country, where a small number of clients 
received cash loans to establish and maintain irrigation systems, to support 
potato farming. This Farming Loans initiative, however, sought to provide more 
comprehensive support than had been offered previously. Inspired by the One 
Acre Fund methodology52, clients would receive all the inputs required to begin 
farming, including seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, equipment, and specialist 
                                               
51 Cloud Loan website (Cloud Loan Source 6.1) 
52 More information on One Acre Fund’s asset-based, agricultural loans can be found on 
their website, https://www.oneacrefund.org/our-approach/program-model  
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training. All that clients would need to provide themselves was land, with a 
minimum holding of half an acre being a criterion for eligibility. Cloud Loan 
began piloting the new loan in 2012, providing, through one of their Central 
Region branches, a small number of farmers with all the inputs required to 
begin growing corn. In 2013, the pilot was expanded to a second branch in the 
Region53, and the following year to a third54, so that by the 2014/15 growing 
season, 227 clients were participating55.  
The initiative was pioneered and coordinated by Helen, a retired 
agricultural economist based in the UK, who had a long-standing relationship 
with Cloud Loan, and had approached the CEO and Founder with her proposal 
for the venture. Helen continued to be the driving force behind this project, 
working directly with senior staff in Malawi, and officers in participating 
branches. The African Head Quarters played a major role in the delivery of this 
programme, as all purchasing of the inputs that were distributed to 
participating clients was coordinated centrally, by the Malawi Finance Team. 
The intention was that this approach would allow the organisation to keep costs 
low and benefit from economies of scale, as the team could purchase the majority 
of items in bulk. The explanation from the finance team as to why these 
activities were centralised also reflected several of the themes raised in the 
previous section of this chapter, about the perceived skills and trustworthiness 
of branch staff. As one officer told me, he and his colleagues were more skilled 
negotiators than staff in branch offices, and so even when goods needed to be 
purchased from local suppliers, it was better for this to be done centrally.  
In establishing this operational model for the initiative, successful 
coordination and good relationships between teams and branches became 
essential to the success of the venture. Reports written by Helen, and accounts 
from participating staff, however, raised that a lack of coordination and 
communication had been among the greatest frustrations voiced by staff in 
participating branches, and had undermined the success of the programme.  
                                               
53 The third Central Region branch 
54 The second Central Region branch 
55 Cloud Loan Research Report (Cloud Loan Source 6.2) 
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In May 2015, Helen produced an internal report for senior management 
in Cloud Loan, reviewing the experience and outcomes of this third year of the 
Farming Loans pilot. In her report, Helen reflected that clients’ yields had been 
significantly lower than expected. A major factor in this, she observes was that 
there had been major delays in the delivery of inputs. While all items were due 
to have been delivered to clients by mid-October, she describes that,  
“Unfortunately the timing of delivery was far from satisfactory. All 
the farmers and groups interviewed had missed the first rains. The 
majority of inputs were delivered in the second half of DECEMBER. 
By this stage many clients had given up hope of receiving them.”56  
In her report, Helen is critical of the contracted suppliers, many of whom, she 
explains, failed to honour their commitments and keep to agreed schedules. 
Staff in the central purchasing team also made similar complaints, citing one 
example where 12 units of fertilizer had been ordered for one branch, but only 
three had been delivered. On another occasion, a piece of farming equipment 
had been delivered that was so badly damaged as to be unusable. Such failings 
were, however, only partial contributors to the observed delays. As Helen also 
notes, while she set-out a prescribed timetable for when Cloud Loan staff should 
order and distribute the various inputs, this was not adhered to. I spoke with a 
member of staff in the African Head Quarters about Helen’s observations, and 
her response echoed the explanation for Lumbani’s failure to respond to Calvin’s 
IT requests. Helen was a volunteer, she explained, rarely in either the London 
or Malawian offices, and so could not personally oversee the day-to-day activities 
of the purchasing team, to ensure that work was progressing. I found members 
of the finance team reluctant to discuss the Farming Loans project, or the issues 
encountered therein. Comments that were made, however, were largely 
dismissive, with one member of the team conveying that he didn’t like the 
project because Helen and staff from participating branches were always 
bothering him with complaints or demands, taking up time that he didn’t have 
to spare. It was clear, in these limited conversations, that staff saw tasks related 
                                               
56 Cloud Loan Research Report (Cloud Loan Source 6.2) - emphasis in original 
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to the farming Loans as an irritating addition to their work, rather than an 
integral part of it, and prioritised their workloads accordingly.  
Having identified in previous years this tendency for instructions not to 
be followed and tasks not to be prioritised, a local Project Manager had been 
appointed to oversee and coordinate work in the 2014/15 season. This 
appointment had, however, been unsuccessful. As Helen complained to me, he 
had received no guidance nor support from senior staff in the organisation, and 
so was unclear both on what his responsibilities were, and how he should pursue 
them. Here again Helen wrote in her report that the project manager should, in 
the future, be supervised by a manager who themselves had “strict performance 
related targets”57 connected to the ambitions of the Farming Loans project. If the 
manager isn’t held to account for such achievements, she continues, they will 
not encourage the project manager to prioritise these areas of work. Lipsky 
relates such tendencies to the imposition of controls and KPIs, similar to those 
that I have described in this chapter. Placing focus and rewards on certain 
aspects of operations, he explains, will have the unavoidable effect of 
deprioritising other areas of work (Lipsky, 1980). In addition to this de-
prioritisation, I also argue that my observations here reflect mixed messages 
received by staff in Malawi about special initiatives, such as Farming Loans. As 
I discussed in Chapter 4, Alex, Cloud Loan’s Director of Operations, was 
candidly critical of certain initiatives imposed by the London Head Office, 
complaining that they overcomplicated the organisation’s work, and were time 
consuming distractions. In Chapter 4, I also explain that Alex’s disregard for 
certain mandated practices had led to their de-prioritisation in in-country 
operations. In this context, with mixed-messages being received about what 
tasks should and should not be considered essential, staff in the African Head 
Quarters could be forgiven for thinking it acceptable not to follow Helen’s 
instructions.  
These observations raise that once again that within Cloud Loan, 
different teams were failing to effectively act in concert, and communicate, with 
one another. In this case, the result was that inputs were delivered late to 
                                               
57 Cloud Loan Research Report (Cloud Loan Source 6.2)  
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clients which, both Helen and branch office staff emphasised, severely limited 
the harvests that the farmers could expect to see, and therefore had a direct 
result on the benefit of these loans to participating clients. As Helen observes in 
her report, in agricultural initiatives, timing is key, and, 
 “To encourage clients to take out a [Farming Loan] and then for 
head office to appear to have such a lack of understanding of the 
agricultural process and requirements is inexcusable and 
demonstrates a lack of appreciation of the precarious existence of the 
clients.”58  
Farmers in Malawi are all too familiar with the risks and vulnerabilities 
associated with agriculture. As I raise in Chapter 2, the World Bank (2017) 
estimates that the sector accounts for some 70% of total employment in the 
country, yet factors such as increasingly severe weather events, fluctuating 
market prices, and a need for scarce agricultural inputs see many of the 
country’s farmers struggle to maintain their livelihoods (Coulibaly et al, 2015). 
In recent years, much attention has been paid by development actors to 
overcoming these vulnerabilities, and increasing the resilience of rural 
communities59. Such efforts throw in to stark contrast the actions that I 
observed around the Farming Loans, where, as I described, ensuring the timely 
delivery of inputs to maximise the chance of high yields was not prioritised by 
the staff responsible. Rather than making the farmers’ circumstances less 
precarious, participants were instead left not only with lower than expected 
yields, but also with a debt to repay. It did not seem to me that the 
circumstances of clients, and the impact of delays upon them, were taken 
seriously in the delivery of this programme. 
In Chapter 8, I go on to consider downward accountability in Cloud Loan, 
and raise that while the organisation speaks and acts on behalf of their clients, 
channels of communication and means by which the organisation can 
understand the circumstances and experiences of their clients are deficient. This 
lack of upwards communication through the organisation to decision makers is 
notable in this project. Agriculture, as I have raised, is a significant source of 
                                               
58 Cloud Loan Research Report (Cloud Loan Source 6.2)  
59 See, for example, Asfaw et al (2015), and FAO (2012) 
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income and employment across Malawi, and this is particularly true in the rural 
communities where the Farming Loans work was undertaken. As such, 
participating clients will have come to the project from a position of experience 
and knowledge: while there was an identified need for training and inputs, they 
already had knowledge and expertise on what would work in and on the land 
that they were farming. Similarly, as Orr & Orr (2002) explore, Cloud Loan were 
not the first organisation that sought to address rural poverty in Malawi 
through the intensification of agriculture, yet the project was designed without 
input from clients on their experience of such interventions. As I also go on to 
argue in Chapter 8, these deficiencies in downward accountability are closely 
related to poor internal communication within Cloud Loan. As the individuals 
closest to clients, engaging with them most regularly and hearing of their 
challenges and achievements, it is the loan officers who, among Cloud Loan 
staff, can offer the greatest insight into the experience and preferences of their 
clients. As I have presented in this chapter, however, due to practical issues, 
and certain prejudices, the views of loan officers and branch staff were neither 
actively sought nor respected by decision makers.  
The problems that I encountered around the purchasing of inputs also 
went beyond the previously observed delays in delivery. As staff in participating 
branch offices told me, Cloud Loan’s purchasing team had been unable to secure 
several of the key items within the planned budget, meaning that the total cost 
of each package of inputs was higher than anticipated. These increased costs 
were passed on to clients so that many of those participating found themselves 
liable for larger loans than they had originally expected. Loan officers, as I have 
described previously, are, for the majority of clients, the face of Cloud Loan, and 
the person that they rely on for all information about their loan. As one officer in 
the third Central Region branch commented, however, “We are not consulted, so 
if things go wrong, we do not know what to say. We are the ones who have to 
explain to clients, but we are not told!”. Other officers in participating branches 
made similar reflections, often sharing that they would give information to 
clients in good faith, only to find out later, from their colleagues in Head 
Quarters, that the situation had changed. Just as I discussed in Chapter 5 that 
issues around information sharing within the organisation hindered Cloud 
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Loan’s accountability to donors, this example illustrates clearly the importance 
of strong and accurate communication between different parts of the 
organisation in enabling Cloud Loan to be accountable to their beneficiaries. 
While these issues of internal communication, and their impact on 
external accountability, emerge frequently in this work, they are not unique to 
either Cloud Loan or microfinance. In their study of knowledge exchange in the 
Malawian healthcare sector, for example, LeMay & Bocock (2012) share a 
comment from a frontline worker that, 
“The most challenges that we face is mainly in the way information 
reaches us. Information reaches us late and we don’t have materials 
to disseminate the information [to clients].” (LeMay & Bocock, 2012: 
69) 
The pair go on to note that, “Respondents tended to describe their culture 
as an oral one that does not … readily share technical information or 
knowledge” (LeMay & Bocock, 2012: 70), with individuals tending to 
prioritise tasks and relationships that were more immediate to them. 
Interestingly, however, the pair also observe that certain conditions within 
the organisations studied were exacerbating these national tendencies. In 
particular, they note the impact of staff shortages, describing that when 
individuals feel overworked and under-resourced, they become 
increasingly likely to focus on the customers and tasks that they can 
readily see, to the neglect of those that are more remote. This issue of staff 
being given insufficient time to complete the tasks demanded of them is 
one that I have raised throughout this thesis, and will return to in later 
chapters. 
Conclusion 
While discussions of accountability so frequently consider only the relationships 
and exchanges between organisations, such as the giving of reports to donors 
and regulators, or communications with clients and beneficiaries, in this chapter 
I have raised that integral to the success of an organisation, and to these wider 
forms of accountability, are strong, functioning systems of internal 
167 
 
accountability: As Stephenson Jr. (2005) contends, coordination and 
communication between units are essential for the successful delivery of 
international development interventions. Furthermore, I argue that internal 
accountability should not be equated with control and hierarchy. Instead, 
building on the work of Diallo & Thuillier (2005), who emphasise the importance 
of trust and communication within organisations, I argue that there is a need for 
systems which foster dialogue and respect.  
 In this chapter, I explored ideas of trust and autonomy. In so doing, I 
raised that the location of an individual was an influential factor in the degree of 
trust placed in that person. There was, I observed, a stark contrast between the 
treatment of UK and Malawi based members of staff, which did not necessarily 
correspond to their positions in the organisational hierarchy. This, I argued, 
reflected the enduring personal influence of Cloud Loan’s CEO and Founder, 
and his tendency to trust, and give greatest autonomy to, those whom he knew 
personally and engaged with regularly. As Fry (1995) observes, it is not 
uncommon for powerful individuals to act in this way, favouring the familiar. As 
I describe in this chapter, however, this form of favouritism has created and 
exacerbated tensions and inefficiencies across the organisation.  
There have also been, I describe, efforts made to preserve the power and 
influence of this elite across the organisation. In this chapter, I presented the 
Cloud Loan KPI system, which was the means by which the organisation’s 
leadership sought to monitor performance across its expansive geography. 
Roberts (1991; 2001) proposes that such tools can help an individual to see their 
place in an organisation, and evidence to their superiors the work that they are 
doing and achievements that they are making. As he describes, they act as ‘a 
constant reminder that the security of self depends upon being able to 
continually meet the standards of utility that accounting advertises’ (Roberts, 
2001: 1553). In Cloud Loan, however, I observed that the KPIs were widely 
interpreted as a means by which senior management could control the minutiae 
of the organisation’s work. They were, I continue, indicative of their lack of trust 
in staff working in branch offices, and did not fairly reflect the efforts of branch 
staff (Lipsky, 1980). Crowley & Ryan (2013), in their book on NGO management, 
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are deeply critical of the ‘command and control’ styles of management that I saw 
being deployed in Cloud Loan. Reflecting McPeak’s 2001 observations, that such 
an approach is common when an organisation’s leadership feel that they are 
losing control of an expanding organisation, Crowley & Ryan conclude that, 
while popular, they represent an outdated and ineffective approach. In 
observing these practices in Cloud Loan, I drew a similar conclusion. Contrary 
to Roberts’ unifying vision, the tensions and resentment around the KPIs, wider 
management and audit processes, and the perceived unfairness of reward 
systems, were fuelling animosity between different teams and locations within 
the organisation.  
 I also, in this chapter, investigated a troubling aspect of this favouritism: 
prejudice. I noted, for example, that in the wake of recent incidents of fraud, the 
organisation’s centre has sought to regain control and order through the 
installation of expatriate members of staff into senior positions, previously 
occupied by Malawian nationals. This move, I describe, reflected the desire 
expressed by Mukasa (1999) for ‘impartial gatekeepers’, and in so doing betrays 
an assumption that these international appointees are inherently more capable 
than, and preferable to, national members of staff. This, I argue, reflects what 
Agaba (2018) describes as a ‘hierarchy of worth’ in the aid sector, and ignores 
the important roles of language and cultural familiarity in building effective 
networks and relationships. This issue of prejudice, I also note, was observable 
at the national, as well as the international level. In my examination of the 
Farming Loans project, for example, I describe that responsibility for purchasing 
inputs was centralised, in part because staff in central functions were 
considered to be more skilled than their colleagues in branch offices. This 
decision, I argue, once again overlooked the importance of local knowledge that 
frontline staff can bring to strategy and operations. 
McPeak (2001) reflects that, as organisations grow and expand, a degree 
of specialisation occurs, with different functions commonly clustering around 
specific geographical locations. This was a pattern that I observed in Cloud 
Loan, with, for example, the concentration of fundraising staff and functions in 
the London office. Relationships with external actors are similarly not commonly 
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held across organisations, but rather specific units will have their own set of 
relationships. Such specialisation creates an additional need for information to 
flow effectively around the organisation, as while a relationship may be held by 
one team or location, it is likely that they will require intelligence from 
elsewhere in the organisation. Major donors, for example, interact exclusively 
with London-based fundraisers, but the team require information from across 
the breadth of Cloud Loan’s operations in order to fulfil reporting requirements.  
As I described in this chapter, the ability of loan officers to be transparent and 
accountable with their clients was hindered by insufficient information being 
made available to them. In contrast, however, demands from more powerful 
actors, such as regulators and donors, have been instrumental in the design of 
Cloud Loan’s internal accountability. The KPIs and monthly performance 
report, for example, were designed to provide senior management in the African 
Head Quarters with information that they are required to submit to the 
country’s microfinance regulator, the Reserve Bank of Malawi. As will be 
explored further in the following chapters, this is illustrative of Cloud Loan’s 
prioritisation of upwards accountability. This tendency to prioritise the needs of 
influential actors emerges throughout this thesis, and is a manifestation of the 
same dynamics discussed in previous chapters, where I argued that the focus on 
business support was means of conforming and appealing to the preferences of a 
target group of supporters, and that the PPI tool had been adopted as a means of 
signalling the organisation’s commitment to monitoring and evaluation, rather 
than for the value of the information produced.  
In my investigation of Cloud Loan’s Farming Loans initiative, I also 
raised the lack of consideration given to context and cultural norms in the 
project design. I noted, for example, the observed and expressed preference for 
face-to-face communication. While not a challenge specific to this project, or 
organisation, it was noteworthy that no accommodation had been made for such 
preferences within the organisation’s approach to internal communication. I 
argue in this chapter that creating more opportunities for staff in different 
locations to meet and interact would reap wider benefits through relationships 
created. Furthermore, reflecting observations made by LeMay & Bocock (2012), 
I argue that the issues of understaffing and under-resourcing, observed 
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throughout this thesis, are exacerbating the challenge of inter-location 





Chapter 7: Upwards Accountability 
On my first trip to Malawi, while based in the Central Region, I unexpectedly 
found myself with a free-day. While I had seen and heard advertising and 
conversation about the following day being Mother’s Day, I hadn’t realised that 
in Malawi, the day is marked by a public holiday. As such, Cloud Loan’s offices 
would be closed, and no group meetings were scheduled. Taking advantage of 
this break, I made the short journey to Senga Bay, on the shore of Lake Malawi, 
where I soon found a quiet spot on Livingstonia Beach. Shortly before lunch, two 
guests at the nearby hotel approached, asking if they could join me in the shade. 
The women, Hilda and Jennifer, were tourists from Arkansas, who explained 
that they had recently returned from a safari in Zambia, and were enjoying a 
few days at the lake before their flight home. On noticing the book that I was 
reading – Hugh Sinclair’s, ‘Confessions of a Microfinance Heretic: How 
Microlending Lost Its Way and Betrayed the Poor’ – Hilda gasped at the title, 
and asked “Why would anyone be against microfinance? I mean, it helps poor 
women!”. On hearing her friend’s remark, Jennifer also turned to look at the 
book, commenting that her niece had talked about microfinance at a recent 
family dinner, and had decided to “sponsor an entrepreneur in India”. It 
transpired that her niece was among the 1.6 million people60 who invest in 
microfinance, and micro-entrepreneurs, through the online platform, Kiva: 
“It’s wonderful” she commented of the site, “you get to read all about 
what the women plan to do with their loans before you choose one… 
you can make sure the money gets to someone who will really use it 
well…you know exactly where your money is going”. 
Through this celebrated platform, and its contemporaries, the stories of 
microfinance are brought to international audiences, new relationships are 
formed, and, as Schwittay (2014a) comments, all those in possession of a credit 
card can find themselves as commissioners of microfinance. 
                                               




In this chapter, I explore Cloud Loan’s upwards accountability. As I introduced 
in Chapter 3, this is a form of accountability that is typified by hierarchy and 
power, describing as it does accountability to those influential actors without 
whose support work cannot be undertaken. Previously in this thesis I have 
argued that major decisions and activities had been made and undertaken in the 
interests of attracting and securing funding, raising that from this group of 
influential actors, it was those who provided funding that held a particular 
status within Cloud Loan. 
In Chapter 2, I outlined that while the majority of Cloud Loan’s income 
(40%) came from interest repaid by clients, the organisation had also attracted 
support from a range of actors from individuals, through corporations and 
trusts, to institutional donors. Roy (2010) similarly observes that support for 
microfinance includes, but also goes beyond, traditional international 
development donors. As she describes, “Microfinance is simply everywhere. It is 
both the celebrity cause and the ordinary citizen’s development tool of choice” 
(Roy, 2010:xi). In this chapter, therefore, I focus on this popular appeal, 
exploring Cloud Loan’s relationships with individual donors through online 
funding platforms, Kiva and LWC, which, Sengupta & Aubuchon argue, make 
microfinance, “as accessible to lenders as the Grameen Bank made microcredit 
accessible to borrowers” (Sengupta & Aubuchon, 2008: 28).  
Characterised by their clear and concise articulations of where a 
supporter’s money will go and how it will be used, these platforms can seem to 
represent the epitome of accountability and transparency. Armstrong et al 
(2018) present the work of Kiva in this light, explaining that the role of such 
online funding platforms, in the global ‘microfinance ecosystem’ is that of a 
connector, continuing that their purpose is to bring together, and create trust 
between, lenders and borrowers. Both Armstrong et al, and Kiva themselves, 
explain that not only can lenders choose where their money will go, but also that 
the processes put in place by the platform, through which these profiles are 
generated, offer assurance to lenders that the information they see is genuine 
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(Armstrong et al, 2018: 150). As I discuss in this chapter, however, what I 
observed during the course of this research was that a fundamental lack of 
transparency sits at the heart of these platforms. This lack of transparency, I 
argue, undermines Cloud Loan’s accountability to their supporters, as unless 
these supporters are provided with reliable information on how their funds have 
been used and what achievements have been made as a result, their ability to 
hold Cloud Loan accountable is severely diminished. 
Cloud Loan partner with two such online funding platforms, though as 
one, Lendwithcare (LWC), is closely modelled on the other, Kiva, I pay 
particular attention to Kiva in this chapter. I begin my discussion by offering a 
summary of Cloud Loan’s work and history with the two platforms, and 
exploring the platforms’ stated ambitions of brokering connections and 
relationships between lenders and borrowers. I then move on to discuss the 
efforts made towards achieving these ambitions, and explore how Cloud Loan 
responded to and managed these processes and requests. From this discussion, I 
highlight the disconnection between the stated aims of forging relationships, 
and the reality of how funds are used, which, I argue, creates what Dolan (2010) 
refers to as a paradox of visibility and concealment. 
Institutional Donors 
In this chapter, I focus specifically on Cloud Loan’s partnership with online 
funding platforms, and through them, individual donors internationally. As I go 
on to describe, examination of these platforms offers valuable insight not only in 
to how Cloud Loan presents themselves and their work in public fora, but also 
into contemporary trends in charitable giving, and public discourse on 
international development. As I note in Chapter 2, however, these are not the 
only donors with whom Cloud Loan have a relationship. The organisation were, 
for example, recipients of funding from DFID through the agency’s Global 
Poverty Action Fund (GPAF)61. In Chapter 5, I describe that attracting such 
funding was a key motivation behind Cloud Loan’s development of their Social 
                                               




Performance Management function. Prior to this, much of the organisation’s 
funding had come from groups and individuals who had a personal relationship 
with Cloud Loan’s CEO and Founder. As the organisation grew, however, these 
sources were no longer sufficient, and the team were keen to attract funding 
from larger, institutional donors. Early efforts to access such funds had, 
however, been unsuccessful, with the organisation receiving feedback that their 
practice around monitoring and evaluation, and evidencing impact, needed 
improvement. Nina, one of the London-based fundraising officers, described to 
me that many of the organisation’s early supporters demanded little in the way 
of reporting and accountability, so the step-up to the demands of donors such as 
DFID had been a significant one. That the preferences of influential donors had 
such a significant role in shaping Cloud Loan’s operations and practice 
demonstrates the influence that the likes of DFID have on those whom they 
fund.  
As I also describe in Chapter 5, the period in which Cloud Loan initiated 
their work on PPI was one where, in the UK, public support for international 
development was showing signs of faltering, and DFID were facing increasing 
calls from Government to make themselves more accountable for their spending. 
When, in May 2010, Andrew Mitchell assumed the office of Secretary of State for 
International Development he, as Valters & Whitty describe, “immediately 
positioned results, evidence, value for money and transparency at the centre of 
aid management” (Valters & Whitty, 2017: 9). Microfinance is notably an 
intervention which lends itself to the production of numbers, favoured under 
this agenda. In Chapter 6, I outline the highly quantitative approach to 
performance management within Cloud Loan, with the organisation’s focus on 
tracking measures such as the number of clients and the size of the loan book, 
as well as PPI scores. The sector is also able to make such reports relatively 
quickly, with the majority of funds received being disbursed as loans, rather 
than invested in more complex projects. This is in contrast to, for example, 
advocacy programmes, where outputs and achievements can be both far less 
tangible, and often only realised over several years. The Results Agenda has, 
however, attracted vocal critics, among them Rosalind Eyben who observes that 
if results are demanded, then they will be produced, but whether they bear any 
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relation to real change is a different matter (Eyben, 2013; 2015). Bateman & 
Chang are similarly critical of such simplification, observing that an ability to 
demonstrate that more micro-loans have been disbursed has too often been 
erroneously assumed be evidence that poverty has been reduced (Bateman & 
Chang, 2009: 2). 
Despite such criticisms, the promise of mechanisms being put in place to 
provide evidence clearly proved persuasive, with discussion of PPI measures 
being particularly prominent in Cloud Loan’s successful funding applications. 
Despite their promises, however, as I also note in Chapter 5, Cloud Loan were 
not always able to fulfil their commitments in this area. In one 2014 report to 
DFID, for example, Cloud Loan decsribe having been overwhelmed by the task 
of processing PPI data, and of having encountered issues with their 
management information system, which together had left them unable to 
provide required evidence of outreach and impact. In discussing this report with 
Cloud Loan’s fundraising team, I had been surprised to learn that they had 
received no queries on this issue from the donor, who had instead been satisfied 
with the anecdotal stories of clients’ successes, which had been included in the 
report. This observation supports an argument that I set-out in Chapter 5, 
which is that Cloud Loan being able to tell the story of their commitment to 
evidencing results and impact, demonstrated through their adoption of the PPI 
tool, was more persuasive than the quality of evidence that they were able to 
produce. In this chapter I build on this argument, contesting that where 
microfinance excels is in the creation of compelling and emotionally resonant 
stories, which ultimately have proved more lucrative for Cloud Loan than any 
more substantial forms of evidence.  
Partnerships with Online Platforms 
Founded in 2005, Kiva is a US based crowdfunding platform, commonly cited as 
being the first website to facilitate so called ‘peer-to-peer’ micro-loans. While 
other similar platforms have since come and gone, the site remains a dominant 
force, and is one of two such organisations with whom Cloud Loan partner. 
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Operating domestically and internationally, across 85 countries62, Kiva hosts 
and promotes profiles of micro-entrepreneurs, and facilitates individuals and 
organisations from around the world in making small loans of upwards of $25US 
to their chosen borrower, pursuant to their mission, “to connect people through 
lending to alleviate poverty”63. Internationally, all these loans are extended 
through partner organisations, such as Cloud Loan. The relationship between 
the two organizations was established in 201464, and at the time of writing 
Cloud Loan is one of Kiva’s four partners in Malawi65. In July 2018, Kiva 
reported that since the establishment of their partnership, 20,519 Cloud Loan 
clients had received support through the Kiva platform, totalling $2,039,22566. 
Cloud Loan’s second partnership of this type is with Lend with Care 
(LWC), an initiative of the INGO, CARE International UK. The platform was 
launched in 2010, and is described as being, “a peer-to-peer lending relationship 
between people in the UK and people in the developing world” (CIUK 2015: 37). 
CARE explain that the initiative was modelled upon its predecessor Kiva, and 
operates along similar lines, facilitating opportunities for individuals to make 
loans of upwards of £15 to micro-entrepreneurs. This endeavour is articulated as 
being a response to learning from CARE’s wider programmatic work, and the 
identification that microfinance could play a role in furthering the NGO’s wider 
ambitions of overcoming poverty and injustice. What, CARE claim, has been 
holding back work in this area is a shortage of funding, and thus LWC was 
conceived as a means of attracting new funds to support poverty reduction 
efforts67. As Armstrong et al (2018) observe, this is an endeavour in which such 
platforms have been highly effective, appealing and engaging as they have, new 
groups of donors and supporters. Like Kiva, LWC work with local organizations 
to extend the loans advertised on their platform, and they began working with 
Cloud Loan in 201368. At the time of writing Cloud Loan continues to be the only 
                                               
62 Kiva: Why Kiva?  https://www.kiva.org/ [accessed 1/7/18] 
63 Kiva: About Us https://www.kiva.org/about [accessed 14/6/17] 
64 Cloud Loan 2014 Annual Report (Cloud Loan Source 7.1) 
65 Kiva: Where Kiva Works https://www.kiva.org/about/where-kiva-works [accessed 
1/7/18] 
66 Cloud Loan, Kiva Partner Profile (Cloud Loan Source 7.2) 
67 LWC: About Us https://www.lendwithcare.org/info/about_us [accessed 22/6/17] 
68 Cloud Loan 2013 Annual Report (Cloud Loan Source 7.3) 
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partner extending loans on behalf of LWC in Malawi. Cloud Loan do not 
themselves disclose the specific sums received from either Kiva or LWC and, 
unlike Kiva, LWC do not offer such data on specific partnerships. 
Management from the African Head Quarters 
While responsibility for fundraising in Cloud Loan was overwhelmingly held by 
the organisation’s team in London, the partnerships with Kiva and LWC were 
unique in that they were managed from the African Head Quarters. Though the 
decision to enter into these partnerships had come from the CEO and Founder, 
there was very little input from UK staff in the day to day operations. Reflective 
of this status, senior managers based in Malawi, such as the country CEO, and 
the Head of Finance, often spoke with particular pride of these arrangements, 
with the former explaining that being selected as partners of these prestigious 
organisations reflected well on Cloud Loan, bestowing a status that brought 
respect from other actors in the Malawian microfinance sector. This echoed the 
sentiments of the London based CEO and Founder who often spoke of funding 
relationships in these terms, discussing the prestige that being supported by 
influential or well-known donors brought to the organisation. It was for this 
reason, he explained to me, that acquiring DFID funding had been a priority for 
him some years previously.  
Responsible for coordinating Cloud Loan’s work with Kiva and LWC was 
a Project Officer named Angelica. Angelica was the second incumbent of this 
role that I had met, with her predecessor, Paula, having left the organisation 
shortly after our brief meeting, on my first visit to the African Head Quarters. 
Her departure had been sudden, with a manager in the office later telling me 
that the role had not been a good fit, and that she had been encouraged, “to take 
a more appropriate role in a different organisation”. Shortly before my time with 
Cloud Loan ended, Angelica herself left the organisation, with responsibility for 
work on the platforms passing to Elizabeth, an administrator and office 
assistant, then working with Elsie, the Head of Human Resources and 
Administration. I would later learn from Elsie that there had also been concerns 
about Angelica’s performance in the role, with another member of staff telling 
me that Angelica had also been frustrated, as she felt that she was blamed for 
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not delivering tasks which she had never been told were her responsibility, or 
properly shown how to do. These were sentiments that Angelica herself had 
expressed when we met.  
Several months had passed between Paula’s departure and a 
replacement being appointed. When she started, Angelica explained that she 
had met with a backlog of reports and requests for information, but had received 
no handover or induction. As the only member of staff in Malawi with 
responsibility for fundraising, she described that she had been left to ascertain 
the requirements of the role herself, through conversations with colleagues in 
other teams, and from some guidance materials provided by Kiva and LWC that 
she had found in her office. The lack of support that Angelica received in her 
role was symptomatic of the juxtaposition of pride and disinterest that I would 
see echoed across areas of work such as PPI (Chapter 5) and the Client Hotline 
(Chapter 8). While Cloud Loan’s senior management spoke with pride at being a 
partner of Kiva and LWC, this pride did not translate into the investment of 
sufficient resources into this area of work. As I go on to describe in this chapter, 
collecting and processing the information required by these platforms engaged 
not only Angelica, but also staff across branch offices, who frequently raised that 
they were neither sufficiently supported nor rewarded in these tasks. The 
decision to absorb Angelica’s responsibilities into Elizabeth’s remit represented 
a further reduction in investment in this area of work as, as I discuss in Chapter 
8, hers was an already overburdened role.  
Creating Connections  
Reflecting on international development, and the third sector more widely, the 
ways in which an individual can support a particular cause or agency are 
countless: In the past few days alone, I’ve been invited to drop my spare change 
in a bucket, to buy a piece of charity-branded merchandise, and to establish 
monthly direct debits. In Chapter 4, I discussed microfinance in the context of 
Bottom Billion Capitalism, raising that it is an initiative which resonates with 
commercial, neoliberal ideals, and as such, has successfully attracted new and 
different sources of support and funding. Cloud Loan, I discussed, have 
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capitalised on this appeal, seeking to distinguish themselves from wider 
charitable efforts by promoting the idea that their interventions offered ‘hope, 
not handouts’ (Chapter 4). Furthermore, the organisation has sought to find 
innovative ways of appealing to, and engaging with, supporters attracted by this 
message. 
As mechanisms for brokering funds, to support microfinance initiatives, 
Kiva and LWC have similarly sought to set themselves apart, in this crowded 
fundraising arena, by offering supporters a more intimate and personal link to 
the end beneficiary, than is offered by many other giving opportunities. As Kiva 
claimed in 2007,  
“Unlike any other organization, Kiva allows individuals to fight 
global poverty in a personal and sustainable way by enabling them to 
directly connect with low-income entrepreneurs in the developing 
world.”69 
Across the mission statements, and wider promotional materials of these two 
platforms, the theme of connecting individuals is prominent and oft-repeated. 
Returning to Jennifer on the beach in Livingstonia, it was this creation of a 
personal relationship that had made Kiva, and microfinance itself, such 
compelling propositions for her and her niece. Here, they felt, was an 
opportunity to directly affect change in the life of a specific, chosen, named 
individual. These are sentiments reflected too by Jessica Jackley, one of Kiva’s 
co-founders. In her 2015 memoir, Jackley describes her desire to connect more 
deeply with those whom she wished to help as an inspiration for her work on the 
platform. As she recalls, 
“Part of me knew that giving a few dollars here and there was a 
cheap replacement for what I really sought. Deep down, I knew that I 
would never be satisfied until I could make some sort of real contact 
with the people I felt obligated to serve. In fact, I was becoming more 
and more certain that the strange cycle of giving in which I’d been 
participating actually made me feel more disconnected from the 
human beings I felt called to help” (Jackley, 2015:8). 
                                               
69 Kiva: loans that change lives http://media.kiva.org/KIVA_brochure_6.1.07.pdf 
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In microfinance, she continues, she found an alternative to the forms of 
charitable giving with which she had become so frustrated, and through 
developing Kiva, she had satisfied her desire for personal contact.  
Jackley’s ambitions of addressing global poverty and need, while 
achieving a sense of personal impact and connection, are not restricted to online 
lending platforms. Rather, they are prominent themes in what Ananya Roy 
terms as Millennial Development (Roy, 2010). As she describes, “The turn of the 
century has been marked by the emergence of remarkable global conscience: an 
awareness of world poverty and the articulation of the will to end poverty” (Roy, 
2010: 6). While neither poverty nor compassion are new phenomena, what Roy 
argues is that the conceptualisation of, and form of interest in, poverty evolves 
according to wider trends, ideologies and concerns. Recent influential shifts have 
included ever increasing visibility, with real-time images and stories of global 
poverty becoming instantly accessible, and major cultural figures using their 
profile to draw western audiences to these issues and accounts, resulting in 
greater, if sometimes biased or superficial, awareness of development issues.   
Emerging alongside such interest and awareness, however, has been 
frustration. The scale of these challenges can seem to dwarf into insignificance 
the efforts of any normal person, without the political leverage or access to funds 
of global players. Furthermore, while opportunities to engage in and support 
causes and initiatives proliferate, these have been accompanied by concern over 
the bureaucracy and trustworthiness of aid institutions (Keating et al, 2018). 
Online lending platforms offer a means of overcoming both these challenges. As 
I explore in the following section, a defining characteristic of these sites is that, 
rather than focusing on large and complex issues of poverty, they present 
visitors with the stories and circumstances of specific individuals. Alongside 
these stories is a pre-packaged and accessible solution: for you, the visitor, to 
give the person you are reading about a loan. As Schwittay (2014a) observes, the 
way in which issues of poverty are presented to a donor audience is often more 
telling of that audience’s preferences and preconceptions, than the reality of the 
lives being shared. As she continues, the realities of extreme poverty may be too 
far removed from the lived experiences of those in more affluent countries to be 
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comprehensible. Applying a recognizable metric, however, such as money, can 
provide a relatable touchstone: While ideas of poverty generally may be 
intangible and nebulous, the idea of having a shortage of funds, and therefore 
not being able to pursue desired ventures and activities, is wholly relatable.  The 
financialization and presentation of poverty in this way is criticised by the likes 
of Hulme & Shepherd (2003), who argue that it creates and perpetuates an 
overly simplistic understanding the lives of people living in poverty. Such 
simplicity, however, can also be encouraging and empowering for the prospective 
lender, as by being in possession of a relatively small sum of money and a credit 
card, they are able to solve the issue put before them (Schwittay, 2014a).  
This focus on targeting support to a specific individual also goes some 
way to addressing concerns over the opacity of NGOs and charitable giving, as 
donors are presented with a specific account of where their money is going and 
how it will be used. Exploring this characteristic, Roy frames Kiva as a portal of 
millennial development, through which lenders can transcend the barriers of 
geography and circumstance to achieve, “a liberal intimacy with the world’s 
poor” (Roy, 2010: 33), with the transfer of money acting as a proxy for social 
interaction or connection. In so doing, loans made through these platforms allow 
the lender to signal not only their compassion, but also their integrity, as a 
person who is interested in understanding where their money is going (Elwood, 
2015; Allison et al, 2013). 
Client Profiles 
To engender the sense of intimacy and personal connection, sought by Jackley, 
both LWC and Kiva maintain an intense focus on the individual. Little, if any, 
information is provided on the countries or contexts in which projects are 
operating, and allusions to microfinance itself are restricted to simplistic 
messages of empowerment and sustainability, echoing the narrative employed 
by Cloud Loan in their own promotional materials (Chapter 4). Instead, the 
pages of these websites are overwhelmingly occupied by images and stories of 
specific entrepreneurs. On clicking the prominent ‘Lend’ icon on Kiva’s 
homepage, visitors to the site encounter what resembles a ‘friends’ list on 
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Facebook, or the pages of a school yearbook, with images of groups and 
individuals accompanied by short explanations of who they are, and why they 
are requesting a loan: 
“Alba Lisseth, El Salvador: A loan of $1,100 helps to buy pigs to 
fatten up and sell.” for example, or “Linda Group, DRC: A loan of 
$9,850 helps a member to buy 3 bundles of bedding, pay for transport 
and build up her working capital.”70  
Clicking on the image of a borrower then takes the visitor to a more detailed 
profile of their chosen beneficiary. Alba’s page, for example, offers that: 
“Alba is 24 years old. She went to school through grade 9. She is 
married and has a daughter. Her husband is a driver for public 
transportation. 
Alba has worked raising and selling pigs for two years. She decided 
to begin this occupation with the desire to generate income for her 
family. Her husband helps her care for the pigs in his spare time. 
Alba needs a loan to buy pigs to fatten up and sell. She dreams of 
giving her daughter a good education. She would also like to have a 
mill to provide that service since her community does not have one”71 
In August 2018, the Kiva site included 6,112 such client profiles72, all 
searchable through more than 40 categories and attributes, such as the gender 
or location of the client, their circumstances, or the nature of their enterprise, 
enabling the lender to target their support according to their own specific 
priorities and preferences. This ability to make targeted selections was a feature 
prized by the women that I had met on the beach in Livingstonia, and one that 
led Premal Shah, the President and Co-Founder of Kiva, to state in a 2006 
interview that, “We like to think of ourselves as an eBay73 for micro finance”. 
Visitors can, Shah continues, peruse a number of different client profiles, before 
                                               
70 Kiva, Lend https://www.kiva.org/lend [accessed 10/7/17] 
71 Kiva Profiles, Alba Lisseth https://www.kiva.org/lend/1544942 [accessed 10/7/17] 
72 Kiva, Lend https://www.kiva.org/lend [accessed 1/8/18] 
 
73 Notably eBay themselves founded a now defunct lending platform, Microplace. 
Discussing the platform, Holahan (2007) describes the site as being “a website launched 
by Tracey Pettengill Turner that lets small investors provide low-interest ‘micro’ loans, 
of US$50 or more, to would-be small business owners [which] benefits from the lessons 
eBay has learned working with small business owners and consumers who buy and sell 
on its family of sites” 
183 
 
selecting their preferred recipient, just as they do in their online shopping (NPR, 
2006).  
Cloud Loan Client Profiles 
A core task of Angelica’s was to draft profiles of the Cloud Loan clients who had 
been selected to feature on the Kiva and LWC platforms. This work required 
extensive input from branch staff, as it was they who would collect and supply 
the personal information about clients, integral to the profiles. In the absence of 
a formal induction, Angelica had explained that gaining an understanding of the 
structure and dynamics of Cloud Loan, and establishing relationships with those 
colleagues with whom she had to work, had been particularly challenging. There 
was no budget, she explained, for her to travel to branch offices and discuss the 
requirements with staff in person, meaning that she had to remotely influence 
their actions. This, she continued, remained the most challenging, and 
frustrating, part of her role. As I described in the previous chapter, similar 
frustrations with tasks associated with the platforms were raised by staff in 
branch offices, who recounted that they were often time consuming, and difficult 
to accomplish when the required IT equipment and support was not provided. 
As I also explored in Chapter 6, such tensions between teams and locations 
within Cloud Loan were common, further exacerbating the difficulty of 
Angelica’s role. 
As both the lending platforms stipulated that clients profiled on their 
sites must be unique, Cloud Loan designated eight of their offices as Kiva 
branches, and seven as LWC, thereby avoiding any crossover. In making these 
allocations, it was intended that there should be a mix of Kiva and LWC 
branches in each region, so as to allow the greatest variety of clients on each 
platform. Explaining this to me, Rose, one of Cloud Loan’s Regional Managers, 
expressed her frustration with this decision, as it meant that she had found 
herself responsible for overseeing branches fulfilling the similar, but different 
requirements of the two platforms. This was a situation, she continued, that had 
resulted in her mistakenly having, on occasion, given wrong information to her 
branch managers, as she sought to understand and differentiate the demands of 
each organisation. Reflective of concerns discussed in the previous chapter, Rose 
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continued that the specific demands were not always communicated to her in a 
clear and timely manner.  
Angelica explained that she would receive notifications from Kiva and 
LWC, when they wanted more Malawian clients to feature on their platforms. 
She in turn would then send requests to relevant branch managers, who would, 
in consultation with their officers, select appropriate clients. As described in 
Chapter 2, Cloud Loan employed a group lending approach, meaning that group 
members shared responsibility for repaying the total sum borrowed by the 
group, but pursued their own business endeavours. In keeping with this 
approach, Cloud Loan would select whole groups to appear on the platforms, but 
feature one specific member of that group in the profile. In a recent, typical 
example, a profile on Kiva featured the name of the credit group, alongside a 
photograph of 19 women, one of whom had her hand raised. This was the 
featured client, and while visitors were invited to lend their support to the 
group, it was her story that was told, with details given of her age and the size 
of her family, as well as the nature of her business. 
Selecting Clients 
Good Groups 
Cloud Loan’s protocols dictated that only groups who were in at least their 
second loan cycle should be selected to feature on the platforms, with Rose 
emphasising that the group should have repaid their previous loan or loans 
without incident or delay. Several members of staff, in both Kiva and LWC 
branches, similarly reflected that an influential consideration when selecting 
clients was whether the group were a ‘good group’, meaning that they complied 
with Cloud Loan’s rules and procedures, and were unlikely to have any problems 
either in repaying their loan, or in their wider circumstances.  
The importance of selecting low maintenance, high performing groups was 
particularly emphasised by loan officers in the second Southern Region branch 
office. At the time of my visit, staff in the branch were, on top of their usual 
workload, facing the additional challenges of being severely short staffed, and of 
managing the fallout from recent, serious floods in the area. On our drive, Rose, 
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the Regional Manager, had raised the staffing issue, explaining that fraudulent 
activity by three of the Branch’s loan officers, and the Branch Manager, had 
been detected, and all had been fired. They were working, she continued, to 
recruit new loan officers as soon as possible, and had recently appointed a new 
branch manager. Throughout this thesis I have observed that the job of a loan 
officer was a demanding one, with constant conflicting pressures to both 
accomplish more tasks in client meetings, and to reach more clients. As a result 
of the recent dismissals, on top of these pressures, some of the remaining staff 
were managing almost twice their regular case load. Furthermore, following the 
extreme flooding in early 2015, many clients in the region had been left 
homeless, or had lost crops and other possessions essential to their business, so 
were requesting that their loans be written-off. Consideration of such requests 
necessitated additional actions and support from the loan officers. An further 
challenge for the team was that flooding had damaged, and in some cases made 
impassable, many of the roads and access routes used by the officers, greatly 
increasing already lengthy journey times for client visits. The significance of this 
last issue was starkly revealed on my second day with the team. I had left the 
office with one of the branch’s loan officers, who estimated that it would take us 
45 minutes to reach our first group. Nearly two hours later, however, we found 
ourselves back in town having tried two alternative routes to our destination, 
only to find the first still flooded and blocked with debris, and the second too 
covered in thick mud for the bike to pass through. 
In the face of such pressures and demands, the whole team visibly 
bristled when, during a team meeting shortly after our arrival, Rose mentioned 
that Angelica had contacted her to complain that requested case studies had not 
been received. Speaking later with two of the officers present, I asked about the 
reaction;  
“There is always something else” one of the officers told me, “always 
something else that we must do. How can so many things be a 
priority? We are told you must do this, you must do that, you must 
ensure that your clients are repaying their loans…If we do not, they 
think we are lazy, but we are so busy!” 
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Echoing the comments of officers in other branches, the pair went on to explain 
that if there were no other issues to contend with, then obtaining and 
submitting the requested information was an irritation, but not overly 
problematic. When there were other matters requiring the time and attention of 
the officers, however, it became extremely difficult to take on any additional 
tasks.  
Compelling Stories 
The second criteria for client selection, as raised by the team in the second 
Central Region branch, was that the business and profile of the chosen 
individual should lend itself to a compelling narrative. As I described, these 
platforms seek to attract funds by drawing supporters into an emotional, as well 
as financial engagement, with the featured entrepreneurs (Yartey, 2017; Black, 
2009), and compelling stories are the means by which such engagement is 
sought. The question of what constitutes a compelling story is one that has been 
much explored by academics and researchers interested in Kiva, but while there 
is broad agreement that the characteristics and presentation of clients impact 
the level of support that their online profile will receive (Martens, et al, 2007; 
Herzenstein et al, 2011), opinions vary on what attributes make a story most 
compelling. Allison et al (2015), for example, argue that biographies and profiles 
that evoke empathy, and an opportunity for the benefactor to feel that they are 
helping others, are more persuasive than those who focus on the client’s 
business experience and endeavours. Moss et al (2015) conversely argue that,  
“Kiva lenders are more likely to fund ventures that signal autonomy, 
competitive aggressiveness, and risk taking. These same lenders are 
less likely to fund ventures that signal conscientiousness, courage, 
empathy, or warmth” (Moss et al, 2015: 45).  
Galak et al (2011) also explore this issue, arguing that lenders are more likely to 
support entrepreneurs with whom they identify, or share some commonality, 
whether that be around gender, occupation, or individuals bearing the same 
name as themselves or a loved one. The trio conclude that, “despite the 
financially-oriented nature of microfinance, people are nonetheless affected by 
more psychological factors” (Galak et al, 2011: S135). While seemingly 
contradictory, these findings are also indicative of the diversity of support that 
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microfinance, and online platforms receive. As Roodman observed, “Almost no 
development project has held such strong and multidimensional appeal as 
microcredit. It appeals to the left with talk of empowering women and the right 
by insisting on individual responsibility” (Roodman, 2012: 271). With such 
diverse interests on the part of donors, it is logical that they will find different 
stories and circumstances to be compelling propositions for support. As I return 
to later in this chapter, platforms such as Kiva are deliberately selecting and 
producing client profiles that will appeal to these diverse interests, much as 
other online sellers may seek to stock a variety of products. In this way, I argue, 
clients are being commodified, with the central purpose of the platforms being to 
create and sell stories, and the sense of intimacy and connection that these 
stories support. As I also argue, however, this focus on appealing stories can 
come at the cost of transparency. 
 Cloud Loan, as one provider of this diverse content offering, had several 
specific criteria that branch staff were instructed to use when selecting clients. 
Discussing these with Angelica, she raised that clients who were involved in 
farming or selling groceries tended to have their loan requests met most quickly, 
and as such, officers were encouraged to select from their clientele borrowers 
who were engaged in these activities. Angelica had, she explained, discussed 
this trend with her contact at Kiva who had been unsurprised, reflecting that 
these were endeavours which supporters could easily understand, and often 
perceived as being solid and sustainable businesses. This exchange highlighted 
the prioritisation of the interests of the lender, or customer, when identifying 
clients to be featured. 
 All Cloud Loan clients featured on the Kiva and LWC platforms were 
also female. While the majority of the organisation’s clients were women, several 
branches in the southern and central regions also worked with male clients, who 
had been invited to join in one of the organisation’s Venture Loan initiatives. 
This fact was not, however, alluded to in any of Cloud Loan’s promotional 
materials. Discussing this trend with Nina, one of Cloud Loan’s London-based 
fundraising officers, she had explained that to include male clients would have, 
“confused the brand”, and that as men represented such a small proportion of 
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the organisation’s clientele, they were not a significant part of their story. Dogra 
(2012) observes that women and children are the most featured subjects of 
INGO literature and imagery, yet there is little diversity in their portrayal. The 
same is true of Cloud Loan’s representation of their clients, on the funding 
platforms and beyond: despite the emphasis placed on individual stories, the 
women are described and pictured in similar terms, and become almost 
indistinguishable from one another. Black (2009; 2013) similarly comments on 
the predominance of female borrowers featured on Kiva’s website, arguing that 
they are selected to appeal to prospective lenders, representing, as they are seen 
to do, the most sympathetic and deserving recipients of supports. In discussing 
this trend, Black draws parallels between client profiles and the fictionalised 
narratives of literature, which employ female characters in similarly emotive 
roles. On these platforms, she continues, female clients are transformed into the 
appealing, tragic heroines of poverty, observing that, 
“Through Kiva, lenders are allowed to perceive borrowers as fictional 
characters: figures whom they might read about and imaginatively 
engage with, if they so desire, but who will never speak back into the 
lives of those reading the website except through the careful 
mediation of Kiva’s conventions” (Black, 2013: 117) 
 This quote from Black also draws attention to what is not included in the 
clients’ stories and profiles, namely details of progress and achievement. As 
Black (2013) recounts, in Kiva’s early days, regular updates, or journal postings, 
were published on the platform, detailing how featured clients had used, and 
benefited from, their loans. As the site has grown, however, the number of 
individuals featured has exceeded the platform’s capacity to continue this 
function, resulting in fewer, more selective, updates being provided. When, in 
2018, I made a loan through Kiva to a Cloud Loan client, I received no further 
information on that individual: their business or their circumstances. Instead, I 
received notifications that the loan was being repaid. Building on the work of 
Moodie (2013) Yartey (2017) asserts that,  
“Kiva has no mechanisms in place to find out what happens to 
borrowers once money is loaned to them; Kiva is rather focused on 
the process of lending and repayment of the loan to lenders, but not 
with the borrower managing the loan” (Yartey, 2017: 75). 
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The result is an upended approach to accountability. In the introductory 
chapters of this thesis, I observed that the relationships between donor and 
recipient, and the giving of an account by the latter to the former of how those 
funds were used and what was achieved, has been central to even the narrowest 
definitions of accountability. Here, however, we find donors to be more 
concerned with, and influenced by, compelling, constructed stories of need, than 
such matters of process or results. It is for the provision of compelling stories 
that the platforms, and their extending partners, are held accountable 
(Schwittay, 2014a; 2014b). 
In this endeavour, the microfinance sector is excelling, yet, as Roy (2010) 
raises, even sector insiders have their doubts about whether actual 
achievements correspond with the stories and imagery being publicly presented. 
Recounting an interview with an official working for Consultative Group to 
Assist the Poor (CGAP), the World Bank hosted microfinance forum, Roy recalls 
their comments that the sector is more effective at producing emotive imagery 
and narrative that tugs on the heartstrings of supporters, than it is in making 
any real progress in alleviating poverty (Roy, 2010: 27). 
This observation echoes arguments that I have made throughout this 
thesis, of accountability mechanisms and processes, such as PPI (Chapter 4) or 
the Client Hotline (Chapter 8), being adopted for their performative value, and 
the role they play in enabling Cloud Loan to construct and communicate a 
particular story of who they are, and what they do. As I raise in these 
discussions, I observed such stories to be more persuasive to external audiences 
than evidence of results.  
Interest Rates 
While it was common within Cloud Loan for Kiva and LWC to be discussed 
collectively and interchangeably, as Rose had raised, there were some 
differences between the requirements of the two platforms, which impacted how 
they were managed. The major difference came in the interest rates that clients 
featured on the platforms were charged for their loans. Both LWC and Kiva, 
Angelica told me, had stipulated maximum interest rates that their respective 
borrowers would pay. For LWC clients, this rate was 20%, the same as the 
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organisation’s standard loan rate. This was in line with guidance from the 
platform that, “the requirements of the Lendwithcare programme should not 
differ from normal loan provision practices” (Thomas, 2014). For clients in 
receipt of these loans, this meant that their experience would in no way differ 
from that of their non-featured contemporaries, or from previous loan cycles, as 
a result of their designation. Furthermore, while, as I describe in the next 
section, some additional information was collected from clients who were to be 
featured on the platform, this was often through a process indistinguishable 
from the wider tasks and data collection undertaken in the course of group 
meetings, meaning that clients may have been unaware that they were LWC 
Clients. 
In contrast to the LWC groups, clients featured on the Kiva website paid 
a reduced rate of 12% interest on their loans. This was the lowest rate of 
interest charged by Cloud Loan for any of their loan products. I had heard about 
this lower rate from staff in several branch offices, so when I had the 
opportunity to speak to Angelica, one of my first questions was why this reduced 
rate was being offered. In response, she told me that it had been implemented at 
the insistence of Kiva, when their partnership with Cloud Loan had been 
established. On reviewing the MOU between the two organisations, however, I 
could find no mention of this required rate. Querying this again with Angelica, 
and with Alex, the Director of Operations, both told me that there were many 
elements of the arrangements with these two platforms that they did not fully 
understand, and this was one element of the programme which had passed into 
accepted wisdom and practice. Staff turnover, Alex explained, meant that there 
had been a significant loss of institutional memory, and the staff who had 
negotiated and signed the original agreements had long since left the 
organisation. Here again, issues of internal communication and knowledge 
management emerge. Finding myself unable to resolve the mystery of this 
reduced rate within Cloud Loan, I contacted Kiva representatives several times, 
asking for an opportunity to talk more about this issue, and their work in 
Malawi, but received no response. 
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Kiva’s online presentation of the partnership similarly neither confirmed 
nor explained the 12% rate. Beyond confirming that clients would pay interest 
on their loans, no further details were provided. I found this surprising, as the 
negotiation of a reduced rate for clients supported through their platform would 
seem to be a compelling incentive for prospective lenders to channel their 
support in this way, yet no such information was provided. The lack of specific 
detail on interest rates was not, however, surprising. Elsewhere in this thesis I 
have raised that I often found it impossible to ascertain through publicly 
available sources, the interest rates charged by various microfinance 
organisations in Malawi. In an interview with the CEO of one lender, I had to 
ask several times what rates his organisation charged, as he repeatedly evaded 
the question. Consistently I was told, by practitioners and Government officials 
alike, that this was commercially sensitive information, which most 
organisations took steps to avoid making public. This was a pervasive 
transparency issue that cut across the sector.  
While neither site provided specific information to lenders on how much 
the clients whom they support will pay in interest, both Kiva and LWC are 
forthright in their defence of interest being charged. Kiva, for example, explain 
on their website that revenue from interest payments is essential in enabling 
their extending partners to deliver and manage loans in often rural areas, and 
to provide support and services which add value to the loan, such as client 
training74. LWC post a similar explanation, but also raise that this interest 
revenue helps extending partners to offset the risk they incur by offering clients 
collateral free loans. Furthermore, LWC highlight the competitive value of their 
partners’ loans against other, more expensive forms of borrowing75.  
Attaching this unique interest rate to groups designated as Kiva Clients, 
introduced additional considerations for client selection. As they were cheaper 
for the clients, participating branches were encouraged by senior managers in 
Malawi to treat ‘Kiva Loans’ as an incentive and reward for exceptionally good 
                                               
74 Why are your Field Partners' interest rates so high? 
https://www.kiva.org/help/solution/why_are_your_field_partners_interest_rates_so_high 
[accessed 27/7/17] 
75 Cloud Loan, LWC Partner Profile (Cloud Loan Source 7.4) 
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groups. As previously described, groups were considered to be good if they 
complied with Cloud Loan’s rules, and paid-off their loans without delay or 
incident. These cheaper, Kiva loans, staff in participating branches told me, 
were awarded to groups who had maintained such behaviour over several loan 
cycles. Notably, neither the poverty level of the clients, nor their business 
endeavours were considered in these decisions. The result of this was that 
clients whose income and circumstances had enabled them to manage successive 
loans were paying less for their new loan than others who were in more 
vulnerable or precarious positions. While this makes sense from a business 
perspective, with there being a lower risk of these more reliable clients 
defaulting on their loans, or needing additional support from Cloud Loan, it is 
somewhat contradictory to the Kiva messaging, that loans are going to those 
most in need. 
Collecting Information 
One loan officer told me that branch staff had little power to influence the 
behaviour of their clients, or to ensure their compliance with Cloud Loan 
regulations and protocols. As a result, he continued, being able to use Kiva 
Loans as an incentive to induce such good behaviour was something that he 
found valuable. This positive take on the Kiva and LWC loans was, however, an 
anomaly among the branch staff with whom I spoke. The majority opinion was 
that they were difficult and time consuming to manage, and, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, no additional support or reward was provided to staff 
undertaking these additional tasks.  
 As previously described, when new client profiles were required, Angelica 
would forward the platform’s requests to relevant branch managers. They, with 
their loan officers, would then select groups, and from those groups, individual 
clients whose stories would be featured. At the next meeting of the selected 
group, the loan officer would collect information on that chosen individual. To 
assist in this process, a questionnaire had been developed by one of Angelica’s 
predecessors, which was used in both Kiva and LWC branches. On this simple 
template, comprising one side of A4, the loan officer was required to record some 
general information about the group, including the number of members and the 
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size of their collective loan. Having noted this information from group records, 
the loan officer would then take the client who had been selected as the featured 
borrower away from the group, as they did for the PPI interviews, and ask them 
10 questions about their business and personal circumstances. These included, 
• Marital Status 
• No. of Household dependents 
• Main Source of Client’s Income 
• Estimated Monthly Income 
• How will you spend the money? How will this help your 
family? 
• Why did you start the business? 
• No. of People Employed in the Business?  
• What are your personal goals for the future? Where do you see 
your business in 2 years?76 
Much like the PPI interviews, I saw these conversations undertaken with little 
or no preamble or explanation, casting doubt over whether clients understood 
why these questions were being asked, or had consented to their information 
being used for this purpose. 
 At the same meeting, the loan officer would take a photograph of the 
group, with the featured client’s hand raised. The walls of branch offices were 
always adorned with photographs of groups with whom the team were working, 
to help officers identify clients, so this act of having such a photograph taken 
would not have been an unusual experience. If the featured individual’s 
business was nearby, the officer would often accompany the client to her place of 
work, and take additional, staged photographs of her going about her business, 
for example tending crops, working a sewing machine, or selling groceries. These 
images, as described, feature prominently on the platforms, but as Black (2013: 
108) comments, they are deliberately not professionally shot, artistic portraits. 
Instead, she explains, their amateur quality is retained, so as to add 
authenticity and relatability, mimicking as they do the images that a 
prospective lender may take themselves. In so doing, they further the sites’ 
                                               
76 Kiva and LWC Questionnaire (Cloud Loan Source 7.5) 
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ambitions of evoking empathy, and forging a sense of connection between lender 
and borrower. 
Having recorded by hand the client’s answers, these were then scanned 
and emailed by the loan officer, along with the digital photographs, to Angelica. 
Discussing Kiva, Sinclair (2012) dismissively comments that, “It doesn’t cost 
much to hire some local staff to snap photos, write little stories, and send them 
off to the U.S.” (2012:175). While it is true to say that the task of collecting 
information for the platforms was not in and of itself onerous, to staff in the 
field, it was perceived as being yet one more task in the ever-increasing list of 
demands being placed upon them. As I described in the previous chapter, a 
particular grievance voiced by many branch staff was that they received no 
financial reward for completing this work in a timely manner, and they were 
therefore inclined to prioritise work that would attract a bonus. Furthermore, as 
I also raised in Chapter 6, this work was vulnerable to faults and failings in the 
IT equipment in branch offices, and when such faults occurred, support from 
Head Office was often not forthcoming. 
Creating Profiles 
On receiving the forms, Angelica would use the information recorded on the 
questionnaires to draft a short profile of the featured client. This, she would 
upload to either the Kiva or LWC system. Those she submitted to LWC, 
Angelica explained, would usually either be rejected, or accepted and posted 
almost exactly as she had written it on to the LWC platform. The most common 
reason given for a profile being rejected, she explained, was that the photograph 
did not meet the Platform’s requirements. Sometimes, she explained, officers 
would forget to ask the featured client to raise their hand, or the image would be 
out of focus. In these cases, Angelica would usually request that the loan officer 
take new pictures at the group’s next meeting, and with these, she would re-
submit the profile.  
For the Kiva submissions, as previously raised these would be received, 
reviewed and edited by one of Kiva’s global volunteers. As Allison et al (2013) 
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argue, the content and visual appeal of a profile can play a major role in 
determining the level of support that it will attract. As they observe, 
“the language used in entrepreneurial narratives may influence the 
decision to invest in a new venture … our study suggests that 
entrepreneurial narratives be carefully crafted to maximize the 
likelihood of securing funds from potential investors” (Allison et al, 
2013: 705). 
Kiva’s specialist team of volunteers represent a means by which appealing 
profiles can consistently be generated, compensating for the varying skills of 
submitting staff in partner organisations. Gajjala et al (2011), however, while 
similarly acknowledging the importance of presenting borrowers as empathetic 
and deserving of support, also note the removal of agency and subjugation of the 
borrowers that can occur in this process. In findings from their visual and 
content analysis of Kiva profiles, they observe that,  
“the image that is meant to be persuasive to the lender from the 
affluent world, serves to inadvertently portray the image of a 
borrower from the third world as an object of charity rather than as a 
budding entrepreneur” (Gajjala et al, 2011: 888). 
Furthermore, as all the content that ultimately appears on the profiles has been 
edited and approved by a team of volunteers, working with a common set of 
corporate guidance, there is a flattening of the variety in the stories portrayed. 
Regardless of where the borrower is located, their personal characteristics, or 
their intentions for the loan, all profiles follow the same form, obscuring the 
diversity of geography, culture, and circumstance of those profiled on the site 
(Schwittay, 2014b; Yartey, 2017). 
Armstrong et al (2018) also discuss the review and crafting processes 
undertaken by Kiva, before profiles are published online. These, they argue, are 
processes which enhance the value of the platform, explaining that information 
is checked and verified, so that visitors to the site can be assured of the 
legitimacy of the borrowers’ profiles and requests. In so doing, they continue, 
trust is built between parties. Tremblay-Boire & Prakash (2017) similarly 
emphasise the importance of, and desire for, such assurance mechanisms, when 
donors cannot physically oversee how their funds are being used, as is common 
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in international development work. Dolan (2010) also reflects on the importance 
of trust in virtual exchange, in her study of support for Fairtrade. As she 
observes, however, an essential component in creating trust, partnership, and 
legitimate representation, is the inclusion of those who are being represented. 
Having recounted the process by which information was collected and profiles 
generated in Cloud Loan, I have observed that representations were made of 
individual clients, with limited input or consent from those individuals. As I 
described, information was hastily collected in the field, crafted in to a profile by 
the Project Officer, and then submitted to kiva for their review before 
publication. At each stage, the person creating the profile became further 
removed from the individual about whom they were writing, yet had greater 
voice in determining how that person would be represented. In Chapter 8, I 
explore more fully issues of downward accountability, or Cloud Loan’s 
engagement with their clients, and the impact of deficiencies in this area on 
wider organisational legitimacy and effectiveness.  
The Illusion of Connection 
As I have detailed in this chapter, significant work and consideration went in to 
selecting clients, collecting their information, and crafting the appealing profiles 
that would appear online. Despite these efforts, and the sites’ wider messaging 
to the contrary, however, the decision of a Kiva or LWC lender to support a 
particular Cloud Loan entrepreneur had no direct effect on that borrower. By 
the time a client profile had been posted and begun to attract support, that 
individual’s loan would already have been made, and they would most likely be 
in the process of, or may even have completed, repayment.   
 In a 2007 brochure, Kiva stated that, “When a loan is completely funded 
by individual lenders, Kiva pools the money and transfers it to an MFI 
[Microfinance Institution] partner who administers it to the entrepreneur” 77. 
This description of the process supports the wider impression conveyed to 
potential lenders, that it is their support that is essential, and will make a 
                                               
77 Kiva: loans that change lives http://media.kiva.org/KIVA_brochure_6.1.07.pdf 
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difference for the pictured individual: only if and when funds are provided by 
supporters will the borrower receive the support they are requesting. In reality, 
however, this would prove impractical. If the sites were true to this version of 
events, then a situation would be created where, having had their information 
collected, and profiles compiled and posted, clients would be left in limbo, 
waiting weeks or months to find out if or when they would receive a loan, and 
unsure of how much they would receive.  
 Instead, Angelica explained to me that Cloud Loan, as other extending 
partners of these platforms also do, use the money to backfill loans already 
granted. When support is received for an individual or group featured on the 
platform, funds are transferred to Cloud Loan, who add this sum to the general 
funds available for lending in Malawi. Operating in this way transfers the risk 
of a loan not being funded away from the client and on to Cloud Loan, as even if 
the funding target is not met, no money will be withdrawn or withheld from the 
group. Conversely, the client’s business could fail, or the group could default, but 
the lender will still receive repayment of their investment, with the 
accompanying belief that the borrower’s endeavours were successful, thereby 
also preserving the lender’s emotional investment. 
Since the 2007 publication of the previously referenced information 
leaflet, Kiva have updated their messaging to acknowledge that their partners 
may manage loans in this way, now stating on their website that, “when a 
lender supports a partner loan on Kiva, the borrower may already have those 
funds in hand”78. This acknowledgement is, however, made on a relatively 
obscure page of the organisation’s website, with more prominent content 
continuing to emphasise the direct role that lenders can play in the lives of 
featured borrowers.  
Understanding that loans do not go to the profiled client changes the 
status of these online profiles. Rather than real people with whom lenders are 
invited and supported to form a direct relationship, they become avatars for the 
extending partner’s wider ambitions, strategy and work. While it is not unusual 
                                               
78 Kiva, About https://www.kiva.org/about/how [accessed 24/7/17] 
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for those seeking to represent complex realities to present simplified 
representations, I argue that that there is a fundamental lack of transparency in 
the approach of these platforms, in their continual reinforcement of the idea 
that lenders are forging direct, personal connections. Not only are names and 
images used, but exact sums are requested for specific purposes, and Kiva 
provide ‘real time’ information on the giving and receiving of loans through their 
‘Happening Now’ map79, where summaries of recently granted loans appear, and 
metrics are constantly updated. On visiting the page, for example, we see an 
update that, “Vareesha made a loan, which helps Aneela buy a new Juki sewing 
machine for her tailoring purposes”80, accompanied by photographs of both 
Vareesha and Aneela. Scrolling down the page, high level information on where 
loans are coming from and going to, and the purposes to which these funds will 
be put, is constantly being updated. The abundance of such detailed information 
would seem to be the epitome of transparency and accountability, yet as I have 
raised in this chapter, where it concerns the actions and involvement of partners 
who work as Cloud Loan do, it is largely a work of fiction. 
Partner Profiles 
In this chapter so far, I have focused on the lending platforms’ presentation of 
borrowers. As I raised in the previous section, however, in Cloud Loan, funds 
were received by the organisation generally, rather than named clients 
specifically. This way of managing funds means that the information provided 
on who the extending partner is, and what they do, offers greater insight to the 
lender on how their funds will be used, than the stories of clients. Though less 
prominent than the image and story of the borrower, information on the 
extending partner for the loan is provided by Kiva, as part of the more detailed 
client profile. This information typically includes an overview of the 
organisation’s relationship with the platform, outlining, for example, how long 
the organisations have been working together, and the number and total value 
of loans that have been supported. Also included is a quote from a Kiva 
                                               
79 Kiva: Happening Now https://www.kiva.org/live  
80 Kiva: Happening Now https://www.kiva.org/live [accessed 3/7/18] 
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representative, under the heading of, “This loan is special because”. On the 
profiles of Cloud Loan clients, the explanation is given that,  
“This loan is special because: It enables women living below the 
poverty line to start businesses”, continuing that, “This loan is part of 
[Cloud Loan] Malawi's efforts to provide very poor women, mostly 
below the poverty line of $1.25 per day, startup capital for small 
businesses. The organization uses a data system to target women 
that qualify for this program”81 
As I raised in Chapters 4 and 5, while this statement is in keeping with Cloud 
Loan’s presented ambitions, my findings were that Cloud Loan did not track the 
way that loans were used by clients, beyond information provided in the loan 
application, and therefore could not systematically evidence this claim that 
loans were being used for their stated purpose of business investment. My 
findings in these chapters also challenge the claims around poverty outreach. 
Contrary to the suggestions here, the Progress out of Poverty Index (PPI) was 
not used by Cloud Loan as a means of targeting clients of particular wealth or 
poverty, as information was only collected after clients had begun working with 
the organisation. Furthermore, in Chapter 5 I also raised that Cloud Loan’s PPI 
data indicated that, since the adoption of the tool in 2010, the majority of the 
organisation’s clients were considered to be living above, rather than below, the 
$1.25 a day poverty line82.   
Such discrepancies between the claims made by Cloud Loan on the Kiva 
website, and my observations of their operations, challenge the claims made by 
Armstrong et al (2018) that platforms such as Kiva and LWC offer a means of 
enhancing accountability to donors through their quality control and validation 
mechanisms. What mechanisms there were had either failed to identify the 
issues I raise here, or accuracy and transparency had not been prioritised in the 
generation of the Cloud Loan profile. Speaking with a senior member of staff in 
the African Head Quarters, this impression of the platforms employing a light 
approach to verification was strengthened further. In our conversation, he 
                                               
81 Kiva Website (Cloud Loan Source 7.6) 
82 In 2015, 49.8% of Cloud Loan clients were considered to be living under $1.25 a day, 
while 84.3% were considered to be living under $2.50 (Chapter 5) 
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observed of their requirements that they were, “easy, not like some funding 
where there are so many visits, and inspections, and reports”.  
It is also not the case that Cloud Loan is an isolated example of such 
discrepancies having occurred. In his 2012 book, Hugh Sinclair recounts in great 
detail his experience with the Nigerian microfinance organisation, Lift Above 
Poverty Organization, or LAPO. Criticisms of this organisation, he reports, have 
included concerns over extortionate interest rates, misappropriated client 
savings, and the disproportionate retention of profits within the organisation. 
LAPO was one of Kiva’s partners in Nigeria, though when the stories of 
corruption came to public attention, their relationship ended83. Before this time, 
however, there was no indication of the extortionate practices that would later 
be exposed, suggesting again the deficiencies of Kiva’s verification processes. As 
I argued previously, it is for compelling stories, not reliable information, that 
these platforms are held accountable for providing. This lack of rigour and 
transparency can, as a New York Times writer observed, mean that lenders may 
unwittingly find themselves supporting and perpetuating the exploitative 
behaviours that they turned to these platforms to avoid. (MacFarquhar, 2010). 
Transparency, whether about how funds will actually be used, or issues 
of internal corruption, is, however, not without its risks. In Chapter 4 I reflected 
on the dilemma faced by many NGOs, between presenting an appealing, if 
misleading, narrative, which attracts the funding that the organisation needs, 
versus being more open with current and potential donors, and risking the 
consequences of reduced funding or support (Blowfield & Dolan, 2008; Gray, 
2001; Owen et al, 2001; O’Dwyer, 2005). In Cloud Loan’s communication and 
engagement with their supporters through these platforms, I have argued in 
this chapter that they have pursued the misleading, but appealing approach.  
                                               
83While no full explanation of the reason for the dissolution of the partnership is 
provided on the site, Kiva offer the statement that, “Kiva and the Lift Above Poverty 
Organization (LAPO) have agreed to discontinue their partnership at this time. LAPO's 
full balance has been repaid and the partnership is now closed. We sincerely thank 
LAPO for working so closely with Kiva and supporting our mission since the earliest 





Accountability, as I’ve argued throughout this thesis, is a concept fundamentally 
concerned with relationships, and communication and exchange between actors. 
In this chapter I have explored upwards accountability in Cloud Loan, through 
examination of the organisation’s work with the online funding platforms, Kiva 
and LWC. Through these platforms, Cloud Loan communicate, and establish 
relationships with, financial supporters.  
What makes these platforms of particular interest in a study of 
accountability is that establishing relationships, and a sense of connection and 
intimacy on the part of the donor, is core to their operational model, with such 
connections being fostered through the presentation of specific information on 
where funds will go and how they will be used. In a competitive fundraising 
arena, NGOs must seek new and innovative ways of attracting and retaining 
support, and the sense of connection generated by these platforms has resonated 
with the aspirations and values of so called ‘Millennial Development’ (Roy, 
2010), and proved lucrative for microfinance organisations. 
Through the sites’ search functions, lenders can peruse details of 
thousands of potential borrowers, and choose to target their support to the 
individual whose story they find most compelling. It is this function that led 
Kiva’s co-founder, Premal Shah to describe his site as “eBay for micro finance” 
(NPR, 2006). This analogy, however, draws attention to the contradiction 
between the aspirations of genuine connection, and the power imbalance 
inherent to this transactional approach. While lenders are invited to enact their 
own preferences, and empowered through the provision of an achievable, 
impactful action, the client has had their information and likeness reshaped by 
strangers into a story designed to appeal to western audiences (Gajjala et al, 
2011; Schwittay, 2014a; Schwittay, 2014b; Henkel & Stirrat, 2001; Yartey, 
2017). In so doing, these sites have conformed to a tendency observed by Lidchi, 
of organizations presenting people living in poverty as “fetishistic objects, docile 
and visible bodies” (Lidchi, 1999: 90).  
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Ebrahim (2005) is among those who observe the ever increasing influence 
of funders’ agendas, preferences and priorities on the operations of NGOs, and 
particularly on accountability policy and practice. In Chapter 3, I raised that the 
influence of powerful actors over the accountability agenda is often justified by 
claims that powerful actors are making these demands in the interest of 
protecting vulnerable communities. In this chapter, however, I observed that the 
processes put in place were extractive and disempowering, resulting in a loss of 
agency on the part of clients, whose images and stories were commodified in the 
interests of Cloud Loan. As such, I also argue that this area of work highlights 
the need for concerted efforts to promote downward accountability, an area of 
work I explore more fully in the next chapter. 
In this chapter I also raised the falsehood which sits at the core of these 
platforms, in my observation that Cloud Loan did not pass on funds directly to 
the profiled group or individual. This meant that the decision of a Kiva or LWC 
lender, to support a particular Cloud Loan entrepreneur, had no direct effect on 
that borrower: By the time a client profile had been posted, that individual’s 
loan would already have been made, and they would most likely be in the 
process of, or may even have completed, repayment. Instead, funds received 
from the platforms were added to those available for general lending across the 
country. This practice, while acknowledged in the small print of Kiva’s website, 
contradicted sharply the message of direct, interpersonal connection that was 
emphasised across the platforms. This, I argue, represents a fundamental lack 
of transparency. While lenders are furnished with information that would seem 
to represent the epitome of accountability and transparency, where it concerns 
the actions and involvement of partners who work as Cloud Loan do, it is largely 
a work of fiction, creating what Dolan (2010) refers to as a paradox of visibility 
and concealment. In this observation I agree with Sinclair, who comments of 
lending platforms, such as Kiva and LWC, that they are “craftily designed to 
extract money from the hapless user” (Sinclair, 2012:169). Just as clients are 
disempowered through the loss of agency and control over their own 
representation, the ability of lenders to make informed decisions is also being 
hindered by misleading and inaccurate information. 
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Fox (2007) observes of the relationship between transparency and 
accountability that while the two can overlap and can be mutually supportive, 
they are not synonymous, and that often increased transparency, or the making 
available of information, can be seen as an easier alternative to addressing the 
richer, more complex engagements of accountability. I argue however, that my 
analysis of Cloud Loan’s work with online funding platforms demonstrates the 
fundamental importance of transparency. The absence of transparency, 
manifested here in the misleading narratives, and flawed information, 
undermines the relationships that are founded on that misinformation. The 
result is that while these, and wider processes discussed in this thesis, are 
designed to appeal and to and communicate with funders, what is being created 
is the illusion of upwards accountability. I observed in Chapter 3 that when an 
actor cannot threaten to withhold funds or essential permissions, their ability to 
hold agencies accountable for their actions, is limited. The example of these 
platforms, however, raises that this ability is similarly limited by a lack of 
reliable information: For donors and regulators to hold Cloud Loan accountable 
for their actions and achievements, a realistic account of these actions and 
achievements must be provided. While Premal Shah compared Kiva to eBay, a 
more appropriate online comparison, I argue, would be to say that these 
platforms offer a form of Poverty Tinder, with visitors invited to make 
judgements and selections based on carefully constructed representations, and 
the most superficial of information. As with the dating app, it must be 







Chapter 8: Downward Accountability 
 
Just after 3 o’clock on a Thursday afternoon, Eddie, a loan officer from the 
second Central Region branch, and I arrive to meet our third group of the day. 
Not unusually, we are almost two hours behind schedule, and while Eddie had 
texted ahead to say that we were running late, the group are quick to make 
visible their frustration at having been kept waiting. The meeting place is on the 
edge of the village, and as we approach I see two benches intersecting to form a 
‘V’, around the base of a large and shady tree. Six women are seated on the 
benches when we pull-up, and as we disembark from the bike and remove our 
helmets, one woman rises to meet us, gesturing angrily at her waiting 
colleagues. She explains that several group members had not been able to wait 
any longer, and had returned to their homes or businesses, and dispatches two 
of those present to summon them back for the meeting. As we wait for their 
return, Eddie unloads files and training materials from his backpack, and we 
carry them over to the seating area. As we walk, and even once we are seated, 
the same woman continues to follow Eddie, talking and gesturing in an 
animated fashion, while other members watch closely. He later tells me that she 
had been complaining that Cloud Loan officers were always late, and that this 
showed a lack of respect for clients. One comment in particular stood out as he 
recounted that, “she says if we do not respect them, why should they respect 
us?”.  
Eddie is visibly shaken by the encounter, and seeks to calm the mood, 
repeatedly apologising, and explaining that our previous groups had overrun. He 
tries to move proceedings on, gathering the clients back to the meeting space, 
and with the arrival of the remaining group members, the meeting begins. 
Despite the commotion at the start of the meeting, the group are largely silent 
during the training, which this week focuses on the importance of savings. I saw 
this same training module delivered several times before and after this meeting, 
and in those other sessions there would be an interactive component. In the 
second Southern Region branch, for example, the officer distributed three leaves 
to each member of the group, and asked the clients to hold up each in turn, and 
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relate to the group what three plans and ambitions they had for their savings. 
Common answers would be a desire to extend or improve their homes, to 
purchase land, or to fund a child’s education. While the props would differ, 
depending on the officer and the environment, this was the first time that I had 
seen the exercise excluded completely. Speaking to Eddie later that evening, I 
asked him about the meeting, and whether that was how he always ran this 
particular session. The difficult day, however, had clearly affected him, and he 
was not in the mood to talk, so I didn’t press the issue.  
The next day, however, was Friday, and as was Cloud Loan policy, this 
meant that no group visits were scheduled, and Eddie and the other loan officers 
were in the office all day. As the rest of the team were busy with paperwork and 
other tasks, we had tea together. He was clearly in better spirits than he had 
been the previous evening, so I asked again about the meeting. “They are a 
difficult group”, he responded, “Usually we don’t have these kind of problems, 
the clients understand us. But sometimes…sometimes there is a difficult group.” 
He went on to explain that this was the group’s second loan cycle, and while 
there had been relatively few issues, beyond the teething problems to be 
expected with new clients, in the previous round, this time tensions such as 
those I had seen the day before had become common. At the root of the 
problems, Eddie reported, was a frustration with the savings requirement. 
While Cloud Loan is a non-deposit taking MFI, they do stipulate that clients 
must make a savings deposit at each repayment meeting. The amount to be 
saved is determined for each client at the start of the loan cycle, and is 
proportionate to the size of the loan that the client holds. This requirement is 
described by Cloud Loan as being a key means of ensuring sustainable outcomes 
for the client. On their website, for example, Cloud Loan explain that that by 
establishing this habit of saving, clients are encouraged to become more 
“financially prudent”84. Within some groups, however, there was frustration at 
this requirement. Discussing the group that we had met the day before, Eddie 
recounted that shortly after starting this second loan cycle, the group had asked 
                                               




to abandon the fortnightly savings deposits. Instead, they had wanted to 
combine the funds to make larger repayments against their loans, paying off the 
sum more quickly.  In other situations, I observed clients making savings 
deposits of less than the originally agreed amount, and loan officers were 
generally relaxed about occasional shortfalls, commenting that such instances 
often coincided with periods where clients had faced unexpected expenses, or 
were related to general peaks and troughs in household or business income. 
Eddie explained, however, that the model being proposed by this group 
represented a more substantive issue. Loan repayment periods were 
standardised and centrally determined, he continued, and no flexibility was 
possible. As such, he had denied the group’s request immediately. In the third 
Central Region branch, I witnessed an almost identical exchange with one of the 
Farming Loan groups, who similarly had asked to repay their loan in fewer, 
larger instalments. Here again, the loan officer explained that this was not 
possible, and the response was similarly ill-received.   
This inflexibility was a choice made by senior staff within Cloud Loan, 
with the then Head of Operations explaining to me that this frequency of 
repayments was informed by his observation that other microfinance 
organisations employing a similar schedule saw that it enabled the best balance 
between ensuring that clients could afford repayments, while not stretching the 
repayment period for too long, which would require clients to pay more interest. 
As Joseph, the senior Social Performance Officer, later explained, the repayment 
period was also fixed due to the inflexibility of the organisation’s loan 
management IT system, which made it impossible for loans that deviated from 
prescribed periods and rates to be entered in to the system.  
While I can’t say whether reducing savings and paying the loans off more 
quickly would have been viable or beneficial options for these clients, what I 
found striking was that these requests were not considered. As discussed in 
previous chapters, Cloud Loan offered various different loan products, often as 
the bequest of donors who wished to see particular services provided in return 
for their support. Despite repeated requests from clients, across different 
branches and regions, for a loan that could be repaid more quickly and without a 
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savings requirement, however, no such loan product was being considered by 
cloud Loan, and their inflexibility in existing products remained constant.  
As Lipsky (1980) describes, and as was discussed in Chapter 4, workers 
in roles similar to those of Cloud Loan’s loan officers frequently find themselves 
forced to routinize their work, engaging with clients as collective units rather 
than offering bespoke, individual services, in order to balance the needs of their 
clients with organisational concerns around efficiency and maximising outreach. 
As Lipsky also describes, however, so called, street-level bureaucrats must also, 
“at least be open to the possibility that each client presents special 
circumstances and opportunities that may require fresh thinking and flexible 
action” (Lipsky, 1980: 161). In contrast, however, as I go on to describe in this 
chapter, no such discretion was afforded to loan officers, who were instead 
encouraged always to prioritise the demands and priorities of the organisation, 
and adhere to prescribed rules and protocols. This supports an argument made 
in this chapter, and across this thesis, that Cloud Loan are not meaningfully 
seeking to hold themselves accountable to their clients, with products and 
services being designed to conform to the interests and agendas of donors and 
other powerful actors, rather than to meet the expressed needs and wishes of 
those in whose name work is being undertaken. 
While loan officers and other staff would explain to me after meetings 
why they had felt obliged to refuse such requests of their clients, it was also 
notable that no such explanation was offered to the clients themselves. At most, 
there would be a reiteration of the organisation’s policy that loans were 
repayable over a prescribed period, and that savings were mandatory. The 
residual effects of concerns being dismissed in this way included the tensions 
and animosity that I had observed in the second Central Region branch, and my 
experiences, both there and in the third Central Region branch, brought in to 
question Cloud Loan’s commitment to “listen to our clients and measure ‘social 
performance’ to enhance our services and social purpose.”85 It is this 
                                               
85 Cloud Loan 2015 Annual Report (Cloud Loan Source 8.2) 
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commitment that is the starting point for this chapter, resonating as it does 
with the question of to whom microfinance organisations are accountable.  
Introduction 
In this chapter, I continue to explore the question of to whom Cloud Loan are 
accountable, focusing on the organisation’s relationship with, and accountability 
to, their clients. Building on the introduction to downward accountability, 
presented in Chapter 3, I begin by discussing the vital role that these 
relationships play in establishing the legitimacy and effectiveness of an 
organisation, and their interventions. I also, in this discussion, argue that it is 
the responsibility of the implementing organisation to ensure that opportunities 
and mechanisms are created to ensure effective, two-way communication with 
those in whose name they are working, because, as Bhatnagar & Williams 
observe, “People do not participate in external interventions; they live their 
lives” (1992:181). 
 Having established, therefore, the importance of Cloud Loan proactively 
engaging with, and inviting feedback from, their clients, I go on to explore 
downward accountability through examination of the organisation’s Client 
Hotline. This phone line service, was, I discuss, launched by the organisation in 
2011, and was described to me by the Senior SPM Officer as being “a mechanism 
to ensure that problems are raised and recorded”. It is also an area of work that 
is much discussed in Cloud Loan’s donor reports and public and literature. As 
the organisation’s CEO and Founder articulates in such a report, “Since we 
made our first loan in Malawi, [Cloud Loan] has always listened attentively to 
its clients”86, and the Hotline is described as the means by which this ambition 
is achieved. 
Despite the status of the service, however, in exploring the Hotline in 
practice, I observe various issues, which I discuss in this chapter. Firstly, the 
service was not well used, with only a handful of contacts being received every 
month. This was in stark contrast to the abundance of questions and feedback 
                                               
86 Cloud Loan Research Report (Cloud Loan Source 8.3) 
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that I observed in group meetings. The Service was also not prioritised, or 
sufficiently resourced, internally, with responsibility for its management 
frequently being transferred between teams and departments, and for periods, 
abandoned. Furthermore, the information generated through the service was 
not taken seriously, with only cursory feedback being given to clients, and no 
substantive action taken.  
In considering these failings, I argue that, reflecting a trend observed in 
previous chapters, it is the existence of the service that Cloud Loan value, rather 
than the dialogue and interactions than it can support, or the information that it 
can generate. Furthermore, I identify that the Hotline was developed primarily 
with the interests of the sector regulator, the Reserve Bank of Malawi, in mind, 
and question whether such imposed tools can meaningfully promote downward 
accountability, if they are not embraced, resourced and integrated into the 
implementing organisation’s wider practice. 
Downward Accountability 
In 2000, an article published in The Economist reported on civil society activism 
and protest around the 1999 Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO). In this scathing piece, two powerful questions were asked of the massed 
actors:  Who elected Oxfam, and who holds the activists accountable?’ (The 
Economist, 2000). These questions captured concerns over whether protestors 
were speaking from a position informed by, and in the genuine interests of, 
those they purported to represent. These are questions that permeate discourse 
on accountability, and find particular resonance in discussion of downward 
accountability. As concerns have risen over the ethics and efficacy of externally 
imposed, top-down approaches to development, discourse and practice around 
participation, and downward accountability, have emerged as means of 
supporting communities to hold powerful actors to account for their actions and 
commitments, and to have a voice in shaping the interventions that affect their 
lives (Chambers, 1983; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Lentfer, 2012). 
Reflecting on the importance of investing in relationships between 
implementing agencies and their intended beneficiaries, Montanaro comments 
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that, “If a constituency cannot exercise authorization and demand 
accountability, this opens the space for an abuse of power” (Montanaro, 2018: 
79). Microfinance is an arena where such abuse and exploitation has been shown 
to be possible. Sinclair, for example, recounts tales of MFI lending and collection 
practices that have destroyed the lives of those whom they purported to be 
helping, tracing horrific events such as the suicides of clients in Andhra 
Pradesh87 back to the encouragement of over-indebtedness and bullying by MFIs 
(Sinclair, 2012: 205-208). While not reaching the extremes of Sinclair’s examples 
from India, neither the Malawian microfinance sector generally, nor Cloud Loan 
specifically, are immune from such issues. As will be recounted in the later 
section on Regulation, a major impetus for creating a regulatory framework in 
the country was, a representative of the Reserve Bank of Malawi told me, to 
protect clients from asset grabbing and other harmful practices that had been 
observed in several microfinance institutions. As has been discussed previously, 
numerous incidents of fraud and malpractice among Cloud Loan staff were 
raised by various individuals over the course of this study, and in this chapter I 
will return to these issues, reflecting on the role of mechanisms of downward 
accountability in identifying and addressing such behaviour. 
In addition to the potential for mechanisms and processes of downward 
accountability to reduce incidents of harm experienced by clients, there are 
compelling arguments that such initiatives go to the heart of an organisation’s 
legitimacy to operate (Jordan & van Tuijl, 2006). Cloud Loan have successfully 
attracted funding from a range of prestigious individual, corporate and 
government donors, and have the ear of the Government of Malawi, as 
participants and consultees in the development of microfinance policy. Founded 
by a British man in London, removed from clients both in terms of geographical 
location and personal characteristics and circumstances, Cloud Loan is not, 
however, an organisation that holds a ‘natural’ right to speak or act on behalf of 
its claimed constituency, of women living in poverty in rural Malawi 
(Montanaro, 2018). This is not a situation, however, that should preclude such 
                                               




action. Rather, as Montanaro (2012) and Chung et al (2012) emphasise, 
international, or otherwise external, actors can play a valuable role in 
addressing issues around poverty and human rights. Montanaro (2018), for 
example discusses achievements of such actors in being able to amplify the 
voices of communities affected by a particular issue, allowing them to be heard 
in ways that would not otherwise have been achieved. This idea resonated with 
my observations of the microfinance sector in Malawi. Across various meetings 
with Government officials, engaged in making and monitoring microfinance 
policy, I was struck by the limited direct exposure they had to microfinance 
programmes and clients. Adwell Zembele, for example, was the Chief Economist 
in the Ministry of Finance, Economic Planning and Development, and was also 
the Strand Lead for Economic Development, providing a point of coordination 
between Scottish Government funded activities under this theme, and the 
Government of Malawi88. Despite holding this role, however, neither he nor his 
department received any funding from the Scottish Government, and without 
such support, he explained, the cost of travelling to visit projects was 
prohibitive, and something that he could only do around once a year. Beyond 
this, he was reliant on the reports of implementing agencies for intelligence. A 
similar issue emerged in conversations with Peter Mwale, the Desk Officer for 
Village Savings & Loans and Microfinance, also based within the Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Planning and Development. Peter held responsibility for 
overseeing work in these two fields, and monitoring achievements against the 
ambitions articulated in the Ministry’s 2012, Malawi National Social Support 
Programme (MNSSP) (GoM, 2012b). The Programme sets out a number of 
                                               
88 As the Scotland Malawi Partnership describe, “One of the unique and effective 
features of the Governmental links over the past 10 years has been the formal 
coordinating structures between government and civil servants between Scotland and 
Malawi. All projects are formally signed off both by the Minister responsible for 
international/foreign affairs in Scotland and Malawi, and the decision on which areas of 
work to fund are influenced by the priorities communicated by the Government of 
Malawi through meetings of the “Joint Permanent Commission of Cooperation” (JPCC). 
Following the awarding of funds grant managers in for the Scottish Government have 
direct counterparts in Malawi (called “Strand Leads”) who are responsible for supporting 
the Malawi side of the funded projects under their strand. This structure ensure that 
projects meets the needs and priorities as identified by the Government of Malawi, 
contributing towards development aid principles of alignment and harmonisation, and 
reducing the duplication of effort.” (Scotland Malawi Partnership, 2015)  
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specific, quantified targets for the microfinance sector, yet when I asked about 
progress towards these, Peter admitted that the planned monitoring and 
evaluation work had not been delivered, due to budgetary constraints, and a 
reluctance on the part of practitioners to provide the required information for 
fear that it would jeopardise their competitive advantage. Instead, he too was 
reliant on publicly available reports and literature that practitioners produced 
for themselves or donors, and the work of the microfinance regulator, the 
Reserve Bank of Malawi, though he commented of the latter that they too were 
often unwilling to share information.  
While the MNSSP’s introduction emphasises the consultative processes 
through which the final document was generated, it is notable that Cloud Loan’s 
then Malawi Chief Executive was one of only nine ‘drafting participants’ for the 
microfinance section, alongside senior representatives of other MFIs and various 
Government officials. No direct input from actual or intended clients of 
microfinance organisations were engaged directly. Cloud Loan have been 
regular participants and consultees in the development of such national policy 
around microfinance, engaged to bring the voices of their clients in to the 
process. As such, it is essential that Cloud Loan have relationships with their 
clients that enable them to accurately and effectively speak on their behalf. In 
seeking to achieve such informed and productive relationships, Mansbridge 
(2009) is among those who raise effective, two-way communication as being 
essential in order to manage and overcome inevitable disagreements between 
parties, and to ensure the legitimacy of action and advocacy. In agreement with 
this assertion, Bhatnagar & Williams additionally emphasise that it is a duty of 
the actor seeking to work on behalf of a constituency to ensure that mechanisms 
and processes to enable necessary consultation, communication and feedback 
are in place, stating that,  
“People do not participate in external interventions; they live their 
lives. External interventions interfere in their lives and, therefore, 
the onus lies on external agencies, not people, to devise methods to 
participate” (Bhatnagar & Williams, 1992: 181).  
In the following section I explore the method devised by Cloud Loan for this 
purpose: The Client Hotline.  
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 Before considering the Hotline, however, it is valuable to reflect on the 
wider context of downward accountability in Malawi. As Sibande & Thinyane 
(2016) review, the rights of citizens to participate in, and be informed on, 
decisions and activities which affect their lives is enshrined in Malawian law. 
Despite these legal provisions, however, the pair go on to note that, “There is a 
striking mismatch between the theories of citizen participation and the actual 
status of citizen participation in Malawi” (Sibande & Thinyane, 2016: 3). Actors 
including the World Bank and DFID are engaged in ongoing efforts to promote 
downward accountability and opportunities for citizen engagement and 
participation in the country. The ‘Liu Lathu’ programme, for example, sought to 
trial different technologies and mechanisms whereby poorer citizens of Malawi 
could make their voices heard by, and influence actions of, governments and 
state bodies (Chiweza & Tembo, 2012). While these initiatives have achieved 
varying degrees of success, Norad (2013) note that the challenge of overcoming 
entrenched tendencies towards hierarchical and centralised structures, which 
typify public life in Malawi, remains a constant and significant challenge to 
their promotion of feedback and engagement. Tembo (2013) similarly notes 
these issues, expanding that unless those in privileged positions of power feel 
their status to be in some way threatened or fragile, there is a tendency for 
complaints or feedback received not to be acted upon. While Chiweza & Tembo 
(2012), and Tembo (2013) note that civil society organisations can play a vital 
role in overcoming these tendencies, and promoting downward accountability, 
they also acknowledge that this repeated lack of action has left many in Malawi 
disinclined to make such representations through accountability channels. To be 
utilised, therefore, and for entrenched perceptions to be overcome, it is 
imperative that intended users see their complaints taken seriously, and 
resulting in change.  
The Client Hotline 
I encountered the Hotline only a couple of days after arriving for my first visit to 
Malawi. Before visiting any of the branch offices, I spent several days with 
Social Performance Management Team in the African Head Quarters, and 
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specifically with Simon, the Senior SPM Officer. In one of our early 
conversations, Simon reviewed for me the function and activities of his team, 
explaining that, “[Cloud Loan] want there to be a positive experience for 
groups…we are working on adopting good collection practices”. There were three 
main areas of work, he explained, through which the organisation sought to 
achieve this objective. The first and second of these were the use of the Progress 
out of Poverty Index, to assess the impact of Cloud Loan loans in terms of 
poverty reduction, and efforts to build the capacity and skills of clients through 
training programmes, as discussed in chapters 5 and 4 respectively. The third 
component, he continued, was the Client Hotline, which he described as being, 
“a mechanism to ensure that problems are raised and recorded”. Cloud Loan’s 
website similarly describes the service as being a means by which any clients 
can raise concerns, complaints or comments about the organisation and their 
work89. 
Developed in 2011 and officially launched in 201290, the Hotline initiative 
in Cloud Loan has two parts: one reactive, the other, proactive. The reactive 
component is a model that is easily recognisable as a feedback or complaints 
mechanism. The number for a dedicated phone and text line, monitored from the 
African Head Quarters, is shared with all clients, who are invited to use the 
service to contact the organisation for any reason, but particularly to raise 
issues that either have not been dealt with by their local branch, or that they do 
not feel comfortable raising with the local staff. A record is made of issues raised 
in this way, and then, according to Cloud Loan policy, complaints are usually 
resolved on the same day that they are received. If further action is required, 
the statement continues, then they will be escalated to relevant senior 
managers91. 
A distinguishing feature of this component of the service is that, while it 
is not the only mechanism for data collection utilised by Cloud Loan, unlike 
other tools such as PPI which collect information against pre-set, standardised 
                                               
89 Cloud Loan Website (Cloud Loan Source 8.4) 
90 Cloud Loan 2011 Annual Report (Cloud Loan Source 8.5) 
91 Cloud Loan Website (Cloud Loan Source 8.4) 
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questions, it is the only formal mechanism that is open, with clients invited to 
raise any issue or question that they wish. As such, it offers the potential to 
capture information that is unexpected, or that otherwise would not be raised 
through other SPM activities. For this potential to be realised, however, such 
information has to be valued and utilised, enabling it to inform strategy and 
decision making, and as emerges in this chapter,  
The second, proactive function, was a later addition to the service. Elsie, 
the Head of HR and Administration in Malawi, described that following the 
launch of the service, Senior Management had wanted to ensure that the 
number was being disseminated effectively. To this end, an administrator was 
tasked with calling several, randomly selected to clients, to check that the 
details of the Hotline service had been shared with them. This task had since 
been formalised and expanded, and at the point of my conversation with Simon, 
it was an established component of the SPM team’s responsibilities. Simon 
described that every month, he or one of his colleagues would call three clients 
from each branch, randomly selected from the records of clients against whom a 
working phone number is held. In these spot-check calls, clients are asked two 
questions: firstly, whether they recall the content of their last training session, 
and secondly, whether they are aware of the Hotline, and what opportunities 
there are to raise questions or concerns about Cloud Loan’s work. Responses to 
each of these questions, as well as details of which clients were called, are 
recorded on the same master spreadsheet as incoming Hotline calls. 
The Hotline in Practice: An under-resourced service 
In presenting the organisation’s work on social performance management, 
Simon had given equal weight to each of the three activities: client training, the 
Progress out of Poverty Index, and the Client Hotline. This balance was not, 
however, reflected in my observations of the SPM team, in my time in with 
branch offices, or in subsequent conversations. As previously recounted, PPI had 
an almost overwhelming physical presence in the SPM team’s tiny office in the 
African Head Quarters, with the paper submissions from field staff forming 
precarious towers across all available floor and surface space. It was to process 
these forms that a temporary Data Assistant had been recruited, as the task had 
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so overwhelmed the capacity of the two permanent team members (Chapter 5). 
Simon had explained that there was currently a particular backlog of data to 
process, due to a combination of factors that included downtime in the central IT 
system, and his being pulled away to support other projects, but that they were 
always trying to keep up with the inflow. The cyclical nature of the 
organisation’s work meant that, as new groups were formed and new loans 
approved, there would always be this influx of PPI reports. As such, Simon 
confirmed, this work was a constant demand on their time, and having observed 
the SPM staff manually input every item of this flow of data from the field, it 
became difficult to imagine their undertaking, with equal commitment, 
additional significant tasks. 
During our initial conversation about the Hotline, I asked more about the 
practicalities of the initiative, including how calls were logged and complaints 
progressed, and the nature of issues that had been raised through the service. In 
answer, Simon gave me an electronic copy of a spreadsheet, titled ‘Hotline 
Follow ups Report’, which contained details both of contacts received, and the 
outcome of spot-check calls. The document, he explained, was a live one, updated 
every month, so at this stage it contained information from the first four months 
of 2014. The cover sheet of this multi-page document included guidelines for 
staff on how to log information. Under the section on received contacts, for 
example, staff were reminded that, “All calls received on the client hotline must 
be recorded in the database”. When discussing the spot-check calls, staff were 
instructed to, “Choose 3 clients per branch per month who have a working 
telephone number”, and reminded that, “All calls given must be recorded in the 
database (even if the client refuses to answer the questions)”. The development 
of the Hotline tool will be returned to later in this chapter, but this document, as 
with wider processes and procedures associated with the initiative were, Simon 
explained, developed primarily by he and Matilda, the Social Performance 
Manager, with input from the wider Malawi senior management team. At this 
time, it was Simon’s responsibility, with support from the SPM Assistant, to 
manage, and undertake all tasks associated with, the Hotline. Part of the way 
through this study, however, Simon was promoted and relocated from the SPM 
team to a Regional Manager role, based in the Northern Region of Malawi. On 
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my subsequent visits to the African Head Quarters, I sought to obtain updated 
information on the contacts received through, and wider work around, the 
Hotline, but this proved to be more difficult than anticipated as the role of 
Senior SPM Officer had been vacant since Simon’s departure, and had not been 
filled by the time that my engagement with Cloud Loan ended. I approached 
several senior members of staff in the African Head Quarters, to try and obtain 
the updated records, but following vague and non-committal responses on the 
subject, the information was never forthcoming. It was only on my final visit to 
Malawi that I was able to learn more.   
Twice a day in the African Head Quarters, a thermos of hot water would 
be delivered to every office, along with mugs, tea bags, sugar, and powdered 
milk, signalling the opportunity for a short break. On my final visit to the office, 
I used the opportunity of the tea break to catch up with Elizabeth, an Office 
Assistant who worked closely with Elsie, the Head of Human Resources and 
Administration, and who had been invaluable in helping to arrange my visits to 
various branch offices, thanks to her personal connections with staff in the field. 
Every time that I had spoken to Elizabeth, her role appeared to have expanded. 
Shortly before returning for this visit, I had learned that, Angelica, the LWC 
and Kiva Project Officer, had left Cloud Loan, having only been in the role for a 
few months. On top of her wider administrative and support responsibilities, I 
had heard that Elizabeth had taken-on the duties that had constituted 
Angelica’s full-time role, coordinating work around the online funding platforms, 
discussed in Chapter 7. I had a number of questions about the platforms that 
had arisen on recent branch office visits, and was keen to learn more about this 
transfer of responsibilities, so over tea we arranged to meet again later that 
afternoon, to discuss further. Accordingly, we met in the busy office shared by 
Elizabeth and three other administrative officers, who provided support to 
various senior managers. As was typical, our conversation was interrupted 
several times as Elizabeth had to break-off to answer the phone, or assist with 
queries from colleagues who came to her door, but between these interruptions I 
learned that she had also recently taken on responsibility for managing the 
Hotline. When Simon had been promoted to Regional Manager, she explained, 
he had not been replaced in his SPM role, leaving his remaining colleague over-
219 
 
stretched and overwhelmed. Consequently, work on the Hotline had been put to 
the side as she sought to keep on top of the incoming PPI data. After a period of 
time, the precise duration of which I was unable to glean in this, or wider, 
conversations, it had been acknowledged by Malawi senior management that the 
SPM team no longer had the capacity to manage work on the Hotline. As a 
result, responsibility for the service had been shifted from the SPM team to the 
Finance department. Here again, however, a similar situation was created when 
the Head of Finance was promoted to Acting CEO, following the departure of the 
former Malawi CEO amid allegations of fraud. The Finance role was not back-
filled, and once again other priorities, particularly the Finance team’s work on 
procuring and developing the new Management Information System, meant that 
little attention was paid to the service. Consequently, responsibility had from 
there been passed to Elsie, the Head of Human Resources and Administration, 
who in a later conversation voiced agreement with this decision, reflecting that 
the initiative had more in common with her work on HR and performance 
management, than it did with finance. Having found a new home in HR, Elsie 
had passed on the responsibility to Elizabeth.  
Spending reflecting priorities 
The Hotline, it seemed, had become something of a hot potato, bouncing between 
departments, and in each being deemed less of a priority than other tasks. My 
overriding impression was that concerns about balancing the demands of the 
Hotline with wider workloads were legitimate, but not necessarily unavoidable. 
Rather, I argue, it speaks to a wider theme that has emerged throughout this 
thesis around how resources are allocated, and the prioritisation of financial 
performance and keeping costs low. As I describe in this section, Cloud Loan 
consistently failed to adequately staff and resource the Hotline, meaning that 
while it was promoted to donors and supporters as the means by which the 
organisation could listen and learn from their clients, such benefits were not 
being achieved. This offers a valuable insight into the priorities of the 
organisation, and the question of to whom they sought to be accountable. At the 
same time as the events described in this chapter were taking place, Cloud Loan 
had several full time members of staff in London, undertaking activities such as 
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those described in Chapter 4, where Nina, the Fundraising Officer, would visit 
corporate supporters to provide updates on Cloud Loan’s work, and answer any 
questions that they may have. As Chapter 6 discussed, when funds were 
required to facilitate a fundraising and communications initiative, these were 
readily made available. These efforts to be accountable to donors and supports 
were accounting for a significant proportion of Cloud Loan’s spending, yet, as 
this section describes, the initiative that Cloud Loan described as the means by 
which they sought to be accountable to their clients, was consistently under-
resourced, highlighting the disparity of esteem in which Cloud Loan held these 
two groups. 
The trigger for the events that Elizabeth described had been the reduced 
capacity in the Social Performance Management team, caused by Simon’s 
departure. The Director of Operations explained that there was an intention to 
recruit a replacement, but that this had been delayed by senior management in 
London who wished to review staffing structures in Malawi more generally, 
before bringing in anyone new. By the end of my time with the organisation, no 
replacement had been appointed. This was not the first time that I had 
encountered positions remaining vacant for long stretches of time. As outlined 
above, when the Head of Finance had been asked to take on the role of Acting 
CEO, no additional capacity was provided to support him in taking on these 
additional responsibilities, thereby adding to the already heavy workloads of 
other staff members working in his team. This was not a phenomenon restricted 
to in-country roles. As was raised in Chapter 5, when the Social Performance 
Manager, Matilda, the most senior staff member working on SPM, went on 
maternity leave for a year, her role was not covered. This decision had been 
motivated by the potential financial savings, and had had implications for work 
in this area, with Simon commenting that the team’s projects had stalled, and 
new initiatives had been delayed, in her absence. While the Director of 
Operations, Alex, commented that it was often difficult to recruit for specialist 
roles, in each of these cases, costs were a motivating factor, reflecting comments 
raised previously by a representative of one of Cloud Loan’s partner 
organisations, where he had described the Founder and CEO as being cheap, 
explaining that he “did not pay his people well”. This dynamic of assigning 
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additional responsibilities to teams and individuals, without a corresponding 
increase in capacity to enable the completion of required tasks, is also redolent 
of previously discussed observations in branch offices, where loan officers were 
asked to complete more tasks in their meetings with credit groups, while also 
seeking to increase the number of clients that they visited (Chapter 6). Here 
again, Roodman’s observations of the continual conflict between a microfinance 
organisation’s business interests, and their desire to achieve social impact, 
resonates (Roodman, 2012). 
As a service delivery organisation, time is both Cloud Loan’s most 
valuable asset, and greatest expense, and how it allocates this resource can be 
taken to be indicative of the organisation’s priorities. The Hotline is no 
exception, with the allocation of sufficient staff time to record incoming contacts, 
promote the service, and follow-up on issues raised being integral and essential 
to the initiative’s success. I argue that, across the organisation, insufficient staff 
time was allocated to the service, limiting its potential to support downward 
accountability. I further argue that this inadequate resourcing is symbolic of 
Cloud Loan’s relationships with their clients, and the enabling of client feedback 
and engagement not being a priority for the organisation. 
To understand the importance of staff time in making the Hotline work, 
it is helpful to look again at the initiative in practice. As outlined previously, 
there are two elements to the Hotline service, the reactive, and the proactive. 
The reactive describes incoming communications from clients, by phone or text. 
When such contacts are received, the responsible officer in the African Head 
Quarters records the details of the client’s questions or feedback on a large Excel 
spreadsheet. The below shows an extract of the 2014 document, showing details 
of contacts received in February, and the range of information recorded against 
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10:33 
AM 
LO is late for 
repayment 
meeting 
LO late or 
absent Urgent OM/HRM Yes Yes 03/02/2014 Yes 
      11/02/2014 
11:09 
AM 






waiting to sign 
another loan 
LO late or 
absent Urgent OM/HRM Yes Yes 11/02/2014 Yes 
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AM 
LO is late for loan 
agreement 
meeting 
LO late or 
absent Urgent CEO/RM Yes Yes 19/02/2014 Yes 
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waiting to sign 
another loan 
LO late or 
absent Urgent CEO/RM Yes Yes 24/02/2014 Yes 
      26/02/2014 
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AM 
LO is late for loan 
agreement 
meeting 
LO late or 
absent Urgent CEO/RM Yes Yes 26/02/2014 Yes 







delay Urgent CEO/RM Yes Yes 27/02/2014 Yes 
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92 Mistake in the original record 
93 Cloud Loan, February 2014 Hotline Records (Cloud Loan Source 8.6) 
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In my first conversation about the Hotline with Simon, he shared with me a 
document covering the first four months of 2014, from which the preceding 
extract is taken, and following my conversation with Elizabeth, she sent me the 
most recent working document, containing information on the first eight months 
of 2015. A gap of eight months existed between the information that Simon had 
previously shared, and the start of this report, but Elizabeth explained that she 
did not know where this missing information was held, and had not seen it 
herself. Furthermore, on the 2015 document, there was no record of any contacts 
having been received in July, the month prior to my conversation with 
Elizabeth. While it was not unusual for a low number of contacts to be received, 
for example in June there had been only one, this was the only month that was 
completely blank. I queried this with Elizabeth, who explained that the gap 
coincided with the period of time when the Finance department were requesting 
that responsibility for the service should be reallocated, and a decision had yet 
to be made about where its new home should be. During this time, it appeared, 
if contacts were made, they were not received, meaning that this line of 
communication was not open to clients, as a direct result of insufficient staff 
capacity being allocated to the service. These conversations also raised concerns 
in my mind about whether contacts could have been missed in previous 
transfers of responsibility, and when I raised these concerns, separately, with 
Elsie and Elizabeth, both responded that there was no way to know whether this 
could be the case. 
Promotion and Understanding 
The number of contacts recorded was also concerning for another reason. Cloud 
Loan reported that they ended 2015 with 25,89794 active clients in Malawi, yet 
in the 2014 and 2015 reports, no more than six contacts were recorded each 
month. As discussed previously, if feedback from clients received in the field is 
not being progressed through loan officers, then the Hotline represents the only 
dedicated channel through which perspectives of clients are captured, and can 
be heard, at the Head Office level. If such feedback is not forthcoming, then this 
                                               
94 Cloud Loan 2015 Annual Report, (Cloud Loan Source 8.2) 
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raises concerns about whether it is generating the intelligence required to 
combat claims of uninformed representation, or enabling the quality of dialogue 
required to promote Mansbridge’s prescribed strong, two-way communication. 
On seeing the extremely low numbers of calls received, I had immediate 
questions about how the initiative was promoted, and whether clients were 
aware of the service. Helpfully the Hotline spreadsheet provided some insight 
into this second question. As outlined previously, part of the proactive element 
of the Hotline is that every month, three clients from each branch were called by 
an officer from the African Head Quarters, and asked a set of questions. One of 
the questions asked in these spot-check calls was whether clients were aware of 
the Hotline. Simon explained that this was intended and recorded as a Yes or 
No question, but that he would interrogate either response, for example asking a 
positive respondent whether they were also aware of what the service was for, 
and how it could be accessed. Quarterly summaries of the proportion of clients in 
each branch who responded positively to this question are reported on the same 
spreadsheet as the incoming contacts. The data to which I had access covered 
five operating quarters across 2014 and 2015, and from the 88 entries, only five 
showed a 100% positive response, with 17 showing 0%, reflecting that on these 
occasions none of the clients polled in that branch were aware of the service.95 In 
three branches, 0% scores were recorded in at least two of the five quarters, and 
in one branch, in three. I asked both Simon and Elsie, on separate occasions, 
what happened when branches received such low scores, and both times 
received the same response: The Regional Manager would be asked to remind 
branch staff to share the phone number. Beyond such reminders, no action was 
taken, and no changes had been made, or were planned, to the way in which the 
service was promoted. 
This issue of client knowledge brings in the vital role that branch staff 
play in the Hotline. While it is designed as a two-way communication link 
between clients and the African Head Quarters, loan officers, as the members of 
staff with whom clients interact most regularly, and sometimes near exclusively, 
they play a vital role as intermediaries in the service. The technical component 
                                               
95 Cloud Loan, April 2014 Hotline Records (Cloud Loan Source 8.7) 
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of beneficiary feedback systems, which in this case is the creation of the phone 
line, can only ever be a partial element of rolling out and delivering the wider 
service. The number must be shared with clients, who in turn must be supported 
to understand the purpose of the initiative, when and how it should be used, and 
what to expect when issues are raised. It is a pervasive issue across societies 
that groups and individuals may not know the full range of rights and 
entitlements that they hold, limiting their ability to demand them, and 
challenge situations where they are denied. As Marini et al (2017) also observe, 
without building in a strong educational component to accompany the Hotline, 
its potential is already being limited. As such, the service must be considered as 
part of a wider process of ensuring that all clients understand their rights, and 
what actions and behaviours they can expect from Cloud Loan staff.  
The ever-expanding list of tasks that Loan Officers were expected to 
complete in their client meetings has been discussed at length throughout this 
thesis, as have the increasing pressures faced by branch staff to engage greater 
numbers of clients. While informing clients about the Hotline was considered by 
branch staff as yet another task on their already long lists, Simon observed that 
promoting the service, “shouldn’t be too much [for the Loan Officers], it is taking 
some work away from them and helping them”. This mismatch of perspectives 
echoes the observations made in Chapter 6, that branch staff felt that Cloud 
Loan’s Head Office did not understand or appreciate the demands of their roles. 
While other tasks were accompanied by a range of templates and tools, 
developed to guide the officer through the process of collecting PPI information, 
for example, or delivering a specific training module, no such materials were 
provided to support the dissemination of information about the Hotline. 
Furthermore, while other meeting tasks were accompanied by the completion of 
extensive forms and paperwork, used in part as a means for Head Office to 
ensure that the task had been undertaken as prescribed, no such checks were in 
place on activities related to the Hotline. This further supports my argument 




On my final visit to Malawi I travelled to Dedza to meet with another 
microfinance NGO operating in the country, Insure & Lend96. In an interview 
with the Insure & Lend Chief Executive, he raised that they also had a 
beneficiary feedback system which worked along very similar lines to the Cloud 
Loan Hotline. What was notable, however, was that the organisation had 
invested in physical tools to help field officers promote the service. While at 
Cloud Loan, Loan Officers are responsible for both coordinating loan 
applications and repayments, and delivering client training, Insure & Lend have 
split these responsibilities, with dedicated Training Officers meeting with 
groups outside of loan repayment meetings. Promoting the Insure & Lend 
feedback service is a responsibility of the training officers which, the Chief 
Executive described, meant that clients would not see it as a tool within the 
control of the Loan Officer, and so would be more likely to make use of the 
service to raise any concerns around fraudulent or exploitative behaviours. 
Cloud Loan’s Head of Internal Audit, Arthur, had raised with me previously 
that he would like to see a similar division of responsibilities within Cloud Loan, 
as this, he opined, would lessen the power and influence of individual officers, by 
ensuring that all clients were in regular contact with at least two 
representatives of the organisation. This strategy would additionally go some 
way towards addressing the concerns raised in Chapter 4, that loan officers’ 
skills in delivering training varied significantly, potentially impacting the 
experience of their various clients. When Arthur had taken this proposal to the 
senior management team, however, he reported that it had been rejected on the 
grounds of the additional costs that the change would incur. 
To support the training officers in their task of promoting the service, 
Insure & Lend had produced a set of wooden A-Boards, on which were detailed, 
in local dialects, the rights and responsibilities of clients, and information on 
                                               
96 The name of this organisation has been changed, with the pseudonym chosen to reflect 
that a distinctive element of this MFI’s programme was that all clients, as a condition of 
their borrowing, were required to purchase health insurance through a dedicated micro-
insurance provider, with whom the MFI partnered. As the CEO explained to me, this 
was a means of protecting the lender against defaults due to ill-health, and also to 




how to raise concerns if these rights were being breached. It was written into 
Insure & Lend’s operational policy that officers should take these Boards with 
them to client meetings, and construct them so that they were in view of 
attendees, with the intention being that even if the officer did not explicitly raise 
the service at every meeting, clients were constantly reminded of its existence. 
This approach was not, however, fool proof. In a later conversation with an 
Insure & Lend field officer she raised that as she and her colleagues were reliant 
on motorbikes to enable them to reach their most rural clients, it was sometimes 
not possible to carry with them more materials that were absolutely essential, 
meaning that the A-Boards were sometimes left behind. Similarly, she 
continued, like their counterparts in Cloud Loan, they were often working to 
demanding schedules. Unpacking and securing materials at the start of the 
meeting, she explained, and dismantling them before departure, was a time-
consuming activity, and one that was on occasion sacrificed in favour of other 
meeting tasks. Similarly, I observed in my time with Cloud Loan that levels of 
literacy among clients were often low, with many signing their loan agreement 
with a thumbprint rather than a signature. This would therefore limit the 
impact of a written promotional tool, such as Insure & Lend’s A-Boards, but the 
approach demonstrates a commitment to ensuring constant promotion of the 
feedback service beyond what was observed in Cloud Loan.   
The South African MFI, SEF, similarly created a physical product as a 
central means of disseminating information to clients about their newly 
established feedback service. Conveying similar information to Insure & Lend’s 
A-Boards, SEF produced small cards which detailed behaviours that field staff 
were prohibited from engaging in, such as the seizing of assets or handling of 
cash. Alongside this information were details on how clients could raise 
concerns, either with SEF’s Head Office, or the national regulator (Marini et al, 
2017). This approach builds on Insure & Lend’s initiative by developing a tool 
that helps field officers to share information about the feedback service, while 
also acknowledging the challenges officers faced when transporting materials. 
Returning to the previous account of the Hotline being insufficiently prioritised 
and resourced at Head Office level, it is also noteworthy that SEF established a 
dedicated post of Complaints Officer as a means of overcoming such challenges.  
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The Rights of Clients 
Central to Insure & Lend and SEF’s promotional tools and activities was an 
ambition to promote their feedback services in the context of ensuring that 
clients were aware of, and understood, their rights and responsibilities. On the 
subject of client rights and responsibilities, Cloud Loan’s website asserts that 
their ambitions of achieving social impact mean that protecting clients, and 
respecting their rights, is fundamental to all that the organisation does. 
Furthermore, the statement continues, all clients receive training to ensure that 
they understand their rights and responsibilities97. In practice, what I observed 
of this process was not as formal as this statement suggests. In the first 
Southern Region branch, I twice observed discussions around roles and 
responsibilities, while accompanying officers to meetings with newly formed 
groups, undertaking their pre-loan training. In this context, however, the focus 
was on the responsibilities that members of a client group had to each other, 
with time given to discussion around how contravention of the group’s own 
agreed rules and procedures should be addressed. In speaking to each of the 
respective loan officers about what they had covered in these discussions it was 
notable that neither had based their presentation on a formal document, as it 
was suggested by the website statement that they would, and also on neither 
occasion was the Hotline mentioned. Throughout my time with Cloud Loan, I 
was never able to obtain a copy of this rights and responsibilities document, and 
no such document is publicly available through the organisation’s website or 
wider literature, reflecting wider issues of transparency raised in this thesis. 
Furthermore, while, as described in Chapter 4, the client training curriculum 
was repeated for returning clients every loan cycle, I only ever saw these 
discussions of rights and responsibilities occur in the pre-loan training, 
delivered to groups only once, before they receive their first loans. In these 
sessions, clients are taking on board a significant amount of new information 
about the borrowing process, and it is not unreasonable to imagine that not all 
of this information will be immediately retained. Furthermore, questions are 
likely to emerge with experience: it is not until a client has some experience of 
                                               
97 Cloud Loan Website (Cloud Loan Source 8.8) 
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receiving and managing a loan that they can know the full range of issues and 
questions that may emerge, so to make these initial engagements the only fora 
for such conversations is reducing the reach and impact of work in this area. 
Overall, ensuring that clients had the understanding of their rights that 
necessarily underpins an initiative such as the Hotline did not emerge as a 
priority in the work of loan officers.  
Failing to highlight Fraud 
Building on the pivotal role played by loan officers in promoting the Hotline, I 
now return to another issue that has emerged throughout this study, that of 
fraud. As discussed previously, the potential for fraudulent activity and the 
exploitation of clients is one factor that makes accountability in microfinance of 
particular importance, and necessitates effective means of ensuring that such 
behaviours are reported and addressed. As was raised in Chapter 6, in my time 
with Cloud Loan issues and incidents of fraud were raised in formal and 
informal conversations with staff at all levels and locations of the organisation. 
It was to learn more about these issues that I had met with Arthur, the then 
recently appointed Head of Internal Audit. As has been recounted previously, 
before Arthur had joined Cloud Loan, the position had lain vacant for 18 
months, covering much of the period of this study, and it was only after he had 
been in the post for four months that our paths crossed, on my penultimate visit 
to the African Head Quarters. Given the absence of an internal audit function 
during this time, Arthur had undertaken to visit every branch office and conduct 
an initial audit, as a means of better understanding the issues that he would 
have to address in his new role. By the time we spoke, he had visited seven 
branches, and explained that “in only one were there no serious issues”. These 
issues, he continued, often fell in to one of two categories.  
The most common form of fraudulent activity that Arthur reported having 
uncovered was the creation of Ghost Clients. In these instances, the staff 
member would add the name or names of non-existent clients to loan 
applications, and ask a member of the group to collect this fictional client’s 
funds at the disbursement meeting, before later passing them on to the officer. 
In the majority of instances where such behaviour had been uncovered, the 
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officer would explain that they passed on all necessary loan payments to the 
group, and it was simply a means of accessing credit to manage their own 
household expenses. This corresponds with the comments made by loan officers 
in the first Southern Region branch, discussed in Chapter 6, that the salary paid 
by Cloud Loan was often too low for staff to cover their own costs, and that 
sometimes the proximity to funds was too tempting. In other cases, however, no 
such repayments had been made, with loan officers claiming that the client had 
absconded after receiving their loan. In these circumstances, the genuine clients 
would be encouraged to pay-back the loan of the fictional group member, in-line 
with Cloud Loan’s policy of joint and several liability for loans. Reflecting on 
cases of ‘Ghost Clients’, Arthur opined that the issue was largely one of a lack of 
oversight and control of loan officers, and the power and autonomy that they 
have in the field, stating that,  
“It is very easy for Loan Officers to create clients, adding to group 
loans with Ghost Clients. They can tell clients what they want…Loan 
Officers have so much power: selecting clients, disbursing, recording, 
and so on…They follow the systems, on the whole they are 
complying, but too much freedom means too much potential for 
malpractice”.  
The second area of problematic behaviour that Arthur reported was the 
tendency of certain officers to exert undue pressure on their clients to repay 
loans. Here, he explained, there was a fine line. In many instances, he believed, 
officers were too quick to file requests for loans to be forgiven. Following events 
such as the 2015 floods, for example, the African Head Quarters had received a 
slew requests from offices in affected regions, explaining that their clients would 
be unable to repay their loans. In the majority of cases, however, Arthur 
explained that not all clients in a particular area were affected the same way by 
such events, and he had more commonly recommended that repayment periods 
be extended, or that no action was required. In contrast to these behaviours, 
however, he continued that,  
“Some communities don’t understand why we are there and why we 
are giving them money! There is a lot of willingness though to take 
money, but fewer are willing to repay. That will always be our 
challenge…Some officers, though… they put undue pressure on 
clients to repay”.  
231 
 
He had, he explained, identified a small number of loan officers who were 
threatening to seize assets, or otherwise punish clients if they failed to make full 
and timely repayments on their loans. Such behaviour, he continued, could 
cause clients to completely disengage from microfinance, reflecting Mazer’s 2013 
discussion of microfinance clients in Ghana who, following experiences of 
fraudulent and exploitative activity, reverted to insecure and potentially 
harmful practices of borrowing from local moneylenders and keeping savings in 
their home. I asked Arthur what he thought was driving such behaviour, and his 
immediate answer was, “inexperience”. Expanding on this claim he continued 
that for many of the loan officers with whom he had met on his visits, this was 
their first time working in microfinance. As has been raised in previous 
chapters, it was not uncommon for field staff to be working with Cloud Loan for 
several months before receiving any formal training, and this, when it did come, 
was limited. Without a nuanced understanding of what the organisation was 
seeking to achieve, Arthur continued, it was not uncommon for officers to focus 
on the importance of achieving high repayment rates, leading in some cases to 
the aggressive behaviours that he had observed. Building on the discussion of 
performance management and internal reporting in Chapter 6, it is not difficult 
to see how field staff could form the impression that it was achievements in this 
realm that would determine their own professional success or failure. 
While, as Arthur had recounted, these issues were occurring in at least 
the majority of Cloud Loan’s offices, and having a direct effect on clients, it is 
notable that no mention of such behaviour had been raised through the Hotline. 
Comments on the behaviour of loan officers accounted for the majority of 
contacts received, but these overwhelmingly focused on issues around officers 
arriving late to meetings, or failing to process loan applications in a timely 
manner. This absence casts further doubt on the effectiveness of the Hotline as a 
means of encouraging full and open communication with clients, and also 
challenges the social performance management team’s ambitions for the service 
to act as a means of protecting clients from the types of behaviours that Arthur 
had uncovered. Understanding why clients affected by such behaviours had not 
used the Hotline to raise concerns would be a valuable area of further study, but 
is outside of the scope of this project. One potential reason, however, worthy of 
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further consideration, relates to clients not knowing about the service. While 
this may be due to loan officers having insufficient time or support to fully and 
effectively promote the service to their clients, it may also be the result of a more 
deliberate attempt on the part of Loan Officers. Those who engaged in 
fraudulent activities, such as those described by Arthur, have an obvious 
incentive to prevent clients from sharing information about their activities, and 
neglecting to inform them of the Hotline is an effective means of achieving this. 
Similarly, the proactive element of the Hotline relies on accurate phone 
numbers being recorded by the loan officers, for all of their clients. Here again, if 
an officer wished to deliberately prevent a particular client from being 
contacted, then not recording an accurate phone number would be an effective 
course of action. In conversations with Elsie, she had raised concerns about the 
issue of inaccurate and missing phone numbers as her main area of concern 
when it came to the Hotline, but did not indicate that any measures to address 
this concern were planned. 
What is it the Hotline for? 
As this chapter has so far discussed, while the Hotline was presented to me as a 
means of protecting clients, promoting communication, and furthering the 
organisation’s ambitions around social performance management, these 
ambitions were not being achieved. The service was not well understood or used 
by clients, incidents of harmful activity and fraud were not being reported, and 
issues that were raised were not being addressed. Furthermore, the service was 
under-resourced, and considered by staff in the African Head Quarters, as well 
as those in branches, to be less of a priority than other demands on their time. 
Despite such issues, however, the service was still operating, which raises the 
question, why? If the stated ambitions for the Hotline were not being achieved, 
but no attempts were being made to change the service, this suggests a degree of 
satisfaction in the status quo, which further implies that Cloud Loan held other 
ambitions for the initiative. In exploring these wider ambitions, two options 
emerged strongly, and in the following sections these will each be explored, with 
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reflections on whether the Hotline is more focused on these ends than those 
previously introduced. 
Watching staff rather than listening to clients 
Beyond the nefarious motivations for concealing the Hotline from clients, I 
argue here that loan officers were often more widely disinclined to promote the 
service due to perceptions around the true intentions of the initiative. As Long 
(2001) emphasised, actors within organisations are not automatons who will 
unquestioningly replicate prescribed policies and procedures. Instead, they will 
interpret and respond to initiatives according to their own perspectives, 
experience and context. In one of my early Cloud Loan branch office visits, I 
asked a long-serving loan officer for his thoughts on the Hotline. He quickly 
responded that it was a tool by which Head Office could monitor and check-up 
on staff. Such perceptions arose frequently in my conversations with branch 
staff about the service, and the logic of the case was clear. In Chapter 6, I 
described the KPIs against which the performance of branch staff was 
monitored and publicly recorded, and the resentment that such processes had 
engendered. The Hotline, officers perceived, was another way in which their 
work was being observed and critiqued. Furthermore, when issues were raised 
through the Hotline, officers reported that they would not be given the details of 
complaint, nor would not have the opportunity to explain the background of the 
issue, or counter any accusation, thereby removing the potential of the service to 
create space for dialogue and improvement, and reducing it to a tool of audit. 
This is particularly significant in the context of frequently raised issues, such as 
loan officers arriving late to meetings, as while the blame was being apportioned 
to the loan officers, they widely felt that their actions were due to decisions 
outwith their control. As two loan officers expressed,  
“They [Head Office] don’t understand. They get complaints, they 
think, ‘Oh it is those staff, they are not doing their job’, but it is 
difficult…They [clients] complain, they [Head Office] tell us to be 
better, but what can we do?!”  
“The Regional Manager might come and tell us again to make sure 
that we are on time, that it is important to be…that we are on time. 
But…yes…but we try! We always try!”  
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The perception that Head Office encouraged the promotion of the service 
as a means of more closely monitoring staff behaviour was given additional 
credibility in a conversation about the Hotline with Elsie, the Head of HR and 
Administration. We came on to the subject from a discussion of a recently 
identified case of fraudulent activity in the Balaka branch, where one of the loan 
officers had, in her words, “absconded with client funds”.  She continued that the 
difficulty in recruiting a new Head of Internal Audit, and the long gap between 
the previous post holder’s departure, and Arthur taking up the role, meant that 
behaviours in branch offices were not being as rigorously monitored as she 
would have liked: “If people know they are being checked, they have some fear”, 
she commented, continuing that, particularly in the absence of an Internal 
Audit function, the Hotline provided,  
“a valuable tool to check on activities. It is useful for us here to know 
more about what is really going on out there”. “A recurring issue” she 
reflected “is that Loan Officers are late, or just did not turn 
up…Some have a very casual approach to work”.  
As Elsie continued to voice her frustration about the challenges of managing 
staff who so frequently worked without physical oversight, Elsie opined that 
managers in branch offices would benefit from Performance Management 
training. Echoing Arthur’s comments regarding the harmful effects of loan 
officers working without having received sufficient training, Elsie also described 
that branch managers were on occasion overly myopic in their perception of the 
responsibilities that were part of the Branch Manager role, giving greater focus 
to business targets, and neglecting responsibilities around overseeing and 
supporting their staff. This articulation of priorities came as a surprise to me, as 
branch managers had been clear, on my visits, that they were judged most 
closely on their achievement of business targets, such as client numbers and the 
size of the loan book, as it was these that were reinforced by the organisation’s 
KPIs. This raises once again my observations around poor internal 
communication within Cloud Loan. 
Ensuring that loan officers are trustworthy and conscientious is a means 
of protecting clients, and as such, ensuring that field staff were delivering a fair 
and satisfactory service to clients is a logical extension of the social performance 
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management ambitions for the service. It seemed, however, that this component 
of the service had become disproportionately significant in the way that the 
Hotline was managed and perceived. In Chapter 6 I raised that relationships 
between Head Office and branch staff were often fraught, with loan officers 
reflecting that central staff did not understand the complex and challenging 
realities of frontline work while. Furthermore, as Elsie had done, staff in Head 
Office were often quick to assign responsibility for failures to the skills and work 
ethic of colleagues in the field. The Hotline had been launched without visible 
consideration of these tensions, and as such has become part of the issue itself. 
Branch staff who feel that they are overly monitored and scrutinised, choose not 
to promote what they see as a tool that enables further scrutiny and criticism. 
Regulation  
By the time the Hotline was launched in 2012, Cloud Loan had been operating 
in Malawi for ten years, having made its first loan in Malawi in 2002. On 
learning about the service therefore, I wondered why the decision to pursue such 
an initiative had been made at this point in the organisation’s history. As 
discussed previously, the creation of the Hotline was presented to me, by various 
senior staff members within Cloud Loan, as being part of the organisation’s 
programme of work to develop their social performance management. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, Cloud Loan’s Social Performance Management team was 
established in 2009, following the report of an external evaluator, commissioned 
to research whether the organisation’s values and ambitions around social 
impact were being reflected in their work. The report identified that there was 
some discrepancy between the organisation’s stated aims and their activities, 
with SPM initiatives, such as the roll-out of the Progress out of Poverty Index, 
being devised as means by which this gap could be closed. 
At the time of the report, Cloud Loan’s CEO and Founder wrote of his 
concerns that the expanding geography of the organisation’s operations meant 
that direct oversight was no longer possible, and it was this concern that 
inspired the commissioning of the research. This statement reflects the 
connection between SPM initiatives, ostensibly in place for the benefit of clients, 
and the aspirations of maintaining top down control through audit and 
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reporting, raised previously in this thesis. In this section, I similarly argue that 
Cloud Loan’s development and use of the Hotline, presented as a tool of 
downward accountability, can more compellingly be understood as a tool of 
upwards accountability: an artefact designed to appease and appeal to more 
powerful actors. 
In seeking to answer the question of why Cloud Loan chose to develop a 
beneficiary feedback mechanism at this time and this form, it was events 
outside of the organisation that offered an answer. Specifically, initiatives 
launched by the Government of Malawi and Reserve Bank of Malawi around the 
regulation of the country’s microfinance sector. In the introduction to Malawi’s 
microfinance sector, offered in Chapter 2, it was outlined that prior to the 
establishment of specific microfinance regulation, a range of protocols licensed 
and governed activities in the sector. As Kalanda (2006) identifies, the form of 
regulation was guided more by the nature of the organisation than the activities 
that they were undertaking, with NGOs and parastatals, for example, facing 
quite different requirements and limitations. Under this haphazard approach, 
no one entity had oversight across microfinance activity, and there was no 
engagement with the Reserve Bank of Malawi, who held responsibility for the 
regulation of banking and financial services more widely. The 2002 Microfinance 
Policy and Action Plan represented a major step towards greater coherence and 
oversight in and of the sector, and in 2010, the Microfinance Act came in to 
effect. Described as, “An Act to provide for the regulation and supervision of 
microfinance services and to make provision for matters connected therewith or 
incidental thereto” (GoM, 2010: 4), the document sets out a more even approach 
to regulation across the sector, and creates a supervisory role for the Reserve 
Bank. In a 2015 meeting with three representatives of the Reserve Bank, the 
most senior official emphasised that a desire to ensure that microfinance clients 
were protected was a key driver for this and subsequent developments, 
reflecting that, 
“The activity of 2010 was, in part, prompted by queries and 
complaints from the public about the behaviour of various MFIs, with 
reports that institutions were forcing people to take extreme 
measures to make their repayments. The problems were most 
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pronounced among programmes based around group liability, where 
there were reports of group members who were unable to pay their 
share having assets grabbed, being physically assaulted, being 
detained until they or family members could provide funds, or even, 
allegedly, being forced to surrender their children or wives in lieu of 
payment. There were also reports of clients being driven to suicide.” 
To support the achievement of ambitions set-out in the 2010 Act, a Directive was 
released in 2012, setting out more specific requirements for non-deposit taking 
microfinance institutions, the category of microfinance organisation into which 
Cloud Loan falls (GoM, 2012). Within Part 5 of this Directive, under the heading 
of Market Conduct, the below requirements are presented:  
“Complaints procedures 
17 (1) A Non-Deposit Taking Microfinance Institution shall have in 
place complaints handling procedures to guide clients in the event of 
complaints 
17 (2) A Non-Deposit Taking Microfinance Institution shall maintain 
a Complaints Register where the following details shall be recorded 
(a) date complaint is received; 
(b) nature of complaint; 
(c) steps taken to resolve complaint; and 
(d) date of resolution of a complaint 
17 (3) A Microfinance Institution shall report to the Registrar all 
complaints received on a quarterly basis” (GoM, 2012c: 190) 
Accompanying these instructions, the Fourth schedule of the Directive provides 
MFIs with the template, copied below, to be used when submitting these reports 




(GoM, 2012c: 211) 
On seeing the Directive template, I was immediately struck by the 
similarities between its content, and Cloud Loan’s Hotline records. As can be 
seen from the extract reproduced on Page 199, Cloud Loan’s own records follow 
a similar structure to the above, with the addition of certain details around the 
origin and processing of the contact, raising the possibility that Cloud Loan 
could have developed their tool as a means of enabling them to meet the 
reporting requirement. As previously described, Cloud Loan were, and continue 
to be, active participants in the development of microfinance policy in Malawi, 
making it highly conceivable that they would have had knowledge of the 
requirements of this Directive in 2011, when work on the Hotline initiative 
began. On my final visit to the African Head Quarters, I was able to confirm this 
suspicion, in a meeting with Albert. Albert was, by this time, the Acting Malawi 
CEO, but in his substantive role as Head of Finance, he had been responsible for 
coordinating reports required by the Reserve Bank. While neither this 
legislation nor the reporting requirement had never been raised by any 
members of Cloud Loan staff, in our conversations about the development and 
use of the service, when I asked about the relationship between this Directive 
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and the Hotline, Albert quickly responded that yes, Cloud Loan’s decision to 
develop the Hotline had been informed by this new requirement. 
This identification of a heretofore unknown stakeholder in the Hotline, 
the Reserve Bank, also offered an answer to another persistent question, namely 
what happened to the information that Cloud Loan captured. As the extract on 
Page 199 shows, when details of a received contact were logged, the officer 
selected a Complaint Category, which in turn automatically identified a staff 
member responsible for taking action on the issue. The officer responsible for 
managing the Hotline would then forward details of the contact to this 
nominated person, who would take on responsibility for investigating the issue, 
identifying and pursuing a solution, and responding to the client. As Mansbridge 
(2009) and others emphasised, through tools of downward accountability, 
agencies should seek to achieve effective, two-way communication with their 
clients and beneficiaries, making this final step of taking action on issues, and 
providing a comprehensive and appropriate response to the complainant, a vital 
part of the system.  
As the majority of issues raised through the Hotline related to the actions 
of loan officers, or to wider branch activities, this responsible person tended to 
be the relevant Regional Manager. None of these post-holders were based in the 
African Head Quarters. Instead, they worked from the larger branch offices in 
their regions, and spent a significant amount of their time travelling between 
the offices for which they were responsible. As I had experienced first-hand, this 
meant that they were often difficult people to get in contact with, particularly 
given the, previously described, extremely limited internet access in most 
branch offices. As such, it was surprising to me that, as was the case in the 
entries from February 2014, replicated in this chapter, The Hotline logs 
overwhelmingly showed issues having been resolved on the same day that the 
contact was received. From my experience with the organisation, for all these 
steps to have been accomplished within hours of receiving the call seemed 
extremely unlikely. This impression was confirmed in an informal conversation 
with a member of staff based in the African Head Quarters, who explained that 
often clients calling in would receive an apology from the officer who took their 
240 
 
call, and from there the matter would be considered closed. Periodically, they 
continued, a summary of relevant issues would be passed to Regional Managers, 
though this would tend to be general guidance, such as encouragement to 
remind loan officers of the importance of punctuality, rather than specific 
complaints. This account reflected the experiences of loan officers with whom I 
had spoken on this subject, who said that they had not been made aware of the 
details of complaints raised by specific groups, instead reporting that they had 
received general reprimands from regional managers for misdemeanours such 
as arriving late to meetings, or not sufficiently promoting the service.  
I had also been struck that the issues raised through the Hotline were 
not well shared or discussed internally. In my conversation with Elizabeth she 
reported that at the end of each month she would send the updated spreadsheet 
to the Malawi Senior Management Team, but that she did not think that it was 
discussed by the group, having not seen any related items appear on the 
agendas of the group’s meetings. Similarly, the information did not appear in 
the monthly KPIs or Performance Report which, as discussed in Chapter 6, 
formed the primary means of communication within Cloud Loan, on the 
organisation’s operations, challenges and achievements. In my conversation 
with Albert, he explained that a member of the finance team would take the 
required information from the spreadsheet, complete the prescribed report 
template, and submit this information along with the other required reports and 
disclosures, to the Reserve Bank. This became the end of the line for 
consideration of the Hotline data. There are, therefore, clear weaknesses in 
Cloud Loan’s systems for progressing and learning from issues raised through 
the Hotline, which is at odds with the social performance management 
ambitions of the service. Seeing the tool primarily as one of regulatory 
compliance, however, makes this situation more understandable. The Reserve 
Bank do not ask for details on what has changed as a result of complaints 
received, nor how satisfied clients are with the service, and as a result, Cloud 
Loan was similarly unconcerned with these matters. In developing the Hotline, 
therefore, I argue that contrary to the articulated ambition of hearing from and 
protecting clients, Cloud Loan’s primary motivation was to comply with the 
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demands of an influential patron, and to do the minimum required of them, 
thereby necessitating the minimum possible investment.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have explored ideas of downward accountability, and the means 
by which Cloud Loan sought to hold themselves accountable to their clients. In 
this discussion, I have argued the importance of these relationships, and this 
form of accountability, engaging with the work of Montanaro (2018) and Jordan 
& van Tuijl (2006) to argue that an actor being accountable to the communities 
in whose name they are working goes to the heart of their legitimacy to raise 
funds, deliver programmes, and speak on behalf of constituents. Furthermore, 
as Jacobs & Wilford (2010) and Featherstone (2013) also attest, I argue that 
meaningful engagement and communication with intended beneficiaries plays a 
major role in ensuring the efficacy and impact of an intervention. Having 
identified the vital importance of downward accountability, however, I went on 
to observe significant deficiencies and failings in the Hotline: the tool that Cloud 
Loan present as being the means by which they can hear and learn from their 
clients. These issues, I argue, centre around the disregard for the service 
internally, and more broadly, the disregard for the experience and perspectives 
of clients. 
 Such disinterest is first manifested in the persistent under-resourcing of 
the tool. As I observed in this chapter, responsibility for the Hotline was first 
given to the Social Performance Management team who, as I observed in 
previous chapters, were a small team, overwhelmed by the demands placed upon 
them. As this workload became untenable, responsibility for the service for 
passed around various other teams within the African Head Quarters, all of 
whom consistently prioritised their other tasks and responsibilities above work 
on the Hotline. Similarly, at the other end of the service, loan officers played a 
vital intermediary role in promoting the service to their clients. This 
requirement, however, came as an additional duty on an already long list of 
tasks required of loan officers, at the same time as they were facing calls to 
reach greater numbers of clients, necessitating their spending less time with 
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their existing groups. Neither of the process therefore, the promotion of the tool 
and the processing of contacts received, were not identified by Cloud Loan as 
priority areas worthy of investment, establishing my argument that capturing 
the voices of clients was not a priority for the organisation. 
 This disregard was also observed in the organisation’s response to 
matters raised through the Hotline. Eyben & Guijt observe that, “accountability 
pressures can stimulate deep organizational discussions on core values and 
what success looks like” (Eyben & Guijt, 2015: 12), raising that both the process 
of engaging with stakeholders, and the intelligence gained from these 
interactions, can promote learning and improvement across the organisation. As 
I described in this chapter, however, the response to issues raised by clients 
rarely went beyond the issuing of a cursory apology to the client, and a 
reprimand to the staff member. Despite complaints, such as reports of loan 
officers arriving late to meetings, being repeatedly raised, no consideration was 
given to whether there were substantive issues in branch procedures that 
should be addressed. As such, systems and procedures that were unsatisfactory 
to clients remained unchanged, leading inevitably to their being repeated. In 
this way, the tool was furthering the sense of animosity felt by branch staff, 
who, as I observed in Chapter 6, often felt that they were unfairly held 
accountable for events beyond their control. Similarly, Mansbridge (2009) 
emphasises that an essential component of downward accountability is the 
enabling of two-way communication. Cloud Loan’s failure to meaningfully 
respond to clients raises that the Hotline does not meet the standards required 
of effective systems of downward accountability. 
Blowfield & Dolan propose that there is a fundamental incompatibility 
between certain initiatives of Bottom Billion Capitalism, such as microfinance, 
and accountability to intended beneficiaries, stating that, “the views of the poor 
are not prioritised, and where they are sought it is through a process of 
technical rendering by experts with their own epistemologies” (Blowfield & 
Dolan, 2014: 34). As described in this chapter, I similarly argue that the views of 
clients and their communities are not prioritised. Furthermore, I raise that in 
the Hotline, Cloud Loan have sought to promote communication between 
243 
 
themselves and their clients through the anonymous technology of the Hotline, 
which disregards wider relationships and interactions. While inadequate 
funding and internal disregard of the Hotline play a major role in the observed 
failings, I argue too that the form of the service also hinders its effectiveness.  
As I observed in this chapter, a fundamental failing of the Hotline, as a 
tool for accountability, is that it is neither well known nor well used. The 
number of contacts received through the service represented only a tiny 
proportion of the organisation’s clients, and significant issues and questions 
were not being captured. Reflecting on the low uptake of the Hotline service, 
Arther, Cloud Loan’s Head of Internal Audit, described that, “The clients have a 
relationship with their Loan Officer, that is how they connect to the 
organisation…a phone call to or from a stranger will not challenge that 
relationship”. This is a reflection which captures the folly of considering the 
existence of a service such as the Hotline as sufficient for enabling downward 
accountability. Blagescu et al (2005) also describe that  
“Complaint and response mechanisms are a means of last resort for 
stakeholders to hold the organisation to account and for 
organisations to become aware of an issue that requires a response 
(Blagescu et al, 2005:3). 
Within Cloud Loan, however, I have observed in this and previous chapters that 
internal communication issues mean that information, questions, and feedback 
did not flow effectively around the organisation, making the Hotline not the 
‘means of last resort’ by which clients can ensure that their voice is heard at 
Head Office, but the only means. In my attendance at meetings between various 
loan officers and their clients, however, I saw that a range of issues were raised 
in conversation, far broader than those raised through the Hotline. As Arthur 
also intimated, this reflects not that clients did not have questions or concerns, 
but rather that they would prefer to raise these with a person that they know, 
than through an anonymous phone line. I argue that efforts to improve 
relationships and lines of communication between various actors and locations, 
specifically ensuring that loan officers’ experiences and reflections from their 
time with clients were heard and respected, would have offered a more 
meaningful investment in downward accountability than the technocratic 
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imposition of the Hotline. While the service can provide a valuable 
accompaniment to these wider channels of communication, providing, for 
example, a means by which clients can circumnavigate their loan officer, if they 
wish to raise a concern about that individual, it should not be seen as a 
substitute. 
In this chapter I have also shown that, consistent with Blowfield & Dolan’s 
observations, the Hotline was an initiative led by ‘experts’. Cloud Loan 
developed the service not with the interests of their clients, nor even their own 
organisation, foremost in mind, but the preferences of the Reserve Bank of 
Malawi. This tendency to adopt a specific tool as a means of appealing to more 
powerful actors is one that I have observed throughout this thesis. In Chapter 5, 
for example, I argued that the organisation’s adoption of the PPI tool was more 
effective as a means of signalling the organisation’s assumed identity as an 
organisation interested in social impact, than it was a means of measuring and 
understanding impact on poverty. I have argued in this chapter that, despite the 
failings of the Hotline in practice, it was similarly adopted, and continues to 
operate, as a means of signalling the organisation’s brand to donors and 
supporters, and to comply with the requirements of the Reserve Bank. Seen 
from this perspective, the Hotline is no longer a tool of downward accountability, 
but rather an investment in upwards accountability and relationships. As 
previously described, however, these two sets of relationships are no un-
connected. If patrons are not compelled to support an agency’s work, then the 
likely consequence is that services will be withdrawn or reduced. Uphoff (1996), 
for example, argues for the prioritisation of relationships with funders and 
regulators, raising that while there may be commendable moral arguments for 
promoting accountability to beneficiaries, without the support of the former 
group, the organisation cannot function. As he observes,  
 “There are structural and philosophical reasons why NGOs…should 
not be expected to function as agencies responsible to their clientele. 
In particular, the staff and trustees of such organizations have the 
burden of mobilizing and managing funds to keep their operations 
solvent” (Uphoff, 1996: 27). 
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Donors and regulators, keen to promote accountability and transparency 
among those whom they fund, frequently include the requirement to adopt or 
adhere to particular initiatives as part of their funding agreements. In the 2011 
PPAs, for example, DFID made it a requirement that all those in receipt of 
funding should publish reports of spending in line with the requirements of the 
International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI). While likely well intentioned, 
my observations of the Hotline in Cloud Loan illustrate the limitations of 
externally imposed initiatives, that are not integrated into the wider 
accountability efforts and operations of an organisation. Instead, I argue that a 
more collaborative approach between communities, and funding, authorising 








Chapter 9: Conclusion 
Introduction 
In the introductory chapters to this thesis, I argued that accountability has 
become a prominent theme in the conversation around how international 
development agencies can best achieve their goals in an effective and ethical 
manner, and how they should seek to engage with their stakeholders. Within 
this discourse, there is a growing consensus that what accountability looks like, 
and how it is achieved, vary significantly according to context: who the actors 
are, where they’re working, and the nature of the intervention being 
undertaken. Despite this consensus, a review of the existing literature revealed 
that there have been relatively few empirical studies of accountability in specific 
contexts. 
Within this limited pool, studies of accountability in microfinance are 
particularly under-represented, yet it is an area of work around which there is 
significant debate and controversy, much of which centres on concepts and ideas 
of accountability. There are those, such as Bateman (2010) and Roodman (2012), 
for example, who question whether microfinance programmes are achieving, or 
even can achieve, the ambitious results that advocates of the sector present for 
them. There are pervasive questions too around legitimacy, whether 
microfinance interventions reflect the will and preferences of those in whose 
name they are being undertaken, and whether participating communities are 
being adequately protected. 
In this thesis I have addressed the shortage of research in this area, 
making a contribution to understandings of both accountability and 
microfinance. By undertaking an in-depth, qualitative case study of a 
microfinance institution in Malawi, I have offered insight into how issues and 
concerns observed and discussed at the macro level are being created, 




Through the extended case study of one organisation, Cloud Loan, I 
asked: for what are microfinance organisations accountable, to whom, and how. 
In this chapter, I review and summarise my findings from these questions. In 
this discussion, I argue that Cloud Loan primarily sought to hold themselves 
accountable for maximising income and keeping costs low, prioritising this 
ambition above stated aspirations of social impact. I further argue that a lack of 
transparency cuts across the microfinance sector, and that rather than 
challenging this, artefacts of accountability are overwhelmingly performative, 
and are supporting this opacity. 
For what are Microfinance Organisations Accountable, and 
How? 
Accountability is frequently raised and promoted as a means of gaining insight 
into the actions and operations of individuals or organisations, and ensuring 
that they are doing what they say they are doing. As such, consideration of what 
Cloud Loan said they were doing, and how they held themselves accountable for 
these achievements, was essential in understanding how accountability was 
manifested and enacted in the organisation.  
Microfinance globally is an approach to international development for 
which ambitious claims have been made. The associated narrative of reducing 
poverty through a sustainable mechanism which empowers beneficiaries has 
proved compelling to a range of donors, governments and policy makers, and 
encouraged widespread support (Roodman, 2012). As I observed in the 
introductory chapters of this thesis, however, an issue of accountability emerges 
when one seeks to interrogate and evidence these claims, with concerns ranging 
from a lack of data through to more fundamental claims that microfinance can 
not only be ineffective, but also harmful (Bateman, 2010; Sinclair, 2012). 
Cloud Loan’s organisational identity was built around two core 
ambitions; to support the establishment and development of profit making 
enterprises, and to reduce poverty among clients and their communities. These, 
as I showed in Chapter 3, were typical ambitions of microfinance organisations 
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globally, and reflected the organisation’s conformity to the norms established by 
influential actors, such as the Grameen Bank. In this thesis, however, I 
observed a discrepancy between these presented ambitions, and the priorities 
held and enacted internally. 
Supporting Clients’ Businesses 
In Chapter 4, I interrogated the first of these ambitions, around supporting the 
establishment and development of micro and small, profit making enterprises. 
In this chapter I observed the centrality of this objective to the operational 
model and brand of Cloud Loan, raising that all of the organisation’s loans were 
issued as business loans, and that this feature was integral to the external 
messaging and promotional activities of the organisation, typified by the oft-
repeated claim that the organisation offered their clients, “Hope, not Handouts”. 
This was a component of Cloud Loan’s brand that had proved appealing and 
lucrative, as I also explored in Chapter 7’s discussion of online funding 
platforms. As one member of Cloud Loan’s fundraising team reflected, “People 
are really sympathetic to this concept of supporting women to build 
businesses…It’s an idea that they understand, it makes sense... People who are 
in business in the UK see the benefits of business overseas”.  
As I argued in this thesis, however, the centrality of such messaging 
owed more to the organisation’s ambitions of establishing an appealing brand, 
distinguishing themselves from other charities, and generating financial 
support, than it did to the actual work of the organisation, and the priorities of 
those within Cloud Loan. Significantly, I observed that the organisation did not 
have a sufficient understanding of the businesses, or business needs, of their 
clients, to meaningfully hold themselves accountable for achievement and 
impact in this area. When loans were granted, clients provided their loan officer 
with information on the industry in which they would be engaging, but this was 
rarely more detailed than a one-word answer, such as ‘fish’, ‘tomatoes’, or 
‘groceries’. No attempts were made to establish a baseline on the size or 
profitability of these enterprises, or to track changes that occurred during the 
course of the client’s engagement with Cloud Loan. Similarly, while all clients 
and branch staff were required to devote time to attending and delivering 
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business training, the organisation neither consulted with clients on what the 
content of this training should be, nor sought to monitor satisfaction or 
effectiveness. Instead, the organisation claimed that if clients were returning for 
loans and borrowing more, then this could be equated to business success. In so 
doing, the organisation was making the same assumptions and over-
simplifications of the link between interventions and impact that the likes of 
Cheston & Reed (1999) and Bateman & Chang (2009) caution against.  
Beyond this issue of deficiencies in monitoring and evaluation, I also 
observed a more substantive contradiction between the internal priorities and 
operations of Cloud Loan, and the external presentation of ambitions and work 
in this area. As I relayed in Chapter 4, Cloud Loan’s Director of Operations, the 
most senior member of Cloud Loan staff based in Africa, acknowledged that 
clients would often use their loans not to grow their businesses, but to fund 
everyday consumption, helping them to manage periods of financial stress and 
“balance their lives”. This, he continued, was just as valuable, if not more 
valuable, a use for these funds. This observation supports the findings of 
Bateman (2010) and Sinclair (2012), who estimate that 50-90% of microfinance 
loans are used to fund consumption spending, rather than entrepreneurial 
activities. Despite such observations, however, the focus of microfinance policy 
and activity in Malawi, as it is globally, is overwhelmingly focused on the 
rhetoric of releasing entrepreneurial potential through lending for business. 
This is in spite of extremely limited information being held on how microfinance 
clients in Malawi are actually using their loans, which would be a valuable area 
for future research.  
As I also explored in Chapter 4, Cloud Loan’s client training programme, 
presented as an integral means by which Cloud Loan was accountable for 
achievement in this area, represented a significant investment of time and 
resources for the organisation. This was particularly true for branch staff and 
clients, who respectively delivered and attended a training session at every 
repayment meeting, in addition to pre-loan training, and specialist training as 
part of Venture Loan initiatives. This investment in business training, however, 
sits at odds with the internally reflected understanding that clients would often 
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not be using their loan to build their business. From this observation, I argued 
that rather than being an investment in achieving articulated ambitions of 
business development, such spending can more persuasively be seen as a means 
of appealing to financial supporters, and of producing compliant clients, both of 
which indicate the prioritisation of financial sustainability and corporate 
efficiency, above this area of social impact. 
Poverty Reduction 
As I presented in this thesis, ambitions around the creation and development of 
clients’ businesses were an intermediate outcome for Cloud Loan, who 
positioned these achievements as an integral part of their theory of change, and 
how they would achieve their ultimate desired impact of reducing poverty. In 
Chapter 5, I explored the organisation’s stated ambitions around poverty 
reduction, and the means by which they held themselves, and were held, 
accountable for achievements in this area. In this discussion, I observed that in 
contrast to the previously discussed inconsistency between Cloud Loan’s 
external messaging around business development, and the internal 
prioritisation of this ambition, the commitment to poverty reduction was more 
consistently voiced throughout the organisation. Furthermore, while efforts 
were not made within Cloud Loan to monitor and evidence the impact of the 
organisation’s services and support on clients’ businesses, the organisation had 
adopted the Progress out of Poverty Index, or PPI, as a means of assessing the 
poverty level of their clients. Cloud Loan, as I described in Chapter 5, took great 
pride in being pioneers in the use of this tool in Malawi, and it was the 
organisation’s flagship accountability initiative. Frequently, I observed, their 
use of PPI was cited in funding applications, and communications to donors and 
supporters, as the means by which the impact of loans and services could be 
understand, and their effectiveness ensured.  As I argued, however, the claims 
made by Cloud Loan for PPI exceeded what the tool what capable of providing, 
and this issue was compounded by insufficient investment in the supporting 
technology and processes through which information was generated and shared. 
 Before examining Cloud Loan’s use of the PPI tool, I first considered the 
organisation’s use of microfinance as their chosen means of reducing poverty. In 
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Chapter 5, I reflected on the diversity of conceptualisations of poverty, across 
actors and contexts, highlighting that the specific understanding of poverty 
adopted would influence who the poor were considered to be, and how best their 
poverty could be reduced. As I discussed several times in this thesis, Cloud Loan 
had a limited understanding of their clients’ circumstances and preferences, 
leading me to conclude that the use of microfinance was based on ideological 
concerns, rather than analysis of the specific circumstances in which the 
organisation was working (Eyben, 2015). Furthermore, the limited internal 
assessment of what impact Cloud Loan’s services were having on their clients’ 
businesses demonstrated that the organisation’s theory of change similarly 
lacked rigour, particularly in light of the contested relationship between 
business-based interventions and the reduction of poverty, as raised by the likes 
of Maîtrot & Niño-Zarazúa (2017) and Blowfield & Dolan (2014). 
While the causal links, and the relationships between interventions and 
changes in the lives of their clients remained untested, Cloud Loan, as I raised, 
did seek to generate data on their social impact through the use of the Progress 
out of Poverty Index. The PPI tool involved the loan officers periodically 
interviewing their clients, and recording information about assets held by, and 
demographics of, their households. From these responses, scores were 
generated, which were used to estimate the likelihood that the respondent was 
living below set poverty lines. By undertaking such an assessment when clients 
first came to Cloud Loan, and repeating the process periodically over the course 
of their engagement with the organisation, I was told, changes in the 
circumstances of clients could be tracked.  
As I showed in Chapter 5, however, this methodology was flawed. The 
PPI tool was designed as a means of assessing poverty at the household level, 
but Cloud Loan, as I described, instead elected to aggregate information from 
individual clients to provide an average score for the group. This was a source of 
immense frustration for staff in the fundraising team, who raised that 
individual stories of change were more compelling to, and more often requested 
by, donors and supporters, but using PPI in this way meant that such individual 
results could not be gleaned from the PPI data. Furthermore, the membership of 
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credit groups would regularly change between loan cycles, as new clients joined, 
and others withdrew. This meant that when the changes in the PPI scores of 
groups were tracked over time, like for like comparisons were not being offered. 
As I described in this thesis, groups were self-forming, and shared collective 
responsibility for repaying their loans, so if one member did not pay their share 
in a loan cycle, the group could move to exclude them from future participation. 
An improvement in average PPI scores could therefore represent the withdrawal 
of the poorest members of the group, rather than real improvement for 
participating individuals. Such wider analysis was, however, not undertaken as 
part of Cloud Loan’s monitoring and evaluation work. 
I also observed in Chapter 5 that while information on Cloud Loan’s 
poverty outreach was regularly being generated, through the use of the PPI tool, 
it was not being well used. As I recounted, the adoption of the PPI tool was 
described to me, and in various Cloud Loan reports, as an initiative that would 
help the organisation to ensure that they were achieving their desired levels of 
outreach and impact. I observed, however, that since they started using the tool, 
their outreach had slightly worsened, with 53.5% of clients estimated to be 
living on under $1.25 a day, and 85.9% under $2.50 in 2010, falling to 49.8% and 
84.3% respectively by 2015. This, I argue, is because having a tool in place to 
measure poverty is not in and of itself sufficient to ensure that ambitions of 
poverty outreach and reduction are being achieved. Rather, intelligence must be 
acted upon, and used to inform strategy and operations. As I document in 
Chapter 5, however, these processes of learning and development were not 
occurring within Cloud Loan. Contributing to one the recurring arguments of 
this thesis, that accountability was performative, I also argued that to Cloud 
Loan, the information generated by the use of PPI was of secondary value to the 
prestige and acclaim that adopting the tool brought from donors and other 
actors in the microfinance community. The use of the PPI tool is less of a means 
of ensuring accountability to the organisation’s mission of reducing poverty, 




Maximising Income, and Minimising Costs 
In examining the means by which Cloud Loan sought to achieve and monitor 
their ambitions of supporting clients’ businesses and reducing poverty, I 
identified that, despite these being the objectives around which the organisation 
constructed and presented their identity and brand, they were, internally, 
subordinated by interests around maximising income, and minimising 
expenditure. It was for the achievement of these objectives that individuals and 
teams were held accountable, and the artefacts of accountability described in 
this thesis were, I argue, overwhelmingly orientated towards these ambitions. In 
the case of PPI or the Client Hotline, for example, these tools were selected and 
used as means of signalling certain values and commitments, and appealing to 
external actors, particularly funders. The organisation’s focus on business 
lending similarly contributed to the construction of Cloud Loan’s image and 
narrative. Understanding these tools and decisions in this way, I assert, makes 
sense of the under-investment in operations and supporting infrastructure, and 
ill-consideration of information generated: What was important, was that they 
enabled the organisation to tell a compelling story, even if that story did not 
reflect the full reality.  
 As well as seeking to appeal to funders and supporters, the second 
priority that I identified was promoting organisational efficiency, or more 
specifically, minimising costs. This ambition was behind many operational 
decisions that I observed in this thesis, such as the encouragement of loan 
officers to reach more clients by working with larger loan groups, and the 
decisions not to cover or fill key roles in the Social Performance Management 
team when they became vacant. In Chapters 5 and 6, I also observed that it was 
information pertaining to these matters of organisational efficiency, rather than 
social impact, which constituted the organisation’s Performance Report. It was 
to this report that senior managers in both the UK and Malawi most commonly 
alluded, when I asked about how they monitored the organisation’s performance 
and achievements, with the information it conveyed being particularly 
influential in strategic and operational decision making.  
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As I outlined in Chapter 3, it is right and proper that Cloud Loan, like 
any other NGO, should seek to ensure the financial viability of their 
organisation. However, as I also raised in this chapter, balancing these demands 
with an interest in achieving social impact is a complex and challenging task 
(Hartarska, 2005), and can create a conflict between the interests of the lender 
and those of their clients (Roodman, 2012). In my time with Cloud Loan, I 
observed such conflict, and I have documented in this thesis examples of where 
decisions were made in the interests of saving money, which were detrimental to 
the organisation’s social impact, and the experience of clients. As Bateman 
(2010) observes, such a focus on financial sustainability is common in the global 
microfinance sector, but, just as I observed here, he notes that often it can only 
be achieved at the expense of the ambitions that made microfinance appealing 
in the first place. In Cloud Loan, I observed that they were attempting to 
achieve the best of both worlds: they continued to present an attractive 
narrative to supporters, but internally were taking decisions which limited their 
ability to deliver on the commitments made. This too supports one of my 
findings in this research, that the microfinance sector is predicated upon such 
deception, and a lack of transparency. 
To Whom are Microfinance Organisations Accountable, and 
How? 
Building on my previous assertion that it was for attracting income and 
ensuring organisational efficiency that Cloud Loan was primarily accountable, I 
similarly argue that it was towards funders and managers that accountability 
efforts were focused. I conversely argue that the organisation did not have, or 
prioritise gaining, an understanding of their clients’ needs, preferences, or 
experience. Furthermore, I argue that internal accountability is essential, 
underpinning as it does wider forms of external accountability, and the 
effectiveness of interventions. Despite its importance, however, I raise that it is 
commonly overlooked, both in practice, and in research. 
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In Chapter 3 I presented that while definitions and understandings of 
accountability vary, what unites them is that they are fundamentally concerned 
with relationships, and the giving of account from one actor to another. I also, in 
this chapter, introduced the three groupings of relationships around which I 
structured my analysis, and the presentation of findings in this thesis: Internal 
Accountability, within the organisation; Upwards Accountability, to donors and 
regulators; and Downward Accountability, to beneficiaries and communities. In 
this section, I review my findings and arguments under these same three 
headings. 
Internal Accountability 
Accountability, as I described in Chapter 3, is commonly conceptualised in terms 
of interactions and exchange between organisations or groups. As Mosse (2011) 
raises, however, the internal dynamics of an organisation can be as complex and 
nuanced as these external relationships. Eyben (2006), in her work on 
relationships in aid, similarly comments on the importance and influence of both 
external and internal relationships on the effectiveness and experience of 
development interventions. Having studied the internal workings of my case 
study organisation, this research supports these assertions. As I review here, I 
argue that the sharing of information between teams and locations is essential 
for an organisation to operate effectively and efficiently, and underpins wider 
forms of external accountability. Despite the importance of internal 
relationships and communications, however, I observed consistent under-
investment in, and disregard for internal accountability. 
In Chapter 6, I explored internal relationships and accountability within 
Cloud Loan. I raised in Chapter 3 that accountability is a concept often 
associated with one actor seeking to control the actions of another, and while 
this trend is commonly discussed in reference to external relationships, for 
example donors seeking to enact their preferences through those whom they 
fund, I observed the same dynamics in the internal relationships within my case 
study organisation. Cloud Loan, I described, is an international organisation, 
operating across 16 locations in Malawi, with a Head Office in the UK. While 
the organisation has grown, senior managers, particularly Cloud Loan’s CEO 
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and Founder, have proved unwilling to cede control over the minutiae of 
operations in these remote locations.  As a means of maintaining this control, a 
set of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) were developed, which enabled Head 
Office to signal their priorities and expectations, and branch offices to confirm 
their diligence and adherence. In reporting against these KPIs, and undertaking 
other tasks required of them, such as PPI interviews, significant volumes of 
information were being generated by staff in these branch offices, and conveyed 
to managers in the African Head Quarters and London office. Despite this near 
constant communication, however, staff in these branch offices commonly 
reflected that there was no space for their feedback and concerns on 
programmes and operations to be voiced: there was no dialogue or reciprocity, 
instead, the engagement between locations and functions was restricted to what 
was prioritised and demanded by senior management, often with little 
explanation or training on why it was being requested, and the means by which 
it should be produced.  
 As I observed in this thesis, these issues of poor internal communication, 
and the animosity fuelled by branch officers’ frustration at not being heard, had 
serious implications for the impact and efficiency of Cloud Loan’s operations. In 
Chapter 6, for example, I described the frustration of one branch manager at not 
being able to access the support that he needed from colleagues in the African 
Head Quarters, and the delays in wider processes and activities that such 
disregard for his request had created. I similarly noted that agreements had 
frequently been made with donors, by UK fundraising staff, without 
consultation with, or feedback from, those staff who would be responsible for 
delivering the agreed initiatives. As the Director of Operations explained to me, 
this practice often resulted in the organisation pursuing projects which were 
time consuming and inappropriate.  
In Chapter 6, I also argued that internal relationships, and 
communication between different teams and locations within Cloud Loan, 
played an essential role in supporting and enabling the organisation’s external 
accountability. In this chapter, for example, I observed that delays in, and 
changes to, arrangements in the centrally managed Farming Loans project, 
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were not being communicated to branch staff in a full and timely manner. Loan 
Officers were consequently unable to share such information with their clients, 
undermining the organisation’s downward accountability. This was a dynamic 
that I raised repeatedly in this thesis, for example in Chapter 5, where I 
reflected that as branch staff did not have a full understanding of the PPI tool, 
they in turn were unable to explain it to the clients from whom they were 
collecting information, and gain their informed consent.  
These communication issues similarly hindered the organisation’s 
upwards accountability. Staff in London, for example, who held responsibility 
for engaging with and reporting to donors were, I explained, reliant on internal 
communications and knowledge management systems to obtain the information 
that they needed. In Chapter 5, I raised that issues with the Cloud Loan 
Management Information System had meant that these UK staff had found 
themselves unable to provide donors with promised information. While, as I 
explore more fully in my later discussion on transparency, I observed that Cloud 
Loan would share certain external communications which were wilfully 
misleading, I also in Chapter 5 observed that on occasion inaccurate information 
was shared because staff and volunteers simply did not have access to current 
reliable operational information.  
I argue, therefore, that consideration of internal relationships and 
communication is essential for those who wish to understand and promote 
accountability, and urge that, as Hilhorst (2003) also raises, researchers and 
practitioners must look beyond the formal artefacts of accountability, to consider 
everyday interactions and relations. 
Downward Accountability 
As the Humanitarian Accountability Partnership (HAP, 2010) articulate, a 
growing movement in the international development sector has called for those 
who are most affected by development interventions to have a right to 
accountability from those actors working in their name. In Chapter 8 I explored 
Cloud Loan’s downward accountability, or the organisation’s relationships with, 
and accountability to, their clients. In this chapter, I engaged with the work of 
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Bhatnagar & Williams (1992), and Mansbridge (2009), in raising the vital 
importance of development agencies creating processes and space which enable 
meaningful, two-way engagement with the beneficiaries in whose name they are 
working. While nationally, Malawi’s microfinance regulator has mandated that 
such mechanisms be put in place, by observing and interrogating Cloud Loan’s 
approach to this task, I argue that the voice and preferences of clients are not 
being heard. Building on the work of Featherstone (2013) and Montanaro (2018), 
I argue that this disregard has limited the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
organisation, and also raised questions about the legitimacy of the sector’s 
endeavours. 
In Chapter 2, I raised that 40% of Cloud Loan’s annual income came from 
the interest paid by borrowers on their loans. This made the organisation’s own 
clients their single most significant source of income. I also observed that in the 
theory of change of microfinance, clients have a vital and active role to play: for 
ambitions of social impact to be achieved, I described, clients must take action to 
convert their loan into desired outcomes. Despite this pivotal role, however, I 
noted in this thesis that Cloud Loan neither sought to tailor, nor, as I described 
earlier in this chapter, test the effectiveness of their support to clients. In 
Chapter 4, for example, I raised that clients would receive the same training, 
regardless of their experience and needs. Loan repayment periods, I noted, were 
similarly fixed, and it was Cloud Loan staff who would determine which loan 
product a client would receive. In Chapter 8 I described having witnessed first-
hand the dissatisfaction that some clients felt with the terms of their loans. 
Various groups and individuals, I heard, wanted to repay their loans more 
quickly, to change the frequency of repayments, or to abandon the required 
savings contributions. Despite such feedback being vociferously voiced to loan 
officers, however, no such accommodations were made or even considered.   
In my own conversations with clients, I often asked groups and 
individuals why they had joined a credit group and why they had taken a loan. 
It was notable that the responses I received very rarely mentioned 
entrepreneurial ambitions. Instead, concerns such as being unable to afford 
school fees or health care were significantly more prevalent, with micro-loans 
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being the support available to them to pursue their true ambitions. This raises 
the question of whether the form of intervention that Cloud Loan had designed – 
micro loans for business creation and expansion – was the most effective way of 
helping their clients. In Chapter 5 I discussed diverse manifestations and 
definitions of poverty that exist, and throughout this thesis, I have described 
that such nuance was not considered by Cloud Loan. Instead, Cloud Loan has 
pursued an approach common across the global microfinance sector of framing 
poverty as a problem of market failure or exclusion, the solution to which is 
therefore market engagement (Roy 2010; 2012). This blanket conceptualisation, 
and the assumptions contained within, left no room for services and support to 
respond to the specific needs and preferences of individual clients. Instead, as I 
argue throughout this thesis, the services were shaped to appeal to upwards 
stakeholders. As the likes of Sinclair (2012) observe, inappropriate interventions 
can have the effect of at best distracting funds from potentially more impactful 
initiatives, and at worst, causing actual harm to recipients. This, I argue, 
provides a compelling argument for downward accountability, as it can help 
agencies to steward resources responsibility, and maximise benefits for intended 
beneficiaries (Featherstone, 2013). 
As I observed in this thesis, decisions around what the organisation’s 
offer to clients would be, were largely taken by staff geographically and 
operationally removed from the intended beneficiaries, and with limited access 
to information on the needs and desires of this group. In Chapter 8, I explored 
an accountability mechanism put in place by Cloud Loan, that could overcome 
these issues of distance, and offer clients a means by which they could make 
direct contact, and share their concerns, questions, and feedback with staff in 
head office: The Client Hotline. In examining the processes which supported this 
service, and the information that it had generated, however, I argued in Chapter 
8 that this potential was not being realised, and that rather than being a tool by 
which Cloud Loan could hold itself accountable to its clients, it was an 
investment in upwards relationships. 
The Hotline service, I outlined, had suffered from persistent 
underinvestment and internal disregard. In particular, it had originally been 
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the responsibility of the already over-stretched Social Performance Management 
Team, but following the promotion of a key member of this team to another 
office, it had been neglected almost entirely. Responsibility was then passed 
between various departments until eventually finding a home with another staff 
member, whose role had already grown beyond her capacity to devote sufficient 
time to this service. The result was that for periods of time, calls were not being 
received or recorded. Similarly, in branch offices, the loan officers played a vital 
role in sharing information about the Hotline with their clients, but as I 
described in Chapter 8, they too were not given sufficient time or resources to 
fulfil this task. Such issues, I propose, contributed to the extremely low uptake 
of the service by clients: while clients frequently had comments, questions or 
concerns about Cloud Loan services and staff, only a very small number were 
choosing to raise these through the Hotline service. 
Just as I observed in Chapter 5 that the information generated through 
PPI was not informing strategic or operational decision making, so too did I 
raise in Chapter 8 that issues raised through the Hotline were not being 
meaningfully addressed by the organisation. For example, despite frequent 
complaints around loan officers arriving late to meetings, no efforts to address 
the schedules and workloads of loan officers had been made. In fact, as I also 
observed in a previous section, in the interests of organisational efficiency, loan 
officers were being encouraged to increase the number of clients with whom they 
worked. This, as several loan officers told me, made it more likely that would be 
late more often. 
I argued too, in Chapter 8, that the primary motivation behind 
developing the Hotline was not a desire to enhance the organisation’s 
relationship with their clients and invite their insight and feedback on Cloud 
Loan’s work, but to appease Malawi’s microfinance regulator, the Reserve Bank 
of Malawi, and to provide another means of monitoring and controlling staff in 
the field. On the first issue, I introduced in Chapter 8 a Directive published by 
the Government of Malawi, which required non-deposit taking microfinance 
institutions, such as Cloud Loan, to adopt a mechanism for inviting, recording 
and reporting complaints received from clients. Positioning the Regulator as the 
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primary stakeholder in this initiative, rather than the clients, helps, I argue, to 
make sense of the weaknesses in the service that I had observed: Cloud Loan 
was not required to report to the regulator on matters such as how well known 
and understood the tool was among clients, or what actions were taken as a 
result of feedback, so these elements of the service were similarly not prioritised 
by the organisation. This observation once again reinforces my argument that 
accountability was focused on upwards constituents, and performative in 
nature.  
Upwards Accountability 
In considering the question of for what Cloud Loan were accountable, and 
through my examination of relationships and accountability within the 
organisation, and to clients, I have outlined my argument that Cloud Loan’s 
accountability efforts were overwhelmingly designed to meet the demands of, or 
appeal to, donors and regulators. In this thesis, however, I also argue that Cloud 
Loan’s concern with appealing to such powerful actors has led the organisation 
to provide inaccurate or incomplete reports and accounts of their ambitions and 
work, fuelling pervasive issues of a lack of transparency. I return to this issue of 
transparency in the next section of this chapter. 
In Chapter 7, I explored Cloud Loan’s work with online funding 
platforms. Through these websites, Cloud Loan, along with hundreds of other 
microfinance organisation around the world, shares stories of their work, in an 
effort to encourage individuals to give financial support. While offering the 
carefully constructed illusion of direct relationships and accountability, however, 
I argue that these platforms demonstrate the deception and lack of transparency 
upon which support for the sector is often predicated. From my examination of 
the content and production of accounts on these platforms, as well as how funds 
were managed and used by Cloud Loan, I argue that these sites represent what 
Dolan (2010) refers to as a paradox of visibility and concealment: Though 
detailed information is being disclosed, it does not offer the recipient genuine 
insight or understanding into the work of the reporting organisation. For Cloud 
Loan to be held accountable by upwards constituents, these actors must first 
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have an accurate and realistic account of the organisation’s work and 
achievements. 
Further Key Arguments 
In answering these research questions, I have offered insight into how 
accountability is manifested and enacted in the Malawian microfinance sector. 
From these observations, two further, overarching arguments emerged; 
A lack of transparency cuts across the microfinance sector 
Bateman (2010) comments that the global microfinance sector has developed a, 
“sophisticated public narrative [of] carefully crafted and deliberately maintained 
myths” [Bateman, 2010: 204] which serve to shield the reality of organisations’ 
actions and priorities from external audiences. I have similarly argued in this 
thesis that many of the relationships and exchanges, essential to the 
undertaking of microfinance activities, were predicated upon a lack of 
transparency: the accounts conveyed to donors, supporters, and other influential 
external actors were, I have shown, carefully constructed, highly selective, and 
on occasion false.  
 Building on Bateman’s work, I have shown in this thesis the extent to 
which maintaining this artifice occupied my case study organisation, where this 
objective was, I argue, prioritised above concerns over social impact. For 
example, as I have described, supporting the establishment and growth of profit 
making micro-enterprise is an ambition that has come to define contemporary 
microfinance, and so too was it core to Cloud Loan’s representation of 
themselves. In this research, however, I revealed that senior officials within 
Cloud Loan doubted the potential for micro-loans to make a substantial and 
sustainable impact in this area. Like Bateman (2010) and Sinclair (2012), who 
estimate that 50-90% of microfinance loans are used to fund consumption 
spending, one of the most senior officers in Cloud Loan reflected that loans were 
often used to smooth household finances, rather than for business investment, 
and that this was, for many, a more valuable use of the funds. Furthermore, 
Cloud Loan did not track, and could not evidence, the impact of their lending on 
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clients’ business activities. Despite such acknowledgements and disinterest 
internally, however, the organisation continued to devote time and resources to 
activities such as business training, and to advance the expected narrative. 
 The reason behind such deception was, I argued, due to a fear that a 
more honest narrative would prove less compelling, and may jeopardise current 
and future funding. As I reflected in this thesis, whether to market a 
constructed or selective representation of your organisation, in order to generate 
funds for less compelling, but none the less important, work that you do, is a 
dilemma faced by many charities and NGOs. While I challenge in this thesis 
whether microfinance was the most effective or appropriate intervention for the 
people with whom Cloud Loan worked, I do not dispute that these were groups 
who should be receiving support. An argument could therefore be made that the 
lack of transparency I observed can be forgiven on the basis that it enabled the 
generation of funds. I would however, challenge this argument on two grounds. 
The first is that, as I have documented, perpetuating the narrative has 
come to occupy and consume time and resources in all parts of the organisation 
with, as I have argued in this thesis, limited positive return for beneficiaries. If 
Cloud Loan, and the wider microfinance sector, were free to deviate from the 
accepted narrative that they were constructing and selling, resources could be 
released to trial different approaches, and pursue more effective interventions. 
My second concern is that this lack of transparency was not restricted to 
organisations’ presentations of themselves. Rather, I observed that it cut deeper 
and more widely across the Malawian microfinance sector, underpinning a 
culture of secrecy. As I raised in this thesis, I found that microfinance 
organisations in Malawi rarely made details of their operations public. 
Obtaining key information, such as the interest rates that various organisations 
charged, I found to be extremely difficult. Often, the concealment of such 
information was explained to me as being a means of protecting commercially 
sensitive information, and once again linked to a sense that such information 
may be off-putting to certain groups of supporters. A victim of this unwillingness 
to share information was the Government of Malawi who, as I described in 
Chapter 8, found themselves unable to complete their monitoring and evaluation 
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plans, due to information on operations and achievements not being released to 
them. As such, while the Government continues to support microfinance in the 
country, they struggle to fully understand the nature and impact of these 
activities. A further manifestation of this culture of secrecy was fraud. As I 
described in this thesis, this was an issue at all levels and locations of my case 
study organisation, and one that permeates the global microfinance sector. For 
this issue to be addressed requires all actors to speak out when it is 
encountered, but with such honesty being suppressed in other areas of 
operations, and the image of the organisation being paramount, it is easy to see 
how such problematic and harmful behaviour can remain hidden. 
In this thesis, I engaged with the work of Fox (2007), who contends that 
transparency is frequently offered as the lowest form of accountability, entailing 
as it does simply making information available and accessible, as opposed to 
more complicated work on supporting meaningful, reciprocal relationships. I, 
however, challenge this idea, and instead argue that transparency is an 
essential component of such deeper accountability. As O’Neill observed in her 
2002 Reith Lectures, the “basic and important obligation not to deceive” (O’Neill, 
2002c: 6) is paramount, and, I contest, efforts are required to improve and 
promote transparency in microfinance, before wider accountability can be 
addressed. 
Accountability in microfinance is performative 
Accountability, as I described, is widely associated with ambitions of enhancing 
trust, ensuring that actors are doing what they say they are doing, and 
protecting vulnerable communities. Where deception and failings, such as those 
I encountered in this research, are revealed, the common response is a call for 
greater accountability, and the imposition of various tools and processes to 
further this ambition (Dixon et al, 2006). Yet where accountability tools and 
mechanism are deployed, they can also legitimise and give new licence to the 
status quo. In this thesis, I presented that a variety of accountability 
mechanisms and processes have already been put in place by Cloud Loan. I 
described, for example, that they had established the Client Hotline, to promote 
engagement with clients, and adopted the PPI tool, to better understand and 
266 
 
evidence their poverty outreach and impact. Despite the presence of these 
artefacts, however, the lack of transparency that I previously raised, persisted. 
As I reviewed in this chapter, in exploring each of these initiatives, I challenged 
their effectiveness in achieving their stated purpose. Furthermore, I argued that 
the primary objective and contribution of such activities was performative: 
rather than challenging the deception and constructed narratives, I argue that 
they were contributing to them. 
Eyben (2013; 2006) cautions that by reducing accountability to the 
undertaking of specific, approved activities, agencies’ sense of responsibility to 
deliver these tasks can overtake their interest in the relationships and learning 
that they were intended to promote: being seen to be compliant becomes the 
ultimate goal, rather than enhancing and sharing trust and understanding. This 
was the tendency that I observed in my time with Cloud Loan. Work on PPI, for 
example, was much discussed, I argue, because it was important that the 
organisation was seen to care about their poverty outreach, not because it 
produced valuable information – as I outlined in Chapter 5, scant regard was 
paid to this information by decision makers and senior management. 
Organisations can, I argue, become increasingly good at seeming accountable, 
without any real change in relationships or actions having occurred. 
It was notable too that these initiatives were overwhelmingly put in place 
either at the specific request of powerful actors, or as a means of impressing 
them. These actors, I urge, must therefore act with caution when making 
explicit or implicit demands for accountability. Even if the intention of these 
powerful actors is to use their influence to promote accountability to other 
stakeholders, I have illustrated in this thesis how that wider ambition can be 
lost, and the demand reduced to an act of compliance, serving upwards 
accountability: as Eyben (2013) cautions, if results are demanded, then they will 
be produced, but whether they bear any relation to real change is a different 
matter. 
To conclude, I return to, and once again align myself with the work of 
Onoro O’Neill, and her reflection that,  
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"We need, I think, genuine rights, genuine accountability, genuine 
efforts to reduce deception, and genuine communication but we may 






Appendix 1: External Interviewees 
• Three representatives of the Reserve Bank of Malawi, who wished 
to remain anonymous 
• The Executive Director of the Malawi Microfinance Network, 
Duncan Phulusa 
• A trustee of the Scotland Malawi Business Group, and former UK 
High Commissioner to Malawi, George Finlayson 
• The National Coordinator of the Malawi Scotland Partnership, 
Happy Edward Makala 
• Three civil servants from the Government of Malawi’s Ministry of 
Finance, Economic Planning and Development:  
o The Chief Economist, and Scottish Government 
Sustainable Economic Development Strand Lead, Adwell 
Zembele;  
o Principle Economist, Golden Nyasulu, and  
o Desk Officer for Village Savings & Loans, and 
Microfinance, Peter Mwale 
• A Private Banking Officer from Standard Bank, Malawi, who 
wished to remain anonymous 
• Senior representatives from four other microfinance institutions, 
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